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H – 1144

International Court of Justice

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-5
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

FLAG OFFICER SUBMARINES
OPERATIONS DIVISION
B.Nr. MOST SECRET. SO. ONLY

Wilhelmshaven, 9.10.39

M-O-S-T S-E-C-R-E-T

To: Supreme Command of the Navy - Naval War Staff/ 1st Div.
No written reference.

Subject: Base in Norway
No previous reference in writing (pencil note)

I. SUPPOSITIONS:

a) A position outside the Shetlands - Norway Straits.
b) Freedom from ice.
c) Rail communications.

These suppositions apply only to Trondheim and Narvik.

II. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES:

1) Trondheim:

Advantages:

a) Position within the fiord which is unaffected by artillery action from the sea.
b) Deep water in the entry channels - difficult for the enemy to mine in their mining operations.
c) Existence of several entry and exit routes.
d) Protected areas directly in front of the harbour for exercises and entry.
e) Southern position; i.e. short lines of communications to Germany, better climatic conditions, shorter route to the Atlantic.
f) Basins which, according to the North Sea Handbook and instructions of the Navy office at Hamburg, are suitable for U-boats.
g) Several industrial installations which facilitate the construction of repair and supply installations.

Disadvantages:

Short distance from the bases of the British Air Force - danger of air attack.

2) Narvik:

Advantages:

a), b), c), d) the same conditions as Trondheim
e) Greater distance from British bases - less danger of air attack.

Disadvantages:

a) Northern position: long lines of communication to Germany, unfavourable climatic conditions, longer route to the Atlantic.
b) Communication by rail only with the Baltic - The Gulf of Bothnia not free from ice.

c) No basins, quay-installations only in the bay.

d) Very few industrial installations.

H1144 - 0002

Trondheim is therefore the more favourable place.

III. The following is therefore proposed:

1) Establishment of a base in Trondheim, including:

a) Possibility of supplying fuel, compressed air, oxygen, provisions.
b) Repair opportunities for overhaul work after a voyage.
c) Good opportunities for accommodating U/boat crews.
d) Flak protection, L.A. armament, patrol and M/S units.

2) That facilities for supplying fuel in Narvik as an alternative be arranged.

(Pencil note - largely undecipherable and apparently irrelevant)

Doenitz

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NUMBER C-5
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

14 November 1945

I, P.O. Betty D. RECHORDSON WRNS, 63370. , hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. C-5.

P.O. Betty RECHORDSON WRNS
63370

H1144-0003

H1144-0004

(SFC 24-3/C.23)

O.K.M.

I - 21 - 1

(Translation of an extract from an unnamed, unnumbered file containing notes year by year from 1927 - 1940 on the reconstruction of the German Navy).

Questions of Type, Shipbuilding Plan.

C O P Y

Copy No. 2.

Berlin, 18. 2. 1938

M

to

Head of Office /

. . . . . .

The true displacement of the battleship »Scharnhorst - Gneisenau« and »F/G« exceeds by 20 % in both cases the displacement reported to the British.

. . . . . .

	Length	Beam	Displacement by Type actual	notified	Draught actual/notified	
Scharnhorst	226.0	30.0	-31.300 ts	26.000 ts	8.55	7.50
»F«	241.0	36.0	-41.700 ts	35.000 ts	8.69	7.90
»HI«	254.0	41.0	-56.200 ts	46.850 ts	9.60	8.40
or »H II«	254.0	41.0	-56.200 ts	45.000 ts	9.60	8.15
or »HIII«	254.0	41.0	-56.200 ts	43.000 ts	9.60	7.85

. . . . . .

In the opinion of A IV it would under no circumstances be right to report a larger tonnage than that which for instance England, Russia or Japan will probably publish shortly, in order that we may not put upon ourselves the blame for a race in armaments.

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-23
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL
(Cont.)

(Translation of an extract from an unnamed, unnumbered file containing notes year by year from 1927 - 1940 on the reconstruction of the German Navy).

SEC 24 - 3/C.23

O.K.M.

Shipbuilding Plans. BZ 221 Vol. 5 S. 5

C O P Y

Copy No. 2.

Berlin, 8. 3. 1938

General Navy Office

BB 6207/38

to M (Chief of Staff

with request to bring to the attention of the C - in - C Navy).

Subject: Address by C in C Navy to Directors of Shipbuilding Yards.

. . . . . It is proposed to make a statement/ some what along the following lines;

"In a clear cut programme for the construction of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor has set the Navy the task the carrying out of the aims of his foreign policy . . . . "

H1144 - 0006

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-23
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL
(Cont.)

(Translation of an extract from an unnamed, unnumbered file containing notes year by year from 1927 - 1940 on the reconstruction of the German Navy.)

(SEC 24 - 3/C. 23)

R.W.M.

A 24 - 2 Planning Committee.

C O P Y

Copy No. 2

Carls
Admiral and C - in C Fleet

Tender "Hela" September 1938

Top Secret

Opinion on the "Draft Study of Naval Warfare against England".

A. There is full agreement with the main theme of the study.

1. If according to the Fuehrer's decision Germany is to acquire a position as a world power she needs not only sufficient colonial possessions but also secure naval communications and secure access to the ocean.

2. Both requirements can only be fulfilled in opposition to anglo - french interests and would limit their position as world powers. It is unlikely that they can be achieved by peaceful means. The decision to make Germany a world power therefore forces upon us the necessity of making the corresponding preparations for war.

3. War against England means at the same time war against the Empire, against France, probably against Russia as well and a large number of countries overseas, in fact against ½ to 2/3 of the whole world.

It can only be justified and have a chance of success if it is prepared economically as well as politically and militarily and waged with the aim of conquering for Germany an outlet to the ocean.

. . . . . .

H1144 - 0007

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-23
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL
(Cont.)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. C-23

12. November 1945

I, GERARD SCHAEFFER, 2nd Lt., 01332102, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document C-23.

GERARD SCHAEFFER
2nd Lt.
01332102

H1144-0008

(PARTIAL)
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. C-35
Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel

30 January 1941 Page 401(of diary)

7) Talk by Ia about the plans and preparations for the "BARBAROSSA" case to be submitted to the High Command of Armed Forces.

I) Objectives of war against Britain

a) Main purpose of the navy consists in continued actions against Britain. Possibility of intensifying U-boat war be necessary discontinuance of submarine training in the Baltic and thereby release of part of the training ships for combat duty.

b) Importance of securing of sea lanes on the West Coast of Norway by the temporarily suspended traffic in the Baltic. Since some battle-worthy security forces are not sufficient, additional combat-units from the Western theater of operation are indispensable.

II) Objectives of war against Russia.

Solution of the problem in spite of Russian superiority possibly by the sacrifice of a temporary discontinuance of our sea traffic(ore transports) in the Baltic.

a) Protection of our coast secured by presently existing or about-to-be reorganized coast artillery. Defense against enemy submarine attack by using units of submarines, pursuit ships and mine sweepers.

b) Prevention of escape of enemy combat vessels from the Baltic secured by the defense power of our coastal batteries, by creating new mined waters with suitable barrage and the existing big air threat.

Additional safety measures:

To get ready loaded minelayers for immediate tactical blockade and the installation of the "SCHLESIEN" and "SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN" ships as floating batteries.

Since it is not possible for the Navy to prevent the escape of smaller Russian combat vessels through the WEISSMEER canal, immediate commitment of air force is required to destroy locks of this canal.

c) To declare minelayed waters and to effect blockades to fortify present defensive powers and to discourage operations of Russian waterborn combat units against the Western Baltic at the start of war:

1) Danger zone "OLAND" between MEMEL and south end of "OLAND".

2) Danger zone "BORNHOLM" between KOLBERG-BORNHOLM and BORNHOLMYSTADT.

3) Danger zone at the south outlet of the Sund(renewed and enlarged)

4) Danger zone "GJEDSER ENGE"

5) Danger zone at the Western outlet of the Finnish Bay(offensive blockade)

Demands to the Swedish navy to blockade Swedish waters including the SOUTHKVARKEN-STREET(AALAND SEA)

D

H1144 - 0009

(PARTIAL)
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. C-35
Contd.

d)To harass the Russian fleet by surprise blows as:
1)Lightning-like commitments at the outbreak of the war of air force units against strong points and combatsvessels in the Baltic, Black Sea, and Ice Sea.
2) Actions with mines (e.g. with E-boats) against the Baltic strong points, attack of submarines against traffic center points, attack of camouflaged mine-layers from the cliffs. If opportunity arises, premature laying of delayed action mines.
3)To make use of the fighting power of the Finnish fleet is desirable. Important support of German objectives by a surprise laying of a blockade with Finnish ships inside the Gulf of Finland. (If the opportunity arises, material support is required).

e)Protection of the sea lanes in the Ice sea is possible, however, not so the elimination of the Russian main stronghold of POLARNOJE-MURMANSK. Here, a lightning-like attack of the air force is necessary(bombers and air mines)

f)In the Black sea, on account of Russian superiority, limitation to coastal defense and securing the Danube and its estuaries.

For early regulation of the Rumanian and Bulgarian objectives, timely appointment of liaison officers is asked. Besides support by furnishing mines and coastal guns, the transfer of river flotillas from the Netherlands to the lower Danube is intended.

Possibilities of preparing a minelayer for offensive purposes and air mine action are being examined.

g)In case Russia respects Swedish rights in her waters, German sea traffic in Swedish waters under convoy of Swedish war ships is aspired from North Sweden to the KATTEGAT.

h)Even after the elimination of the Russian Baltic Fleet, long lasting effects from the mine war, to be expected of Russia, are to be reckoned with. Since our minesweeper units are not at disposal, it is attempted to use also Finnish and Swedish combat vessels and to commit captured Russian booty ships, if the opportunity arises, with a Russian crew. The head of the naval war staff agrees with these proposals. They are submitted to the Armed Forces High Command per naval war staff I op 94/41. Top Military Secret, matter for Chief.

- -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. C-35.

13 Nov. 1945.

I, Ernst M. Cohn, PFC. 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. C-35.

Ernst M. Cohn
Pfc. 33925738.

H1144 - 0010

Exhibit USA 554
Filed Jan. 7, 1946

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-50
OFFICE OF US CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Naval War Staff

Berlin 17 June 1941

Reg. No. 1 SKL. Ia 00149/41 MOST SECRET S.O. Only

(illegible markings)

MOST SECRET
By hand of officer only

ORDER

1. Address to:-

Group North		Copy 1 - 2
Admiral Norway		Copy 3 - 4
Baltic Station		Copy 5 - 6
F.O. Cruisers		Copy 7 - 8
Liaison Staff Finland)	for	Copy 9 -10
Naval Command "C")	inform-	Copy 11 -12
Naval Command "D")	ation	Copy 13 -14

1. Enclosed is an Order by the Führer concerning the application of Martial law in the area "Barbarossa" and special military measures.

2. Make copies of the Führer Order of 13th May and attach 2 copies of each to the document mentioned in 1.

3. I Op.

Naval War Staff

Ii
after departure

iA Ia
initials

(illegible notations)

H1144-0011

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
WFSt/Section L (IV qu)
No. 44718/41 Most Secret S.O.

Führer's Hq. 14 May 1941

Most Secret

Only by Officer

(illegible markings)

23 Copies
7th Copy

Subject: Application of military jurisdiction and procedure in area "Barbarossa" and special military measures.

Enclosed is an order by the Führer concerning application of military jurisdiction and procedure in the area "Barbarossa" and special military measures. If possible further distribution will not be made until 1st June 1941.

The Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces

By order

(Signature) (Undecipherable)

(illegible notation)

DISTRIBUTION:

C-in-C of the Army (Ops-Abt)	1st copy
C-in-C of the Army (Gen Qu)	2nd-3rd copies
Supreme Command of the Army (Chief H. Rüst.u.Bd.E)	4th copy
C-in-C of the Air Force (Lw. Führungsstab)	5th copy
C-in-C of the Air Force (Gen Qu)	6th copy
C-in-C of the Navy (Naval War Staff)	7th copy
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces/WFSt	8th copy
Dept L - Chief	9th copy
Dept L - IH	10th copy
IL	11th copy
IK	12th copy
IV/Qu	13th copy
II	14th copy
Ktb	15th copy
WR	16th copy
Armed Forces Propaganda	17th copy
Foreign/Abw	18th copy
Abw III	19th copy
Reserve	20th-23rd copies

H1144-0012

The Führer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.

Fuhrer's Headquarters, 13 May 1941

(Pencil Note-)
One copy for Group South
sent 15.12.1941. V.W.

Order

Concerning the exercise of martial jurisdiction and procedure in the area "Barbarossa" and special military measures.

The application of martial law aims in the first place at maintaining discipline.

The fact that the operational areas in the East are so far-flung, the battle strategy which this necessitates, and the peculiar qualities of the enemy, confront the courts-martial with problems which, being short-staffed, they cannot solve while hostilities are in progress, and until some degree of pacification has been achieved in the conquered areas, unless jurisdiction is confined, in the first instance, to its main task.

This is possible only if the troops take ruthless action themselves against any threat from the enemy population.

For these reasons I herewith issue the following order effective for the area "Barbarossa" (Area of operations, army rear area, and area of political administration):

I. Treatment of offences committed by Enemy Civilians.

1. Until further notice the military courts and the courts martial will not be competent for crimes committed by enemy civilians.

2. Guerillas should be disposed of ruthlessly by the military, whether they are fighting or in flight.

3. Likewise all other attacks by enemy civilians on the Armed Forces, its members and employees, are to be suppressed at once by the military, using the most extreme methods, until the assailants are destroyed.

4. Where such measures have been neglected or were not at first possible; persons suspected of criminal action will be brought at once before an officer. This officer will decide whether they are to be shot.

On the orders of an officer with the powers of at least a Battalion Commander, collective despotic measures will be taken without delay against localities from which cunning or malicious attacks are made on the Armed Forces, if circumstances do not permit of a quick identification of individual offenders.

5. It is expressly forbidden to keep suspects in custody in order to hand them over to the courts after the reinstatement of civil courts.

6. The C-in-Cs of the Army Groups may by agreement with the competent Naval and Air Force Commanders reintroduce military jurisdiction for civilians, in areas which are sufficiently settled.

For the area of the "Political Administration" this order will be given by the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

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II. Treatment of offences committed against inhabitants by members of the Armed Forces and its employees.

1. With regard to offences committed against enemy civilians by members of the Wehrmacht and its employees prosecution is not obligatory even where the deed is at the same time a military crime or offence.

2. When judging such offences, it must be borne in mind, whatever the circumstances, that the collapse of Germany in 1918, the subsequent sufferings of the German people and the fight against National Socialism which cost the blood of innumerable supporters of the movement, were caused primarily by Bolshevik influence and that no German has forgotten this fact.

3. Therefore the judicial authority will decide in such cases whether a diciplinary penalty is indicated, or whether legal measures are necessary. In the case of offences against inhabitants it will order a court martial only if maintenance of discipline or security of the Forces call for such a measure. This applies for instance to serious offences originating in lack of self control in sexual matters, or in a criminal disposition, and to those which indicate that the troops are threatening to get out of hand. Offences which have resulted in senseless destruction of billets or stores of other captured material to the disadvantage of our Forces should as a rule be judged no less severely.

The order to institute proceedings requires in every single case the signature of the Judicial Authority.

4. Extreme caution is indicated in assessing the credibility of statements made by enemy civilians.

III. Within their sphere of competence Military Commanders are personally responsible for seeing that:-

1. Every commissioned officer of the units under their command is instructed promptly and in the most emphatic manner on principles set out under I above.

2. Their legal advisers are notified promptly of these instructions and of verbal information in which the political intentions of the High Command were explained to C-in-Cs.

3. Only those court sentences are confirmed which are in accordance with the political intentions of the High Command.

IV. Security

Once the camouflage is lifted this decree will be treated as "Most Secret".

By order

Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces

(signed) Keitel

Checked

Dressel (?)
Major d.G.

H1144 - 0014

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. C-50

16 November 1945.

I, ERNST M. COHN, Pfc, 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. C-50.

ERNST M. COHN,
Pfc, 33925738.

H1144 - 0015

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. C-63
OFFICE OF U.S.CHIEF OF COUNSEL

The Chief of the High Command of
the Armed Forces
No.22045/40 Top Secret WFA/Dept.L

Berlin
27 January 1940

5 copies
Copy No. 2

Top Military Secret
Chief Matter
Through Officer Only

(illegible notations)

Re : Study "N"
Ref: 22039/40 Top Secret WFA/Dept L (I) 23 Jan.1940

The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces desires that work on the Study "N" be continued under his personal and immediate influence and in closest collaboration with the conduct of the war as a whole. For these reasons the Fuehrer has ordered me to take charge of the further preparations.

Tor this purpose a working staff will be formed within the High Command of the Armed Forces; this staff will at the same time represent the nucleus of the future operations staff.

I request the High Commands of the Services to appoint each one officer suitable as Ia and, if possible, trained in questions of organization and supply. The Office for Intelligence Abroad (Ausl./Abw.) will furnish the Ic, and Armed Forces General Staff Dept. (WFA) will furnish the transport expert, 1 officer for signal communications and 1 officer for general questions of territorial administration.

The date when the staff will convene will be communicated later.

All further preparations will be conducted under the code-word "Weseruebung".

signed: Keitel

(Marginal note in handwriting: "M.K.A. is informed and takes over the appointment of the officer (probably Sea Captain Kamke Ia (initial illegible) 29/I)"

Distribution:

Supreme Commander of the Army	Copy No. 1
" " " " Navy	" No. 2
Reich Air Minister and Supreme Commander of the Air Force	" No. 3
Armed Forces General Staff Department	" No. 4
Department Air	" No. 5.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. C-63

15 November 1945

I. ERNST M. COHN, Pfc, 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. C-63.

ERNST M. COHN,
Pfc, 33925738.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. C-64
OFFICE OF US CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Meeting of Naval Staff with Fuehrer on 12.12.39 1200
(Keitel, Jodel, Puttkammer)

Norwegian Question

C. in C. Navy has received Quisling and Hajelin. Quisling creates the impression of being reliable and states that:-

As a result of the Russo*Finnish conflict, anti-German feeling in Norway is even stronger than hitherto. England's influence is very great - especially through Storthing-President Hambro (Jew, a friend of Hore-Belisha), all-powerful in Norway just now. Quisling is convinced that there is an agreement between England and Norway for the possible occupation of Norway. In which case Sweden would also stand against Germany. Danger of Norway's occupation by England is very great - possibly very shortly. From 11/1/40 onwards the Norwegian Parliament and therefore the Norwegian Government is unconstitutional as Parliament in defiance of the constitution, prolonged its term by a year. This would give an opportunity for a political re-shuffle. Quisling has good connections with officers of the Norwegian Army and has supporters in important positions, (e.g. Railways). In such an event Quisling is ready to take over the Government and to call upon Germany for help. He is also ready to discuss preparations of a military character with the German Armed Forces.

C. in C. Navy points out that with such offers one never knows how far the people concerned are wishing to further the ends of their own party or how much they have German interests at heart. Therefore caution is indicated --Norway must be prevented at all costs from falling into England's hands. That might have a decisive effect on the war; for Sweden would be completely under England's influence and it would bring the war into the Baltic, thus preventing completely the activities of the German Navy in the Ocean and the North Sea. The Fuehrer too said that a British occupation of Norway would be unbearable. C. in C. Navy pointed out that occupation by Germany of positions on the coast of Norway would naturally produce strong British countermeasures to stop the export of ore from Narvik, and that this would bring about surface warfare off the Norwegian coast, to which the German Navy was not equal for any length of time. This was one weak spot of the occupation.

The Fuehrer thought of speaking to Quisling personally so that he might form an impression of him. He wanted to see Rosenberg once more beforehand, as the latter has known Quisling for a long while. C. in C. Navy suggests that if the Fuehrer forms a favorable impression, the OKW should obtain permission to make plans with Quisling for the preparation and carrying out of the occupation,

a) by peaceful means, i. e., German forces summoned by Norway, or
b) to agree to do so by force Führer agrees (ink note)

2) C. in C. Navy advocates that a very clear policy in the Russo-Finnish conflict be maintained. No help to Finland by the supply of arms (which would mean passing through unreliable Sweden).

The C. in C. Armed Forces states that the Swedish Foreign Office has been informed that arms would only be sent to Sweden, on guarantee in writing by the government that they were only for the use of the Swedish Armed Forces.

H1144 - 0016

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. C-64
Cont'd

The C. in C. Navy on the other hand is in favor of concessions to Russia, for example, the supply of oil to U-boats, as Russia would also offer us practical help, (Vortsile), for example, the holding of foreign steamers in Murmansk until three days after the "Bremen" has sailed.

The Fuehrer has agreed to both points.

RAEDER

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. C-64

13 November 1945

I, BETTY D. RICHARDSON, P.O. 66370, W.R.N.S. hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No/ C-64.

BETTY D. RICHARDSON
P.O. 66370
W.R.N.S.

H1144 - 0017

H1144-0018

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-66
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

SEC 24-G/C-66

(Memorandum for Admiral Assmann for his own use; not for publication. With the signature "RAEDER" and date 10 January 1944).

1. S. O. Only

a) Barbarossa.

1) At this time the Fuehrer had made known his "unalterable decision" to conduct the Eastern campaign in spite of all remonstrances. After that, further warnings, if no new situations had arisen, were found to be completely useless. As Chief of Naval War Staff I was never convinced of the "Compelling necessity" for Barbarossa.

2) During the campaign in France and also during the beginning of preparation for Seelöwe* - while the Fuehrer still had hopes of gaining control of the air, (which he too recognized as being an essential pre-requisite of Seelöwe), it was doubtless his intention after France's fall to concentrate on the Navy and Air Force. The Fuehrer described the moving of troops to the Eastern front in August to me as a large scale camouflage measure for Seelöwe. (A statement from the Supreme Command of the Army would have to be obtained on this point).

The Fuehrer very early had the idea of one day settling accounts with Russia, doubtless his general ideological attitude played an essential part in this. In 1937-38 he once stated that he intended to eliminate the Russians as a Baltic power; they would then have to be diverted in the direction of the Persian Gulf. The advance of the Russians against Finland and the Baltic States in 1939-40 probably further strengthened him in this idea.

The fear that control of the air over the Channel in the autumn of 1940 could no longer be attained - a realization which the Fuehrer, no doubt, gained earlier than the Naval War Staff, who were not so fully informed of the true results of air raids on England (our own losses) - surely caused the Fuehrer, as far back as August and September, to consider whether - even prior to victory in the West - an Eastern campaign would be feasible with the object of first eliminating our last serious opponent on the Continent. The Fuehrer did not openly express this fear, however, until well into September.

The Fuehrer's remark of 21st July 1940 is an indication of reflections of this kind (Section 68) ("It is of course our duty to give careful consideration to the question of America and Russia!"); furthermore, comments such as Section 76, dated 12.8, dealing with the fortification of the North Norwegian fjords, and occasional statements regarding the meeting of Russia demands for the delivery of ships and heavy artillery, which show the Fuehrer's mistrust of the Russian attitude and his hope of evading certain comittments altogether.

* Invasion of England.

H1144-0019

Doubtless during September 1940 the possibility of an Eastern campaign was mentioned rather often by the Fuehrer, for I was worried lest the war should take a wrong turn (being diverted from the main danger "England"), and this caused me to have an interview with the Fuehrer, tete a tete, "even outside my own department" on 26th June 1940, concerning the significance of the Mediterranean and North Africa, after I had first made a thorough report on these questions, on September 6th, 1940. In this interview of 26 September 1940 my statement - "It is questionable whether an attack on Russia from the North is necessary", removed all doubt that there had been talk during the previous weeks of the Eastern operation. It is in keeping with the Fuehrer's usual mode of procedure for him to exercise personal reserve in the first instance in this matter vis-avis the Chief of Naval War Staff, whose concept would necessarily be a different one. In this connection the Supreme Command of the Army will be able to give fuller details, since it was primarily concerned in the preparations, and will have been addressed by the Fuehrer on the matter. I would particularly point out here- quite apart from the Eastern operation- how I have attempted to impress on the Fuehrer the decisive importance for the war of the question of the Mediterranean and North Africa (when I reported to the Fuehrer on 6.9. and 26.9.40). After the discussion on 26.9. the Fuehrer told Kapitan zur See von Puttkamer that this report had been especially valuable to him, and that he could, in the light of it, review his own opinions, and see whether he was "in the right perspective."

3) At that time, (see a 1)*, the Fuehrer was firmly resolved on a surprise attack on Russia, regardless of what was the Russian attitude to Germany, - this, according to reports coming in, was frequently changing. The communication to Matsuoka was designed entirely as a camouflage measure and to ensure surprise. Concern lest a note to Matsuoka which stated his true telling Matsuoka the whole truth. He told me so at the time at a party!

4) The expression "greatly abbreviated" describes the representations I have always made while at 1 SKL, - memorandums, whish were not so much German essays, or very exhaustive, as notes, and thus easier to put into report form. By means of the notes I could the more briefly and forcefully present this report, which without doubt gave a particularly clear and significant picture of the situation. It formed a very good supplement to and continuation of my reports made on the 6.6. and 29.6.40. The Fuehrer, whose primary interest was in the settling in motion of Barbarossa, (thus, for instance, he wanted to employ the German Air Forces principally on the Eastern Front) - naturally took a special interest in those points in connection with which fuller aid could be secured from the Italians. It would be a mistake to conclude, from the expression "greatly abbreviated", that there was "reserve" on my part on this subject, to which I have always given the greatest publicity.

* Ink Note.

5) In view of previous statements by the Fuehrer (see Section 2), and the contrasts in ideology, I personally have always doubted that the Fuehrer believed from the very beginning that the Russo-German pact would last. I think that the pact arose solely out of the need of the moment and that the Fuehrer (-in spite of his speech in the Reichstag on 1.9.39.) in no wise intended it to be a permanent solution of the Russian problem. After the campaign against Poland he had contented himself in the first instance with a frontier line which would, with the help of an Eastern wall, afford an effective defence against Russia. In my opinion it was only later - when, on the one hand, the first successes in Russia had been gained, and on the other, when the prospects of turning North Africa to good account were fading - that it became his aim to make the feeding of Europe dependent on the Ukraine, this plan bringing with it permanent opposition to Russia. Though nothing was actually said, this would involve giving up all thought of targets for which a certain measure of sea power was required, that is, it would mean striving for a pure continental policy.

6) As under section 3). A statement such as this to the Duce should be considered merely as camouflage. The Fuehrer kept his plans most carefully secret from the Italians. I believe that Stalin is our greatest enemy - a statesman at home and abroad, a soldier and an organizer on a prodigious scale, a Titanic genius seeing far into the future. I consider it extremely probable that in 1937 and 38 Stalin came to recognize, through the efforts of the United States ambassador, as described by Davies in "Mission to Moscow", that Russia could play an important part in a subsequent conflict between the Anglo-Saxon races and Germany, and that he thereupon began to speed up his armaments. The pact with Germany was of a kind which would help him towards the realization of the first part of his scheme - Eastern Poland, the Baltic countries, Bessarabia and perhaps the Balkans and the Dardanelles. The gains of 1939/40 were indeed great. In 1940/41 Stalin had no reason to march against Germany. Germany's surprisingly great successes against France and the Balkans impressively demonstrated her strength to him and perhaps even awakened fear of her. Stalin cannot therefore have intended, to take the initiative in attacking this strong Germany in 1941, but while continuing to arm, he must have wanted to wait and see whether the subsequent course of the war between Germany and the Anglo- Saxon powers would offer him a favorable opportunity - he knew from Davies that the USA would join in sooner or later. Whether in this connection he favored a push towards the Rhine, passing through the Scandanavian countries, or to the North Atlantic, or in the direction of the Mediterranean to the Dardanelles, or through Persia to the Indian Ocean, or finally towards India, must have depended entirely on the course of the struggle between Germany and the Anglo-Saxon powers. As I see it, it does not do justice to the importance of Stalin to assume that he intended "to start the war against Germany in the autumn of 1941". It is true that an essential part of his armament was made ready for this dead-line. I have sometimes been in doubt whether, for Stalin, the ideological had not taken second place long ago in favor of a tremendous effort to use to the full the opportunity he was offered of realizing the schemes of Peter the Great. Was the announcement of the dissolution of the Comminterm perhaps a hint to Germany that an understanding between Germany and Russia would have been possible even then, and that, after the Russian territories had been regained, a peaceful relationship would have been possible between the two States, who, taking the long view, are both threatened by the USA?

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7) As no other course is possible, I have submitted to compulsion. If, in doing so, a difference of opinion arises between 1 SKL and myself, it is perhaps because the arguments the Fuehrer used on such occasions (Dinner speech in the middle of July to the Officers in Command, to justify a step he had planned) usually had a greater effect on people not belonging to the "inner circle", than on those who often heard this type of reasoning.

Many remarks and plans indicate that the Fuehrer calculated on the final ending of the Eastern campaign in the autumn of 1941, whereas the Supreme Command of the Army (General Staff) was very sceptical.

H1144-0021

H1144 - 0022

1 Chefsache
Gross Admiral Assmann, for your own personal information.

Not for distribution. Raeder. 10. 1. 44.

a) .....

b) Weser-Ubung.

The memo is wholly insufficient and does not correspond to the contents of the report. During the weeks preceding the report on 10.10.39. I was in correspondence with Admiral Carls, who, in a detailed letter to me, first pointed out the importance of an occupation of the Norwegian coasts by Germany. I passed this letter on to C/SKl for their information and prepared some notes* based on this letter for my report to the Fuehrer which I made on 10.10.39, since my opinion was identical to that of Admiral Carls, while, at that time, SKl was more dubious about the matter. In these notes, I set out the disadvantages which an occupation of Norway by the British would have for us - control of the approaches to the Baltic, flanking of our naval operations and of our air attacks on Britain, pressure on Sweden. I also mentioned the advantages for us of the occupation of the Norwegian coast-outlet to the North Atlantic, no possibility of British minefields as in the year 1917-18. Naturally at the time, only the coast and bases were considered; I included Narvik, though Admiral Carls, in the course of our correspondence, hoped that Narvik might be excluded. (At that time, we were able to use Murmansk and/or a special Russian Base.) The Fuehrer saw at once the significance of the Norwegian problem; he asked me to leave the notes and stated that he wished to consider the question himself.

In the further developments, I was supported by Korv. Kapitän Schreiber Naval Attache in Oslo and the M-chief personally - in conjunction with the Rosenberg Organization. Thus, we got in touch with Quisling and Hagelin, who came to Berlin in December and were taken to the Fuehrer by me - with the approval of Reichleiter Rosenberg.** On the grounds of the Fuehrer's discussion with Quisling and Hagelin on the afternoon of 14.12.39 the Fuehrer gave the order that preparations for the Norwegian operation were to be made by Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

Until that moment, the Naval War Staff had taken no part in the development of the Norwegian question, and, even then, they were somewhat sceptical about it. The preparations, which were undertaken by Kpt.z.S. Kranke in the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, were founded, however, on a memorandum of the Naval War Staff.

.....

* With the help of K.Adm.v.Puttkamer, these may possibly still be obtainable; I had no duplicate as I did not think I should have to give the notes up.

** At the crucial moment, R. hurt his foot, so that I visited him in his house on the morning of 14.12.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT C-66

7 December 1945.

I, KENNETH HUGH MOLESWORTH DUKE, Major R.A., hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Doc. C-66.

'SGD' KENNETH HUGH MOLESWORTH
DUKE

Major R.A.

Read Jan. 4, 1946 part of NSA 139

H1144 - 0023

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-78
OFFICE OF US CHIEF OF COUNSEL

SEC 24-G/C-78

Translation

Office of
Wehrmacht adjutant

TOP SECRET
Only by Officer

at Berchtesgaden
9th June 1941

to the Fuehrer
Br.B.No.7 Top Secret

Top Secret

Re: Conference "Barbarossa"

1. The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has ordered reports on "Barbarossa" by the Commanders of Army Groups, Armies, and Naval and Air Commanders of equal rank.

2. The reports will be made on Saturday, 14 June 1941, at the Reich Chancellery, Berlin.

3. Time Table

a) 11.00 hrs ....."Silver Fox"

b) 12.00 hrs - 14.00 hrs.....Army Group South

c) 14.00 hrs - 15.30 hrs.....Lunch party for all participants in conference

d) From 15.30 hrs.....Baltic, Army Group North, Army Group "Center" in this order.

Participants see enclosed list of participants.
(List of names, etc. follows)

(signed) Schmundt

Colonel of the general staff and Chief Wehrmacht adjutant
to the Fuehrer

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

I.) Morning and afternoon:

1.) Army: General Field Marshal von Brauchitsch
General Halder
Maj.General Paulus
Colonel Heusinger
Lt. Colonel von Gyldenfeldt

2.) Navy: Captain Wagner

3.) Air Force: Reich Marshal Goering
General Field Marshal Milch
Lt. General Jeschonnek
Maj. General Bodenschatz
Brig.General von Waldau

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4.) High Command of the Armed Forces:
General Field Marshal Keitel
Lt.General of the Artillery Jodl
Brig.General Warlimont
Major Christian of the General Staff

5.) Office of adjutant of the Armed Forces:
Colonel Schmundt of the General Staff
Captain von Puttkamer (Navy)
Major Engel
Major von Below

II.) Morning:

1.) "Silver Fox":
Army: General v.Falkenhorst, Army High Command, Norway
Air Force: General Stumpff, Air Fleet 5

2.) Group "South"
Army: General Field Marshal v. Rundstedt Army Group South
General Field Marshal v. Reichenau, High Command 6th Army
Infantry Lt.General v. Stuelpnagel, High Command 17th Army
General v. Schobert, High Command 11th Army
General v. Kleist, Armored Group 1

Air Force:
General Loehr, Air Fleet 4.

III.) Joint dinner of all participants
In addition: General Fromm, General Udet
(arrival: 13.40 o'clock, 78 Wilhelmstrasse)

IV.) Afternoon:

1.) High Command of the Navy:
Grand Admiral Raeder
Vice Admiral Fricke
Captain Schulte-Moenting

2.) Baltic:
General Admiral Carls, Navy Group North
Vice Admiral Schmundt, Commander Baltic

3.) Group"North"
Army: General Field Marshal Ritter v. Leeb,
Army Group North
General Busch, High Command 16th Army
General v. Kuechler, High Command 18th Army
General Hoopner, Armored Group 4

Air Force: Col. General Keller, Air Fleet 1

4.) Group "Center":
Army: General Field Marshal v. Bock, Army Group "Center"
General Field Marshal v. Kluge, High Command 4th Army
General Strauss, High Command 9th Army
General Guderian, Armored Group 2
General Hoth, Armored Group 3

Air Force: General Field Marshal Kesselring, Air Fleet 2

H1144 - 0025

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT C-78

November 15, 1945

I VIRGINIA VON SCHON, 046318 hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document C-78.

VIRGINIA VON SCHON
046318.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C 102
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

SEC 24-5/C-102

Berlin, 11.3.38.

The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
OKW L I a Nr. 420/38 g.Kdos.

Referring to: Operation OTTO

30 Copies
11th Copy

TOP SECRET

1) If other measures prove unsuccessful, I intend to invade Austria with armed forces to establish constitutional conditions and to prevent further outrages against the pro-German population.

2) The whole operation will be directed by myself.

According to my instructions:

The Ob.d.H. will direct the land operations with the 8th Army in the formation and strength suggested to me, and with the attachments of the Air Force, the SS and police (see appendix).

The Ob.d.L. will direct the air operations with the forces suggested to me.

3) Operational duties:

a) Army
The invasion of Austria must be carried out in the manner explained to me. The Army's first target is the occupation of upper Austria, Salzburg, Lower Austria, the Tyrol, the speedy occupation of Vienna and the securing of the Austro-Czech frontier.

b) Air Force
The Air Force must demonstrate and drop propaganda material, occupy Austrian aerodromes for the use of further possible reinforcements assist the Army upon demand as necessary, apart from that, hold bomber units in readiness for special tasks.

4) The forces of the Army and Air Force detailed for this operation must be ready for invasion and/or ready for action on the 12th March 1938 at the latest from 1200 hours.

I reserve the right to give permission for crossing and flying over the frontier, and to decide the actual moment for invasion.

5) The behaviour of the troops must give the impression that we do not want to wage war against our Austrian brothers. It is in our interest that the whole operation shall be carried out without any violence but in the form of a peaceful entry welcomed by the population. Therefore any provocation is to be avoided. If, however, resistance is offered it must be broken ruthlessly by force of arms

Austrian units who come over to us, immediately come under German Command.

6) On the remaining German frontiers no security measures are to be taken for the time being.

Signed A. HITLER

Translator's Note: This document bears the initials of Jodl, Keitel and one other which is undecipherable.

H1144 - 0026

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT C 102

13 November 1945

I, GERARD SCHAEFER, 2nd Lt., O-1332102, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document C 102.

GERARD SCHAEFER
2nd Lt.,
O-1332102

H1144 - 0027

H1144 - 0028

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. C-120
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

DIRECTIVES FROM HITLER AND KEITEL

PREPARING FOR WAR AND THE INVASION OF POLAND

(C-120/A)

Top Secret
Officer Only

The High Command of the Armed Forces (OKW) Berlin, 3 April 1939
WFA Nr. 37/39 Top Secret Officer Only L Ia

SUBJECT: Directive for the Armed Forces 1939/40

5 copies
2nd Copy

The Directive for the Uniform Preparation of War by the Armed Forces for 1939/40 is being re-issued.

Part I ("Frontier Defence") and Part III ("Danzig") will be issued in the middle of April. Their basic principles remain unchanged.

Part II "Fall Weiss" is attached herewith. The signature of the Führer will be appended later.

The Führer has added the following Directives to "Fall Weiss":

1) Preparations must be made in such a way that the operation can be carried out at any time from 1.9.39 onwards

2) The High Command of the Armed Forces has been directed to draw up a precise time-table for "Fall Weiss" and to arrange by conferences the synchronised timings between the 3 branches of the Armed Forces

3) The plans of the branches of the Armed Forces and the details for the time-table must be submitted to the OKW by 1.5.39.

The Chief of the High Command of the
Armed Forces

(signed) KEITEL

Distribution:-

OKH	=	1 (Copy No. 1.)
OKM	=	1 (" " 2.)
RdL u Ob.d L	=	1 (" " 3.)
OKW (L)	=	2 (" " 4 u. 5)
Total		5

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(C-120/B)

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. C-120
Continued

Top Secret.
Officer Only

The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces
OKW Nr. 37/39 Top Secret Officer Only. WFA/LI

Berlin, 11 April 1939

5 Copies
2nd Copy

Directive for the Uniform Preparation of War by the Armed Forces, 1939/40.

I shall lay down in a later directive the future tasks of the Armed Forces and the preparations to be made in accordance with these for the conduct of war.

Until that directive comes into force, the Armed Forces must be prepared for the following eventualities:

I) Safeguarding of the frontiers of the German Reich and protection against surprise air attacks. (see Annexe I)

II) "Fall Weiss" (see Annexe II)

III) The Annexation of Danzig (see Annexe III)

Annexe IV contains regulations for the exercise of military authority in East Prussia in the event of a warlike development.

(signed) Adolf Hitler.

Distribution:

OKH	=	1 (Copy No. 1)
OKM	=	1 (" " 2)
RdL u.Ob.d.L	=	1 (" " 3)
OKW (WFA/L)	=	2 (" " 4 u. 5)

H1144-0030

(C-120/C)

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. C-120
Continued

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ANNEX I to OKW L Ia No. 37/39

Top Secret
By Officer Only

I.

Safeguarding the Frontiers of the German Reich and Protection Against Surprise Air Raids.

(Translation Omitted)

- -

Enclosure to OKW No. 37/39 Top Secret WFA/L I, dated 11 April 43; Annex I

Top Secret
By Officer Only

Special Order for "Frontier Defence" (Grenzsicherung)

(Translation Omitted)

H1144 - 0031

(C-120/D)

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. C-120
Continued

ANNEX II to OKW No. 37/39 Top Secret L I

Top Secret

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II

"Fall Weiss"

The present attitude of Poland requires, beyond the plan "Frontier-defense East", the effecting of military preparations to exclude if necessary any threat from this direction forever.

1) Political Requirements and Aims.

German relations with Poland continue to be based on the principle of avoiding any quarrels. Should Poland, however, change her policy towards Germany, based up to now on the same principles as our own, and adopt a threatening attitude towards Germany, a final settlement might become necessary, notwithstanding the pact in effect with Poland.

The aim then will be to destroy Polish military strength, and create in the East a situation which satisfies the requirements of national defense. The Free State of Danzig will be proclaimed a part of the Reich-territory at the outbreak of the conflict, at the latest.

The political leadership considers it its task in this case to isolate Poland if possible, that is to say, to limit the war to Poland only.

The development of increasing internal crises in France and the resulting British cautiousness might produce such a situation in the not too distant future.

Intervention by Russia so far as she would be able to do this cannot be expected to be of any use for Poland, because this would imply Poland's destruction by Bolshevism.

The attitude of the Baltic States will be determined wholly by German military exigencies.

On the German side, Hungary can not be considered a certain ally. Italy's attitude is determined by the Berlin-Rome Axis.

2) Military Conclusions.

The great objectives in the building up of the German Armed Forces will continue to be determined by the antagonism of the "Western Democracies". "Fall Weiss" constitutes only a precautionary complement to these preparations. It is not to be looked upon in any way, however, as the necessary prerequisite for a military settlement with the Western opponents.

The isolation of Poland will be more easily maintained, even after the beginning of operations, if we succeed in starting the war with heavy, sudden blows and in gaining rapid successes.

The entire situation will require, however, that precautions be taken to safeguard the western boundary and the German North Sea coast, as well as the air over them.

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Against the Baltic States - Lithuania in particular,- security measures are to be carried out for the event of a Polish march through this country.

3) Tasks of the Armed Forces.

The task of the Armed Forces is to destroy the Polish Armed Forces. For this reason a surprise attack is to be striven for and prepared. The camoflaged or open general mobilisation will not be ordered earlier than the day before the attack at the latest possible moment.

The forces provided for the "Western frontier defense" (aanex I "Frontier defense") must not be employed for any other purpose for the moment.

All other frontiers are to be kept under observation - the Lithuanian is to be covered.

4) Tasks of the Branches of the Armed Forces.

a) Army

The operational objective in the East is to destroy the Polish army.

For this purpose the German Armed Forces, on the southern flank, may enter Slovak territory. In the North, communication between Pomerania and East Prussia must be established quickly.

The preparations for the opening of operations are to be made in such a way, that even without waiting for the planned assembly of mobilized units, positions can be taken up immediately by the first available troops. A camoflaged assembly for these units just before the day of attack may be provided. I reserve for myself the decision in this matter.

Whether the forces provided for the "Western frontier defense" will be deployed there completely, or will be partly available for some other employment, - will depend upon the political situation.

b) Navy

The tasks of the Navy in the Baltic sea are as follows:

1) Destruction or elimination of the Polish Navy.
2) Blockade of all sea-ways to the Polish Naval bases, especially Gdynia. The neutral shipping in Polish harbours and in Danzig is to be given at the beginning of the invasion of Poland, a time limit for sailing. After its expiration, the Navy will be free to set up blockade measures.
   The disadvantages for the naval warfare produced by this time limit must be accepted.
3) Suppression of the Polish maritime trade.
4) Securing of the sea-route Reich - East Prussia.
5) Protection of German sea-communications to Sweden and Baltic States.
6) Reconnaissance and protection, as far as possible in an inconspicuous manner, against an intervention by the Soviet Navy from the Gulf of Finland.

Suitable naval froces are to be provided for defense of the coast and coastal zone of the North Sea.

In the southern part of the North Sea and in the Skagerrak measures are to be taken for precautionary protection against a surprise intervention of the Western powers. These measures are to be restricted to the absolute

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minimum. Their inconspicuousness must be assured. It is of decisive importance to avoid here any sort of action which might make the political attitude of the Western Powers more unfriendly.

c) Air Force

The whole Air Force except, for necessary forces left in the West, is to be sued for a surprise attack against Poland. Besides destruction of the Polish Air Force in the shortest time possible, - the tasks of the German Air Force are principally as follows:

1) Interference with the Polish mobilisation and prevention of planned Polish strategic concentrations.
2) Tactical support of the Army, especially support of the spear-heads starting immediately after the crossing of the frontier.

A possible transfer of flying-units to East Prussia, before beginning of operations, must not endanger surprise.

The moment of the first flight over the frontier is to be timed in coordination with the Army's operations.

Attacks against the harbour of Gdynia may be undertaken only after expiration of the time limit for sailing for the neutral ships. (See number 4 b)

Strong points of air-defense are to be set up above Stettin, Berlin and the Upper-Silesian industrial district including Maehrisch Ostrau (Moravská Ostravá) and Bruenn (Brno).

H1144 - 0034

Typed by Officer

Top Secret. Officer Only

High Command of the Armed Forces.
WFA. Nr 67/39 Top Secret Officer Only. L (I)

Berlin, 24th June 1939

5 Copies
2nd Copy

Subject: - "Fall Weiss"

The Army High Command is herewith directed to prepare all measures necessary for capturing intact the bridges over the lower Vistula. On the completion of preparations, the Army High Command will briefly report to the Armed Forces High Command.

Besides, the Army and Navy High Commands will again examine whether the element of surprise in sudden attacks against the bridge at Dirschau will be impaired by preceding actions of the Navy in the Danzig Bay. In view of the importance of the bridge, it should be stated if the consent of the Army High Command to the intended measures of the Navy (mining before Y-time) is upheld.

The Chief of the High Command
of the Armed Forces

(signed) KEITEL 24.6

Distribution:-

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WFA/L	5th Copy

H1144 - 0035

Enclosure to OKW No. 37/39 Top Secret WFA/L I of 11 April 1939 (Annex II)

Top Secret

Senior Officer only
Officer only

Special Orders for

"Fall Weiss"

1) Legal Basis

We must start with the fact that the "State of Defense" or the "State of War" in the meaning of the R. V. Gesetz (Reich Defense Law) of 4 September 1938, will not be declared.

All actions and requests are to be based on peace-time legislation. The Provisions of the Hague Convention on Land Warfare, apply appropriately. The right to issue supplements is reserved.

2) Mobilization

Directives concerning the extent of preliminary measures for execution of "Fall Weiss", especially where they entail the induction of supplementary personnel or the procuring of supplementary materiel, will be issued later by the OKW.

If, for the Armed Forces, or parts of them, a mobilisation without public proclamation (X-case) is ordered, it will not apply automatically to the civilian sphere including the armaments industry. However, the OKW will order such measures, with locally limited application, as are required for the mobilization of the Armed Forces or parts of them and for the maintenance of the ability of government agencies and of enterprises to function.

If for the armed forces as a whole the general mobilisation by public promulgation is ordered, then this mobilisation will quite automatically and indissolubly apply to the civil sphere, including the armaments industry. However, the mobilisation by public promulgation is not to be counted upon, if the military operations are restricted to "Fall Weiss".

3) Zone of operations and executive power..

For "Fall Weiss" the Eastern Zone of Operations (Op. Gebiet Ost) will be put into effect by the OKW. If the "Frontier Defense West" is involved, too, the Western Zone of Operations (Op. Gebiet West), provided for this contingency, will also be put into effect.

After the crossing of the frontier the operation zone will be extended forward, corresponding to the areas occupied by the troops.

In the "Army Operation Zone" the Commander-in-Chief of the Army will by special order receive the authorization to exercize executive power, with the right to delegate this authorization, completely or partly, to army commanders.

4) V.G.A.D. or V.G.A.D. (K) and Frontier Guards.

Orders for the formation "Reinforced frontier control service" - V.G.A.D., or V.G.A.D. (K) and the "Frontier Guard" will be issued by the O.K.W. if necessary.

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5) Powers for the Reichsminister for Air and Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force in questions of aerial defense.

Authorizations given for the mobilization (X-) case to the Reich Minister for Air and Commander-in-Chief of the Airforce according to the order OKW. Nr. 2230/38 g.K. WFA/L II of the 27 Sept. 38, Part. III, may be conferred upon him by an order of the Supreme Commander, already in the period of tension.

6) Clearing the frontier zones.

Clearing and evacuation measures will not be executed in the East. O.K.H. will make preparations for a receiving organization for refugees of German descent from Poland.

7) Evacuation and Rehousing of Population for Protection against Air-Attacks.

Insofar as the evacuation and rehousing of the population, as well as other measures for protection against air-attacks (clearing of school-buildings, public buildings, hospitals etc), come under consideration for the Mobilization (X) Case, these measures are to be prepared and the dates fixed by the Reichsminister for Air and Commander-in-Chief of the Airforce in cooperation with the military and civil authorities concerned. Execution of such plans in the period of tension depends upon the approval of O.K.W.

8) Organization of command.

According to situation, the following will be put under complete or partial command of:

a) The Commander-in-Chief of the Army:
The Air-force units provided for "Fall Weiss";
The SS Military Units (SS-Verfuegungstruppe) according to the order O.K.W. No. 1730/38 g.K. WFA/L II of 28 August 1938.
From the police at first those units provided for by the mobilization plan. The elements of the German Labor Service (RAD) provided according to Special Annex 7 to the mobilization plan for the Army.

b) The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy:
The Naval Air Force units;
The RAD-units provided for by the mobilization plan.

c) The Reichsminister for Air and Commander-in-Chief of the Airforce:
The RAD.-units enumerated in Special Annex 3 of the Air Force Mobilization plan,
The army units provided for airborne operations according to request of the Commander-in-Chief of the Airforce.

9) Supervision and prevention of communications on the land-and sea-frontiers and prevention of railroad-, air- and sea traffic.

The necessary measures will be prepared by the O.K.W. in cooperation with the Services in such a way that they can be put into operation completely or partly for "Fall Weiss" as well as on other frontiers (including the sea coast), according to the situation. Detailed provisions will follow.

10) Signal Communications.

(Translation Omitted)

11) Supply.

According to order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army the troops may be supplied from occupied territory. In this regard the critical

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situation of the German minority should be given due consideration. Requisitioning in occupied territory may be carried out in accordance with the Hague Land War Convention; insofar as contributions must be demanded from people of German descent, they must be paid for in German currency.
The rate of exchange for every kind of contribution will be announced in due time by the O.K.W.

12) Allowances (pay, rations, billeting, clothing, medicalcure)

(Translation Omitted)

13) Accounting of additional expenses which may arise.

Additional expenses resulting from "Fall Weiss" are to be charged finally under expenditure, to ~~the~~ (Special Budget) Account VIII E 230 (Budget of OKW) set up especially for this purpose.

initialled
(illegible!)

H1144 - 0038

Annex III to OKW. Nr. 37/39 Top Secret WFA/L I

Top Secret
By Officer only

5 Copies
2nd Copy

III
Annexation of Danzig

A surprise annexation of the Free State of Danzig may come into consideration, independently of "Fall Weiss", in order to exploit a favourable political situation.

The preparations are to be carried out on the following basis: The "Organisation of command in East-Prussia in case of warlike complications" (see Annex IV) will be put into effect, in regard to fig. 3.

The occupation will be carried out by the Army from East-Prussia.

The Navy will support the action of the Army by intervention from the sea, according to the detailed order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. The naval forces involved are to be instructed to cooperate with the Army.

The extent to which the units of the Air Force can take part in the action of occupation is to be decided by the Reichsminister for Air and Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force.

Details on cooperation are to be settled among the Services directly.

- -

Enclsoure to OKW No. 37/39 Top Secret
WFA/L I, dated 11 April 39, Annex III

Top Secret
By Officer Only

Special Orders for

"Annexation of Danzig"

(Translation Omitted)

H1144 - 0039

Annex IV to OKW/L Ia No. 37/39 Top Secret

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IV

Provisions for the Exercise of Command
in East Prussia in Case of Warlike Complications

(Translation omitted)

H1144 - 0040

(C-120/I)

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. C-120
Continued

Annex V to OKW L Ia No. 37/39 Top Secret

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V

Boundaries of the Zone of Operations
of the Army

(Translation omitted)

H1144 - 0041

(C-120/J)

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. C-120
Continued

Berlin, 10 May 1939

High Command of the Armed Forces
No. 1050/39 Top Secret WFA/L II c.

TOP SECRET

200 copies
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Subject: Exercise of Military Powers in Area of Operations of the Army.

(Translation omitted)

H1144 - 0042

(C-120/K)

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. C-120
Continued

Top Secret
Officer Only

The Supreme Commander
of the Armed Forces

Berlin, 10th May 1939

Nr. 48/39 Top Secret WFA/L (I)

7 copies
2nd copy

Subject: Directive for the uniform preparation of War by the Armed Forces, 1939/40 (OKW.Nr.37/39 g.K.Chefs. WFA/L(I) of 11.4.39.)

Herewith, as Part VI of the "Directive", instructions for the economic war and the protection of our own economy are issued.

The Commanders-in-Chief of the Services will report to the Armed Forces High Command on the measures taken in consequence of these instructions by 1st August 1939.

(signed) Adolf Hitler.

Distribution: -

O.K.H.	=	1 (Pruef Nr. 1)
O.K.M.	=	1 (" " 2)
R.d.L.u.Ob.d.L.	=	1 (" " 3)
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O.K.W. (L)	=	2 (" " 6 u. 7)

H1144 - 0043

Annex VI to
OKW No. 37/39 Top Secret WFA/L Ia

Top Secret
By Officer Only

VI

Directives for the War Against the Enemy Economy (Economic Warfare) and Measures for the Protection of our own Economy.

I. Introduction

1) The most important instruments of the attack against the enemy economy are the Navy and Air Force. Their measures will be supplemented by the sabotage warfare (OKW (Abwehr)). It may become a mission of the Army to widen our German living space by the occupation of enemy territories of special importance to our own economy.

The preparation of economic warfare measures is a responsibility of the GBW (Plenipotentiary for the Economy).

The OKW (WFA in coordination with the W Staff) will insure that uniform objectives are set for all measures against the enemy economy. The same applies for measures for the protection of our own economy.

2) In Section II and III of these Directives, outlines are issued for the economic warfare and protective measures for the contingencies (Faelle) "Frontier Defence" and "Weiss". From them the preparations to be effected by the Services and the GBW will be derived.

* * * * *

III. Directive for "Fall Weiss".

1) The objective is to capture the Polish economic installations as intact as possible. They may be attacked only in case of immediate military necessity.

2) The quick occupation of the industrial districts of Polish-Upper-Silesia and Cieszyn (Teschen) is important for the war economy.

3) All sea-borne imports to Poland have to be prevented by the Navy. For this purpose the form of the trade warfare (Handelskrieg) against Polish imports is to be laid down in cooperation with the Foreign Office in accordance with the political situation. Of special importance here is the treatment of neutral flags and of goods which are possibly destined for Poland by way of neutral ports.

4) For the protection of the German economy, the measures for the case "Frontier Defence" apply where appropriate.

- - - -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. C-120

-- November 1945

I, LUDWIG HARTMAN, T/4, 37446052, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct partial translation of Document C-120.

LUDWIG HARTMAN
T/4, 37446052

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF CERTIFICATE NO. C-122
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL.

SEC24/C/C-122

3 Oct.

5.) The Chief of the Naval War Staff considers it necessary that the Führer be informed as soon as possible of the opinions of the Naval War Staff on the possibilities of extending the operational base to the North. It must be ascertained whether it is possible to gain bases in Norway under the combined pressure of Russia and Germany, with the aim of improving fundamentally our strategic and operational position. The following questions must be given consideration:

a) What places in Norway can be considered as bases?

b) Can bases be gained by military force against Norway's will, if it is impossible to carry this out without fighting?

c) What are the possibilities of defense after the occupation?

d) Will the harbours have to be developed completely as bases, or have they possibly already decisive advantages as supply positions ?
(F.O.U-boats already considers such harbours extremely useful as equipment - and supply - bases for Atlantic U-boats to call at temporarily).

e) What decisive advantages would exist for the conduct of the War at sea in gaining a base in North Denmark e.g. Skagen.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. C-122

16 November 1945

I, ERNST M. COHN, Pfc, 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct partial translation of Document No. C-122.

ERNST M. COHN,
Pfc, 33925738

H1144 - 0044

C 126

EXTRACT FROM OPERATION ORDERS 1 FOR THE CAPITAL SHIP "SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN"

Kiel, August 21st,,1939.

. . . . I Position

(a) Political

"Fall Weiss" means that the Polish Army shall be utterly broken and annihilated by surprise, in order to create a state of affairs in the East which meets the defence of the country.

The Free State of Danzig will be declared to be Reich territory on the outbreak of hostilities at the latest. Security measures will be taken in the Baltic and Kattegat against the intervention of foreign states. .....

Draft signed ALBRECHT
pp Chief of Staff for
Naval Group Command
East.
Fein.

C 126

EXTRACT FROM LETTER TO OKW (L) BY VON BRAUCHITSCH

Berlin, July 3rd, 1939.

The Supreme Command of the Army cannot agree to the measures which the Navy are intending to take before Y-hour - insofar as these could become known to the enemy - and requests that steps be taken to ensure that no measures of any kind which may prejudice a surprise attack be carried out by other sections of the Armed Forces before the time when the army crosses the frontier. The crossings of the frontier by the army takes place at dawn on Y-day. . . . .

C 126

EXTRACTS FROM MEMO OF COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE NAVY

Berlin, May 16th, 1939.

I. Directions of the Fuehrer

2. Conclusions in the military field :-

The major aims in building up the German Army continue to be determined by the hostility of the Western democracies. "Fall Weiss" constitutes merely a completion, by way of precaution, of preparations, and should on no account be regarded as the forerunner of a settlement with our opponents in the West by force of arms.

H1144 - 0045

The isolation of Poland will be maintained the more readily even after the outbreak of war, if we succeed in opening the war with heavy blows struck by surprise and followed up by rapid successes.

---

8. (a) ... It can be expected that Y-hour will be a time in the early hours of the morning, two hours before it grows light (three hours before sunrise).
This time of day is required by the Navy to carry out the measures she has to take, and is recognized by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

(b) With a view to maintaining, on a large scale, the routine of peace-time training, and to avoiding a premature exposure of the measures it is intended to take, a warning (preparation) period of 48 hours may be expected . . . .

V. Date fixed for completion of preparations

According to the instructions of the Fuehrer, "Fall Weiss" should be so worked on that it can be carried out at any time from 1 September 1939. onwards . . . .

C 126

RESULTS OF THE DISCUSSION WITH THE SUPREME COMMAND OF THE ARMED FORCES/LII ON TIMETABLES FOR PREPARATORY MEASURES

Undated

1. The preparatory measures determined upon in timetable form will be submitted to the Fuehrer for approval.
Each section of the Armed Forces can, at its own discretion, proceed with and carry out these measures, when approved, from the time fixed onwards.

2. The measures proposed by the Navy, including exercise in the transmission of orders and intelligence for Group Command East, present no difficulties, since they can be disguised as practice measures.

3. The following should be laid down uniformly for all sections of the Armed Forces :-

Y - 5 24-hour duty for the Senior Staffs, (Army, Group and "Wehrkreis" H.Qs.)

Y - 3 Sections of the Armed Forces may furhter extend 24-hour duty.

Y - 4 Switch over to "Martha" network.

Y - 2 Switch over, in the operation area, to the jamming networks of the two other sections of the Armed Forces.

An earlier time for putting the Martha network into operation is desired by the Navy as well as being requested by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (Armed Forces Communications) so that the Post Office can deal with it in stages.

Y - 6 Disguised stopping of leave, no recalls, especially not from abroad.

Y - 2 Naval air units to come under the tactical control of the C.-in-C. of the Navy.

4. It is intended to switch over to the defence network from 3 August 1939."
. . . .

No signature

C 126

EXTRACT FROM LETTER TO THE FLEET, F.O. (U/B) & B.d.P.

Berlin, August 2nd, 1939.

Attached are Operational Directions for the employment of U-Boats which are to be sent out to the Atlantic, by way of precaution, in the event of the intention to carry out "Fall Weiss" remaining unchanged. F.O. (U/B) is handing in his Operation Orders to Slk. by 12 August (Ink note - a decision on the sailings of U-Boats for the Atlantic will probably be made at the middle of August).

These directions must, if the Operations are not carried out, be destroyed by the 1 September 1939 at the latest . . . .

(Initialled) F.A.
Slk.
1/Slk.

C 126

Berlin 22.6.1939.

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

Re : Preparations for "Fall Weiss".

. . . .

The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces has submitted to the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander a "preliminary time-table" for "Fall Weiss", based on the particulars so far available from the Navy, Army and Air Force. Details concerning the days preceding the attack and the start of the attack were not included in this time-table.

The Fuehrer and the Supreme Commander is, in the main, in agreement with the intentions of the Navy, Army and Air Force and made the following comments on individual points :-

1. In order not to disquiet the population by calling up reserves on a larger scale than usual for the manoeuvres scheduled for 1939, as is intended, civilian establishments, employers or other private persons who make enquiries should be told that men are being called up for the autumn manoeuvres and for the exercise units it is intended to form for those manoeuvres.

It is requested that directions to this effect to issued to sub-ordinate establishments.

2. For reasons of security the clearing of hospitals in the area of the frontier which the Supreme Command of the Army proposed should take place from the middle of July, must not be carried out.

3. It shoud be ascertained whether it appears to be expedient to transfer the S.S. Artillery Regiment to East Prussia and use it there for the purpose intended, in view of the fact that this regiment had only been formed a short time previously, or whether it seems more profitable to use an Army Artillery Regiment in place of an S.S. Artillery Regiment.

The result of the investigation should be communicated to the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

H1144 - 0047

4. The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander will decide at the beginning of August whether the training ships of the Navy will put out according to plan.

Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces.

Keitel.

C 126

SUPREME COMMANDER OF THE ARMED FORCES
OKW/WFA No. 170/39gk Chefs. L.I.

Berlin, 31 August 1939

MOST SECRET

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Known to Ob.d.M.

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Direction No. 1 for the Conduct of the War.

1. Now that all the political possibilities of disposing by peaceful means of a situation on the Eastern Frontier which is intolerable for Germany are exhausted, I have determined on a solution by force.

2. The attack on Poland is to be carried out in accordance with the preparations made for "Fall Weiss", with the alterations which result, where the Army is concerned, from the fact that it has in the meantime almost completed its dispositions.

Allotment of tasks and the operational target remain unchanged.

Date of attack - 1 September 1939
Time of attack - 04:45 (Inserted in red pencil)

This time also applies to the operation at Gdynia, Bay of Danzig and the Dirschau Bridge.

3. In the West it is important that the responsibility for the opening of hostilities should rest unequivocally with England and France. At first purely local action should be taken against insignificant frontier violations.

and Denmark (red pencil note) The neutrality assured by us to Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg and Switzerland should be scrupulously observed.

The German land frontier in the West is not to be crossed at any point without my express consent.

According to this Atlantic U-boats must remain in their waiting positions for the time being. (pencil note) The same applies to warlike actions at sea or any which may be so interpreted.

Defensive measures on the part of the Luftwaffe should at first be confined exclusively to the warding off of enemy air attacks on the frontier of the Reich. In doing so the frontier of the neutral states should be observed as long as possible when dealing with single aircraft and smaller units. Defensive operations should only be permitted over this neutral territory when, where French and English attacking squadrons are operating over neutral states against German territory in considerable force, air defence in the West is no longer assured.

H1144 - 0048

It is of special importance that the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces should be informed with the least possible delay of any violation of the neutrality of their States on the part of our opponents in the West.

4. If England and France open hostilities against Germany, the task of those sections of the Armed Forces which are operating in the West is to uphold, while conserving their strength as far as possible, those conditions necessary for the successful conclusion of the operations against Poland. Within the scope of this duty, damage should be done to enemy forces and their economic sources of supply as far as resources allow. In any case I reserve to myself the order to commence attack operations.

Warfare against Merchant Shipping (Green Pencil)

(See Directions to Groups, ships and U-Boats) (red pencil note).

The Army is holding the West wall and is making preparations to prevent its being turned - the Western Powers violating Belgian or Dutch territory in doing so. If French forces move into Luxembourg, the frontier bridges may be blown up.

(Undecipherable note in green pencil)

In its warfare on merchant shipping the Navy is concentrating on England. To intensify the effect of this, a declaration of danger zones is to be expected.
The Supreme Command of the Navy announces in which areas of sea and within what limits danger zones are considered expedient. The wording of a public declaration should be prepared in conjunction with the Foreign Office and should be submitted to me for approval through the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

The Baltic should be secured against penetration by the enemy. The C.-C. of the Navy decides whether the approaches to the Baltic should be mined for this purpose.

Address to . . (undecipherable) General Warning! (Red pencil note)

The primary task of the Luftwaffe is to prevent the French and English Air Force operating against the German Army and German "Lebensraum".
In waging war against England preparations should be made for the use of the Luftwaffe in causing damage to sea transport, the armament industry and troop transports to France. Full use should be made of favorable opportunities to make an effective attack on massed English naval units, especially on battleships and aircraft carriers. The decision regarding attacks on London rests with me.

Attacks on the English motherland should be prepared, bearing in mind that whatever happens, inadequate success with part forces is to be avoided.

(sgd) A. Hitler

. . . (undecipherable)

Warning?
(Note in red pencil)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT C126

16 November 1945

I, ERNST M. COHN, PFC, 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct partial translation of Document C 126.

ERNST M. COHN
PFC, 33925738.

H1144 - 0049

H1144 – 0050

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-136
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

TOP SECRET
By Officer Only

Berlin, 21 Oct 1938

The Fuehrer
and Supreme Commander of
the Armed Forces

10 copies
3rd copy

OKW L Ia No. 236/38 Top Secret

The future tasks for the Armed Forces and the preparations for the conduct of war resulting from these tasks will be laid down by me in a later Directive.

Until this Directive comes into force the Armed Forces must be prepared at all times for the following eventualities:

1) The securing of the frontiers of Germany and the protection against surprise air attacks.

2) The liquidation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia.

3) The occupation of the Memelland.

1.

Securing the Frontiers of Germany
and Protection against Surprise Air Raids

(Translation omitted)

* * * * * *

2.

Liquidation of the Remainder of Czechoslovakia

It must be possible to smash at any time the remainder of Czechoslovakia if her policy should become hostile towards Germany.

The preparations to be made by the Armed Forces for this contingency will be considerably smaller in extent than those for "Gruen"; they must however, guarantee a continuous and considerably higher state of preparedness, since planned mobilization measures have been dispensed with. The organisation, order of battle and state of readiness of the units earmarked for that purpose are in peace-time to be so arranged for a surprise assault that Czechoslovakia herself will be deprived of all possibility of organised resistance. The object is the swift occupation of Bohemia and Moravia and the cutting off of Slovakia. The preparations should be such, that at the same time "Grenzsicherung West" (The Measures of frontier defence in the West) can be carried out.

The detailed mission of Army and Air Force is as follows:

a. ARMY

The units stationed in the vicinity of Bohemia-Moravia and several motorized divisions are to be earmarked for a surprise type of attack.

Their number will be determined by the forces remaining in Czechoslovakia; a quick and decisive success must be assured. The assembly and preparations for the attack must be worked out. Forces not needed will be kept in readiness in such a manner that they may be either committed in securing the frontiers or sent after the attack army.

b. AIR FORCE

The quick advance of the German Army is to be assured by an early elimination of the Czech Air Force.

For this purpose the commitment in a surprise attack from peacetime bases has to be prepared. Whether for this purpose still stronger forces may be required can be determined from the development of the military situation in Czechoslovakia only. At the same time a simultaneous assembly of the remainder of the offensive forces against the West must be prepared.

3.

Annexation of the Memel District

(Translation omitted)

Signed: Adolf Hitler

Authenticated
/s/ Keitel

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CERTIFICATE OF PARTIAL TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. C-136

24 November 1945

I, Ludwig Hartman, T/4, 37446052, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document C-136.

LUDWIG HARTMAN
T/4, 37446052

H1144 - 0051

H1144 - 0052

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. C-138
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

(Stampp-) Supreme Command of the Navy.
AI Op. 121 38
Received 20 XII 38
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Only through officers.

(Written by Officer)

OBERKOMMANDO DER WEHRMACHT — BERLIN, 17.12.38
Nr. 248/38 WFA/L 1a. Top Secret
Superior Officers only.
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Ref. (Letter of) the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces OKW No. 236/38 Top Secret S.O. only L.I a, dated 21/10.38

(Marginal Hand-written Note

1) Chief to
2) Chief in Office -A
3) (Remainder
4) undecipherable)

2. ~~COROLLARY TO DIRECTIVE OF 21.10.38.~~

Reference "Liquidation of the Rest of Czechoslovakia" the Fuehrer has given the following additional order:

The preparations for this eventuality are to continue on the assumption that no resistance worth mentioning is to be expected.

To the outside world too it must clearly appear that it is merely an action of pacification and not a warlike undertaking.

The action must therefore be carried out by the peace time Armed Forces only, without reinforcements from mobilisation. The necessary readiness for action, especially the ensuring that the most necessary supplies are brought up, must be effected by adjustment within the units.

Similarly the units of the Army detailed for the march in must, as a general rule, leave their stations only during the night prior to the crossing of the frontier, and will not previously form up systematically on the frontier. The transport necessary for previous organisation should be limited to the minimum and will be camouflaged as much as possible. Necessary movements if any, of single units and particularly of motorised forces, to the troop-training areas situated near the frontier, must have the approval of the Fuehrer.

The Air Force should take action in accordance with the similar general directives.

For the same reasons the exercise of executive power by the Supreme Command of the Army is laid down only for the newly occupied territory and only for a short period.

Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces.

KEITEL.

H1144 - 0053

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of the Air Force - 1 (Copy 3)
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OKW - 7 (Copies 2, 5 - 10)

(The document is initialed by Frick, Schaiewind and Raeder - Translator's note.)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. C-138 18 November 1945

I, S/Sgt. Leo Davenport, 32496587, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. C-138.

S/Sgt Leo Davenport
32496587

Exhibit USA 538
Filed Jan. 4, 1946

H1144-0054

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. C-142
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

TOP SECRET (Rubber Stamp)

Top Secret
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21 copies
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PART A

SECTION I

INTENTION OF THE ARMY HIGH COMMAND
(Ob.d.H) AND ORDERS

Intention of the Army High Command
(Ob.d.H.) and orders.

1).
Intention of the Army High Command

The object of the operation is to destroy the Polish Armed Forces. High policy demands that the war should be begun by heavy surprise blows in order to achieve quick results. The intention of the Army High Command is to prevent a regular mobilisation and concentration of the Polish Army by a surprise invasion of Polish territory and to destroy the mass of the Polish Army which is to be expected to be west of the Vistula-Narev line. This is to be achieved by a concentric attack from Silesia on one side and Pomerania-East Prussia on the other side. The possible influence from Galicia against this operation must be eliminated. The main idea of the destruction of the Polish Army west of the Vistula - Narev Line with the elimination of the possible influence from Galicia remains unchanged even if advanced preparedness for defence on the part of the Polish Army, caused by previous political tension, should have to be taken into consideration. In such a case it may be a question of not making the first attack mainly with mechanised and motorised forces but of waiting for the arrival of stronger, non-motorised units. The Army High Command will then give the correspondingly later time for the crossing of the frontier. The endeavour to obtain a quick success will be maintained.

The Army Group Commands and the Army Commands (A.O.K.) will make their preparations on the basis of surprise of the enemy. There will be alterations necessary if surprise should have to be abandoned: these will have to be developed simply and quickly on the same basis: they are to be prepared mentally to such an extent, that in case of an order from the Army High Command they can be carried out quickly.

2). For the execution of these missions, Army Group South, consisting of the 14th, 10th and 8th Armies, and Army Group North, consisting of the 3rd and 4th Armies, are formed. For distribution of forces see Section II and III.

3). First Missions of Army Group South.

Army Group South attacks from Silesia with the concentration of strong forces (10th Army) between Zawiercie and Wielun in the general direction of Warsaw, scatters opposing Polish forces, and occupies as early as possible and with forces, as strong as possible, the VISTULA on both sides of WARSAW with the aim, to destroy the Polish Forces, still holding out in Western Poland, in co-operation with Army Group North.

* * * * * * * * *

H1144 - 0055

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT
NO. C-142 (Cont'd)

(Page 4)

4). First Mission of Army Group North.

Army Group North, beginning with Y-day, will establish the connection between the Reich and East Prussia, by cooperation of Pomeranian and East Prussian forces.

* * * * * *

(Page 7)

6). Cooperation of the Air Force.

The Air Force will, beginning with Y-day, attack and destroy the Polish Air Force and its ground installations.

* * * * * * *

7). Cooperation of the Navy.

The navy will keep open the seelanes to East Prussia, as well as blockade GDYNIA and the bay of DANZIG.

8). Crossing the Reich Frontier.

Army High Command (Ob.d.H) will order Y-day and the hour. With this time the crossing of, as well as flying over the Reich frontier by units of the army and units of the Luftwaffe, subordinated to the army, is permissible.

Supreme Commander of the Air Force will fly over the border with units of the Air Force at the same time.

All previous border violations are prohibited. The border guard, whose posting will follow X-order, is to be committed if necessary.

* * * * * * *

(Page 9)

/s/ BRAUCHITSCH.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. C-142

19 November 1945

I, WILLARD E. SKIDMORE, Lt.(jg), U.S.N.R., 391590, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the indicated excerpts from Document No. C-142.

WILLARD E. SKIDMORE
Lt. (jg) USNR
391590

SEC24-8/C-148

Exhibit USA 555
Filed Jan. 7. 1946

The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

Fuehrer's Headquarters
16th September 1941

WFSt/Section L(IV)Qu)
No. 002060/41 Most Secret

40 Copies
25th Copy

Subject: Communist Insurrection in occupied territories

1) Since the beginning of the campaign against Soviet Russia, Communist insurrection movements have broken out everywhere in the areas occupied by Germany. The type of action taken is growing from propaganda measures and attacks on individual members of the Armed Forces, into open rebellion and widespread guerilla warfare.

It can be seen that this is a mass movement centrally directed by Moscow, who is also responsible for the apparently trivial isolated incidents in areas which up to now have been otherwise quiet.

In view of the many political and economic crises in the occupied areas, it must, moreover, be anticipated, that nationalist and other circles will make full use of this opportunity of making difficulties for the German occupying forces by associating themselves with the Communist insurrection.

This creates an increasing danger to the German war effort, which shows itself chiefly in general insecurity for the occupying troops, and has already led to the withdrawal of forces to the main centers of disturbance.

2) The measures taken up to now to deal with this general insurrection movement have proved inadequate. The Fuehrer has now given orders that we take action everywhere with the most drastic means in order to crush the movement in the shortest possible time.

Only this course, which has always been followed successfully throughout the history of the extension of influence of great peoples, can restore order.

3) Action taken in this matter should be in accordance with the following general directions:

a) It should be inferred, in every case of resistance to the German occupying Forces, no matter what the individual circumstances, that it is of Communist origin.

b) In order to nip these machinations in the bud, the most drastic measures should be taken immediately on the first indication, so that the authority of the occupying Forces may be maintained, and further spreading prevented. In this connection it should be remembered that a human life in unsettled countries frequently counts for nothing and a deterrent effect can be attained only by unusual severity. The death penalty for 50-100 Communists should generally be regarded in these cases as suitable atonement for one German soldier's life. The way in which sentence is carried out should still further increase the deterrent effect.

The reverse course of action, that of imposing relatively lenient penalties, and of being content, for purposes of deterrence, with the threat of more severe measures, does not accord with these principles and should therefore not be followed.

c) The political relations between Germany and the country in which the disturbance is taking place, are no criterion for the censuring of the military authorities in occupation.

Rather, it should be borne in mind and so represented in propaganda, that stern measures also rid the inhabitants of the Communist criminals, and are thus to their own advantage.

Clever propaganda of this kind will consequently not result in the severe measures against the Communists having an undesirable reaction on the well-disposed sections of the population.

H1144 - 0056

d) Forces formed from the local inhabitants will generally fail to accomplish such acts of violance. They should on no account receive further support, for this involves increased danger to our own troops.

On the other hand, the fullest use can be made of rewards and remuneration for the population, in order to ensure their cooperation in a suitable way.

e) Where, in exceptional cases, court martial proceedings should be instituted in connection with Communist insurrections or other offences against the German occupying Forces, the most severe penalties are indicated.

In this connection only the death penalty can constitute a real deterrent. In particular, acts of espionage, deeds of sabotage and attempts to enter the Armed Forces of a foreign power, should as a matter of principle, be punished by death. Sentence of death should also as a general rule, be passed in cases of illicit possession of arms.

4) The Commanding Officersin the occupied territories are seeing to it that these principles are made known without delay to all military establishments concerned in dealing with Communist measures of insurrection.

(Indecipherable initial)

Keitel

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" " " " " Salonica-Aegean	3rd
" " " " " Southern Greece	4th
" " " " Commander Crete	5th
Armed Forces Commander Norway	6th
" " " Netherlands	7th
" " " Eastern territory	8th
" " " Ukraine	9th
Armed Forces plenipotentiary with the Reich Protector in Bohemia and Moravia	10th
Supreme Command of the Army (Ops Section)	11th
(OQu IV)	12th
(Gen. Qu) with Intelligence Section for	13th
Military Commander France	14th
Military Commander Belgium and Northern France	15th
Military Commander with Government of Poland	16th
Chief of Army Ordnance and BdE with Intelligence Section for Officer Commanding German troops in Denmark	17th 18th
C-in-C of the Air Force (General staff of the Air Force)	19th
Supreme Command of the Navy (Naval War Staff)	20th
Armistice Commission Wiesbaden	21st
Foreign Office for the attention of Herr Botsch Ritter	22nd
Orders staff Frankfurt/O) (Verfuegungstab)	23rd
Orders staff Breslau) via LIII	24th
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces	
Armed Forces Ops Staff	25th
Section L	26th-32nd
Armed Forces Propaganda	33rd
Foreign Department / Abwehr	34th
Foreign Section	35th
Abwehr III	36th
Economic Ordnance Dept: (Wi Rue Amt)	37th
General Armed Forces Dept.	38th
WR (?*	39th
Admin Officer with Government of Poland Cracow	40th

H1144 - 0057

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-156
OFFICE OF THE U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Preface

The object and aim of this memorandum isto draw a technically reliable picture based on documentary records and the evidence of those who took part, of the fight of the Navy against the unbearable regulations of the Peace Treaty of Versailles.

It shows, that the Reich Navy after the liberating activities of the Free Corps and of Scapa Flow did not rest, but found ways and means to lay with unquenchable enthusiasm, in addition to the building up of the 15,000-man Navy, the basis for a greater development in the future and so create by the work of soldiers and technicians the preliminary condition for a later rearmament.

It must also distinguish more clearly the services of these men, who - without being known in wide circles - applied themselves with extraordinary zeal in responsibility in the service of the fight against the Peace Treaty; thereby, stimulated by the highest feeling of duty, they risked, particularly in the early days of their fight, themselves and their positions unrestrainedly in the partially self-ordained tasks.

This compilation makes it clearer however, that even such ideal and ambitious plans can be realized only to a small degree if the concentrated and united strength of the whole people isnot behind the courageous activity of the soldier. Only when the Fuehrer had created the second and even more important condition for an effective rearmament, in the co-ordination of the whole nation and in the fusion of the political, financial and spiritual powers, could the work ofthe soldier find its fulfilment.

The framework of this Peace Treaty, the most shameful known in world history, collapsed under the driving power of this united will.

Villau, 20 April 1937.

The Editor

H1144-0058

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-156.
OFFICE OF THE U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL.

SEC-24.9/C-156. Copy Nr. 274.

Secret.
The fight of the Navy
against Versailles
1919 - 1935.
Compiled by
Captain Schüssler
Published
by the High Command of the German Navy
Berlin 1937.

M. Dr. Nr. 352

Dienstschrift Nr. 15. Brtf = Nr 274.

Geheim.
Der Kampf der Marine
gegen Versailles
1919 - 1935
Bearbeitet von
Käpitan zur See Schüssler
Herausgegeben
vom Oberkommando der Kriegs marine
Berlin 1937.

M. Dv. Nr. 352 -

CHAPTER IV PAGE 75.

Concealed Rearmament under the Leadership of
the Government of the Reich.
(From 1933 until military freedom in 1935).

IV. Aufrüstung unter Führung der Reichs=
regierung in getarnter Form.

(Von 1933 bis zur Wehrfreiheit 1935).

The unification of the whole nation which was combined with the taking over of power on the 30th of January 1933 was of decisive influence on the size and the shape of further rearmament. While the second chamber (Reichsrat) approached its dissolution and withdrew as a legislative body, the Reichstag assumed a composition which could only take a one sided attitude towards the re-armament of the Armed Forces.

The Government took over the management of the re-armament programme upon this foundation.

Development of the Armed Forces.

This taking over of the management by the Reich Government developed for the Armed Forces in such a manner that the War Minister, General v. Blomberg, and through him the three branches of the Armed Forces received far reaching powers from the Reich Cabinet for the development of the Armed Forces. The whole organisation of the Reich was included in this work. In view of these powers the collaboration of the former inspecting body in the management of the secret expenditure was from then on dispensed with. There remained only the inspecting duties of the Accounting Office of the German Reich.

Independance of the Commander in Chief of
the Navy.

The Commander in Chief of the Navy, Admiral Raeder, (honorary Doctor), had received hereby a far reaching independence in the building and development of the Navy. This was only hampered insofar as the previous concealment of re-armament had to be continued in consideration of the Versailles Treaty.

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Beside the public budget there remained the previous special budget, which was greatly increased in view of the considerable credits for the provision of labor which were made available by the Reich. Wide powers in the handling of these credits were given to the Director of the Budget Department of the Navy, up to 1934 Commodore Schüssler afterwards Commodore Förste. These took into consideration the increased responsibility of the Chief of the Budget.

Declaration of military freedom.

When the Führer, relying upon the strengthening of the Armed Forces executed in the meanwhile, announced the restoration of the military sovereignty of the German Reich the last mentioned limitation in re-armament works, namely the external camouflage was eliminated. Freed from all the shackles which have hampered our ability to move freely on and under water, on land and in the air for 1½ decades, and carried by the newly awakened fighting spirit of the whole nation, the Armed Forces and as part of it the Navy can lead with full strength towards its completion the re-armament already under way with the goal of securing for the Reich its rightful position in the world.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

I, KENNETH DUKE, Major, R.A., 109907, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation of an excerpt of Document No. C-156.

KENNETH DUKE,
Major, R.A.,
109907.

H1144 - 0060

H1144-0061

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-167
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

NAVAL WAR STAFF
B. Nr. 1. op 355/41 g.K.

- - - - - - - - - - - - -

- - - -9.)

B.) Personnel Position.

f.) The C in C of the Navy asks for confirmation that the whole of Greece will have to be occupied even in the event of a peaceful settlement. Fuehrer: The complete occupation is a prerequisite of any settlement.

- - - - - - - - - - - - -

RAEDER.

- - - - - - - - - - - - -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. C-167

28 November 1945

I, GERALD SCHAEFER, 2nd Lt. Inf. O-1332102, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document Number C-167, which is paragraph 9.B.f., page 6 of Extract of a meeting between RAEDER and HITLER on 18 March, 1941. (C-152).

GERALD SCHAEFER
2nd Lt. Inf O-1332102

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-174
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander
of the Armed Forces
WFA/Abt. L. Nr 22070/40 G. Kdos. Chefs.

Berlin, 1.3.1940

9 Copies
3rd. Copy.

Most Secret *

TOP SECRET
By Officer only

Directive for "Fall Weseruebung" **

1.) The development of the Situation in Scandinavia requires the making of all preparations for the occupation of Denmark and Norway by a part of the German Armed Forces ("Fall Weseruebung"). This operation should prevent British enroachment on Scandinavia and the Baltic, further it should guarantee our ore base in Sweden and give our Navy and Air Force a wider start line against Britain. The part which the Navy and the Air Force will have to play, within the limits of their capabilities, is to protect the operation against the interference of British naval and air striking forces.

In view of our military and political power in comparison with that of the Scandinavian States, the force to be employed in the "Fall Weseruebung" will be kept as small as possible. The numerical weakness will be balanced by daring actions and surprise execution. On principle we will do our utmost to make the operation appear as a peaceful occupation, the object of which is the military protection of the neutrality of the Scandinavian States. Corresponding demands will be transmitted to the Governments at the beginning of the occupation. If necessary, demonstrations by the Navy and the Air Force, will provide the necessary emphasis. If in spite of this resistance should be met with, all military means will be used to crush it.

2.) I put in charge of the preparations and the conduct of the operation against Denmark and Norway the Commanding General of the XXI Army Corps, General d. I. * v. Falkenhorst (Commander of "Group XXI").

In questions of the conduct of operations the above named is directly under my orders. The Staff is to be completed from all the three branches of the Armed Forces.

The force which will be selected for the purpose of "Fall Weseruebung" will be under separate command. They will not be allocated for other operational theatres.

The part of the Air Force detailed for the purpose of the "Weseruebung" will be tactically under the orders of Group XXI. After the completion of their task they revert to the command of Ob.d.L. ****

The employment of the forces which are under direct Naval and Air Force command will take place in agreement with the Commander of Group XXI.

The administration and supply of the forces posted to Group XXI will be ensured by the branches of the Armed Forces themselves according to the demands of the Commander.

Translator's Notes:

* Initialled by Fricke
** Code name for Invasion of Norway and Denmark
*** der Infanterie-of the Infantry
**** Commander in Chief of the Air Forde

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H1144 - 0063

3.) The crossing of the Danish border and the landings in Norway must take place simultaneously. I emphasise that the operations must be prepared as quickly as possible. In case the enemy seizes the iniative against Norway, we must be able to apply immediately our own counter-measures.

It is most important that the Scandinavian States as well as the Western opponents should be taken by surprise by our measures. All preparations, particularly those of transport and of readiness, drafting and embarkation of the troops, must be made with this factor in mind.

In case the preparations for embarkation can no longer be kept secret, the leaders and the troops will be deceived with fictitious objectives. The troops may be acquainted with the actual objectives only after putting to sea.

4.) Occupation of Denmark ("Weseruebung Süd").

Added to this, having secured the most important places, the Group will break through as quickly as possible from Fuenen to Skagen and to the east coast. In Seeland bases will be captured early on. These will serve as starting points for later occupation. The Navy will provide forces for the securing of the connection Nyborg - Korsör and for swift capture of the Kleine - Belt - Bridge as well as for landing of troops should the necessity arise. She will also prepare the defence of the coast.

The Air-Force will provide squadrons of which the primary object will be demonstrations and dropping of leaflets. Full use of the existing Danish ground defences and air defence must be ensured.

5.) Occupation of Norway ("Weseruebung Nord")

The task of the Group XXI: Capture by surprise of the most important places on the coast by sea and airborne operations.

The Navy will take over the preparation and carrying out of the transport by sea of the landing troops as well as the transport of the forces which will have to be brought to Oslo in a later stage of the operation. She will escort supplies and reserves on the way over by sea.

Preparations must be made for speedy completion of coastal defence in Norway.

The Air Force, after the occupation has been completed, will ensure air defence and will make use of Norwegian bases for air welfare against Britain.

6.) Group XXI will make regular reports to the OKW concerning the state of preparations and will submit a chronological summary of the progress of preparations. The shortest necessary space of time between the issue of the order for "Weseruebung" and its execution must be reported.

Intended Battle Headquarters will be reported.

Code names: Wesertag - the day of the operation.

Weserzeit - "H" hour.

(Signed) A. Hitler.

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 TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-174 (Cont'd)

Distribution:

O.C. Group XXI	Copy No. 1.
C.in C. Army	" " 2.
C.in C. Navy	" " 3.
C.in C. Air Force	" " 4.

Supreme Command Armed Forces

Head W.F.A. *	" " 5.
L. Section	" Nos. 6 - 9

* Wehrmachtsführungsamt - operational H.Q. Armed Forces.

- - - - -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. C-174

27 November 1945.

I, D. E. SHERRIFF, Second Officer, WRNS, 36482, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. C-174.

D. E. SHERRIFF,
Second Officer, WRNS,
36482.

H1144-0065

Exhibit USA 544
Filed Jan. 7, 1946

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-178
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

SEC24-10/C-178

Berlin, 11.2. 1943

Naval War Staff
New: Reg. No. 1. Skl Ii 446/43 Top Secret
requested by: 3rd Skl. 1219 g. of 2/1/43

Top Secret

Pencil note: I suggest informing Chief 3/SKL-Ic - the subordinate commanders are informed.

Top Secret,
to be transmitted by officer courier.

I) Via
Ia
to be shown to 1./SKL (Naval War Staff).

SUBJECT: Treatment of Saboteurs:

From the notice given by 3/SKL (Naval War Staff) on February 1st 43, it has been discovered that the competent departments of the General Staff of the Army, as well as those of the Air Force Operations Staff have a wrong conception regarding the treatment of saboteurs. A telephone inquiry at 3/SKL proved that this Naval authority was not correctly informed either. In view of this situation, reference is made to figure 6) of the Fuehrer order of October 18, 42 (Appendix to volume-No. 1 SKL I Ops 26 367/42 Top Secret of October 28, 42) according to which all commanders and officers, who have neglected their duty in instructing their units about the order referring to treatment of saboteurs, are threatened with punishment by court martial.

The first Fuehrer order concerning this matter of October 18, 42 (Appendix to volume-No. 1. SKL. 1 Ops 2108/42 Top Secret of October 27,42) was given the protection of Top Secret merely because it is stated therein:

1.) That, according to the Fuehrer's views the spreading of military sabotage organizations in the East and West may have portentous consequences for our whole conduct of the war and

2.) that the shooting of uniformed prisoners acting on military orders must be carried out even after they have surrendered valuntarily and asked for pardon.

On the other hand, the annihilation of sabotage units in battle is no atall to be kept secret but on the contrary to be currently published in the OKW (Supreme Command of the Armed Forces) reports. The purpose of these measures to act as a deterrent, will not be achieved, if those taking part in enemy "Commando Operations" would not learn that certain death and not safe imprisonment awaits them. As the saboteurs are toebe annihilated immediately, unless their statements are first needed for military reasons, it is necerrary that not only all members of the Armed Forces must receive instructions that these types of saboteurs, even if they are in uniform, are to be annihilated, but also all departments of the home staff, dealing with this kind of question, must be informed of the course of actbom which has been ordered.

Practical difficulties may develop because of the definition of the term "sabotage units". The annihilation instructions,

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according to figure 5 of the Fuehrer order of October 18, 42, do not apply to troop participating in large scale landing operations and large scale air borne operations. The criterion is to be found in that in the latter case an open battle takes place, whereas, for instance, 10 or more people who land by sea or air or drop by parachute not to fight an open battle but to destroy either a factory, a bridge or a railway installation, would fall into the category of those who must be annihilated.

It is to be assumed that Security III is acquainted with the Fuehrer order and will therefore reply accordingly to the objections of the Army General Staff and the Air Force Operations Staff. As far as the Navy is concerned, it remains to be seen whether or not this case should be used to make sure, after a conference with the C-in-C of the Navy, that all departments concerned have an entirely clear conception regarding the treatment of members of Commando units.

II) Ii

Ii

Translator's note: Initials unreadable.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO C-178

23 November 1945

I, WALTER SELIGSON, 1st Lt., 0-1558904, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. C-178.

WALTER SELIGSON
1st Lt.
0-1558904

Exhibit U.S.A. 543
Filed Jan. 7, 1946

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. C-179
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

SEC24-10/C-179

Naval War Staff
Ref. No.1 SKL I Op. 26367/42 Most Secret

BERLIN, 28 October 1942

To:- See Distribution:

Enclosed please find a Führer Order regarding annihilation of terror and sabotage units.

This order must not be distributed in writing by Flotilla leaders, Section Commanders or officers of this rank.

After verbal distribution to subordinate sections the above authorities must hand this order over to the next highest section which is responsible for its confiscation and destruction.

PP:

In Draft signed:

WAGNER

Checked:

H1144-0067

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. C-179
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

H1144-0068

TOP SECRET

The Fuehrer
No. 003830/42 g. Kdos. OKW/WFSt. Fuehrer HQ, 18 Oct. 1942

12 Copies

1.) For some time our enemies have been using in their warfare methods which are outside the international Geneva Conventions. Especially brutal and treacherous is the behavior of the so-called commandos, who, as is established, are partially recruited even from freed criminals in enemy countries. From captured orders it is divulged, that they are directed not only to shackle prisoners, but also to kill defenseless prisoners on the spot at the moment in which they believe that the latter as prisoners represent a burden in the further pursuit of their purposes or could otherwise be a hindrance. Finally, orders have been found in which the killing of prisoners has been demanded in principle.

2.) For this reason it was already announced in an addendum to the Armed Forces report of 7 October 1942, that in the future, Germany, in the fact of these sabotage troops of the British and their accomplices, will resort to the same procedure, i.e., that they will be ruthlessly mowed down by the German troops in combat, wherever they may appear.

3.) I therefore order:

From now on all enemies on so-called Commando missions in Europe or Africa challenged by German troops, even if they are to all appearances soldiers in uniform or demolition troops, whether armed or unarmed, in battle or in flight, are to be slaughtered to the last man. It does not make any difference whether they are landed from ships and aeroplanes for their actions, or whether they are dropped by parachute. Even if these individuals, when found, should apparently be prepared to give themselves up, no pardon is to be granted them on principle. In each individual case full information is to be sent to the O.K.W. for publication in the Report of the Military Forces.

4.) If individual members of such commandos, such as agents, saboteurs, etc. fall into the hands of the military forces by some other means, through the police in occupied territories for instance, they are to be handed over immediately to the SD. Any imprisonment under military guard, in PW Stockades for instance, etc., is strictly prohibited, even if this is only intended for a short time.

5.) This order does not apply to the treatment of any enemy soldiers who, in the course of normal hostilities (large-scale offensive actions, landing operations and airborne operations), are captured - in open battle or give themselves up. Nor does this order apply to enemy soldiers falling into our hands after battles at sea, or enemy soldiers trying to save their lives by parachute after battles.

6.) I will hold responsible under Military Law, for failing to carry out this order, all commanders and officers who either have neglected their duty of instructing the troops about this order, or acted against this order where it was to be executed.

Signed: Adolf Hitler.

DISTRIBUTION:

General Army Staff	1st Copy
Chief of Army Armament and C-in-C Reinforcements	2nd Copy
Supreme Command of the Navy/Naval War Staff	3rd Copy
C-in-C Air Force/Air Force Ops Staff	4th Copy
C-in-C Armed Forces Norway	5th Copy
C-in-C Armed Forces Netherlands	6th Copy
C-in-C Armed Forces South East	7th Copy
C-in-C Armed Forces Eastern province	8th Copy
C-in-C Armed Forces Ukraine	9th Copy
C-in-C Armed Forces West	10th Copy
(Mountain) Army High Command 20	11th Copy
C-in-C German Troops in Denmark	12th Copy
C-in-C South	13th Copy
Panzer Army Africa	14th Copy
German General attached to H.Q. Italian Armed Forces	15th Copy
Reichsführer - SS and Chief of German Police and for H.Q. Security Police	16th - 17th Copies
Supreme Command Armed Forces/AWA	18th Copy
A/Ausl./Abw.	19th Copy
W.R	20th Copy
Armed Forces propaganda	21st Copy
Armed Forces Ops Staff (Army)) (Navy)) Ktb (Air Force)) Organisation) Qu(draft))	22nd Copy
	23rd Copy

Note for Distribution:

These instructions are not to be distributed over and above the Battalions and corresponding staffs of the other services. After notification, those copies distributed over and above the Regimental and corresponding staffs of the other services must be withdrawn and destroyed.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO.C-179

I, Mark S. Schafer, Pvt. 42090012, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. C-179.

Mark S. Schafer,
Pvt. 42090012.

H1144 - 0069

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-182
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

SEC 24-10/C-182

TOP SECRET

Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces
OKW L 1 a No. 427/38 Top Secret

Berlin, 11th March 1938
2045 hours.

C-in-C Navy
(pencil note) has been informed

35 Copies
6th Copy

Re: Operation Otto

Directive No. 2

1) The demands of the German ultimatum to the Austrian government have not been fulfilled.

2) The Austrian Armed Forces have been ordered to withdraw in front of the entry of German troops and to avoid fighting.

The Austrian Government has ceased to function of its own accord.

3) To avoid further bloodshed in Austrian towns, the entry of the German Armed Forces into Austria will commence, according to directive No. 1, at daybreak on 12.3.

I expect the set objectives to be reached, by exerting all forces to the full, as quickly as possible.

signed Adolf HITLER

initialled by JODL
and possibly WARLIMONT

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. C-182

13 November 1945

I, GERARD SCHAEFER, 2nd Lt., O-1332102, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 269 PS

GERARD SCHAEFER
2nd Lt.,
O-1332102

H1144 - 0070

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT L-43
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL.

The Chief of the Organizational Staff
in the General Staff of the Air Force

Berlin
2 May 1938

No. 50/38 Top Secret

3 copies
copy No. 1

To the

Chief of the General Staff of the Air Force.

In the following I submit the

"Organizational Study 1950"

Purpose:

The task is to search, within a framework of very broadly conceived conditions, for the most suitable type of organization of the Air Force. The result gained is termed

"Distant Objective"

From this shall be deduced the goal to be reached in the second phase of the setting-up process in 1942; this will be called

"Final Objective 1942"

This in turn yields what is considered the most suitable proposal for the reorganization of the staffs of the Air Force Group Commands, Air Gaue, Air Divisions, etc. which is called

"Interim Solution as of 1 October 1938"

signed Kammhuber

Table of Contents

a. Text:

Section I : Assumptions
with it: Enclosure No. 1 (Map)

" II : Consideration of the Principles of organization on the basis of the assumptions for war and peace made in Section I.

" III : Consideration of further questions.

" IV : Conclusions drawn from the Study as to the "Distant Objective"
with it: Enclosure No. 2 (Distant Objective)

" V : Conclusions drawn from the Study as to the organization of the Air Force according to the hitherto accepted final objective 1942
with it: Enclosure No. 3 (Final Objective 1942)

" VI : Conclusions drawn from the Study regarding the reorganization as of 1 October 1938
with it: Enclosure No. 4 (Interim Solution as of 1 October 1938)

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b. Special Enclosures:

Proposal for the setting-up of flight formations until 1942 (New Final Objective 1942)	Encl. No. 5
Proposal for dispersal of these formations	Encl. No. 6
Proposal for the setting-up of AA artillery until 1942 (New Final Objective 1942)	Encl. No. 7
Proposal for dispersal of these formations, including increase of mobilization	Encl. No. 8

The Chief of the Organizational Staff

Berlin
2 May 1938

No. 50/38 Top Secret

Organizational Study 1950

I. Assumption.

1. Frontiers of Germany see Map, Enclosure No. 1
2. Organization of Air Force in peacetime:
   7 Group Commands:
   (1 Berlin, 2 Brunswick, 3 Munich, 4 Vienna, 5 Budapest, 6 Warsaw, 7 Koenigsberg).
   1 - 3 flight corps are subordinated to each Group Command.
   Each flight corps consists of 2 flight divisions, each of which comprises
   3 mixed combat Geschwader (2 combat groups, 1 dive bomber group)
   1 heavy fighter Geschwader.
   Total Strength: 18 flight corps = 36 flight divisions =
   108 mixed Geschwader)
   36 heavy fighter Geschwader) = 144 Geschwader
   25 reconnaissance groups (F)

   Minimum performance: Range: 6- 8 000 km
   Speed: 5- 600 km

   2-4 Air Gaue are subordinated to each Group Command.

   (Foot note: In the study 32 Air Gaue are assumed (without sea))

   The Air Gaue are Corps commands. They are in charge of:

   1. Air defense (AA, light fighters)
   2. The Air Gau signal units
   3. The ground organization
   4. Supply
   5. Everything pertaining to replacements (also for flying troops and schools)
   6. The administration
   7. The civil aviation offices

II. Consideration of the principles of organization on the basis of the the assumptions for war and peace made in Section I:

1. Attack Forces:
   Principal adversaries: England, France, and Russia.

   a. One front war, for instance against England.

If all 144 Geschwader are employed against England, they must be concentrated in the Western half of the Reich, i.e. they must be deployed in such a way, that by making full use of their range they can reach all English territory down to the last corner and save themselves unnecessarily

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long flight routes. 144 Geschwader require 432 operational airfields. Concentration in one Air Force Group, for instance, in Air Force Group 2, which is closest to England, is therefore impossible. There must be a deployment in depth, which must be distributed over Air Force Groups 2, 1 and 3 at least.

Regardless of whether or not Germany respects neutrality, i.e., whether or not planes fly to England via the German Bay, in any case the framework of one single Air Force Group will be split:

1. because it is impossible spatially, to accomodate so large an attack force in one Air Force Group,

2. because it is too much for one Command to have to lead so large a number of formations (18 corps), even if it is given authority over all neighboring Airfield Regional Commands occupied by the attack force.

Hence it follows, that the Supreme Commander of the Air Force himself must take over the leadership of the attack. A further, and not the least important reason for this is that otherwise he would be eliminated, for all practical purposes, if he subordinated the entire attack force to a single Command.

It remains to be decided, whether he is to lead by giving direct orders to the Flight Corps, while the Air Force Group Commands would be responsible only for ground organization and supply, or whether the Group Commands are to be established as intermediate authorities also in regard to operations.

The decision is determined

a. by the numerical strength of the flight troops
b. by their dependence on ground organization and supply

Concerning a:

What has been said above a propos a single Air Force Group with regard to numerical limitation, also applies to the Supreme Commander of the Air Force himself. As a rule one Command should not be in charge of more than 6 larger tactical units. Since in the example chosen 18 flight corps are presumed to exist, these cannot possibly be all under the direct command of the Supreme Commander of the Air Force; it is necessary to establish higher commands on an intermediate level. These are the Air Force Group Commands; as the Air Force grows these automatically acquire an intermediate position as operational commands.

Concerning b:

Moreover, the dependence on ground organization and supply is an argument in favor of establishing the Air Force Group Commands as intermediate operational authorities, at the same time leaving them in operational charge of ground organization and supply in one form or another. Ground organization and supply are elements of operational command and cannot be separated from the latter without disadvantage. If, for instance, the Air Force Groups were established purely as operational commands for the purpose of leading the attack forces, the Supreme Commander of the Air Force himself would have to take charge of ground organization and supply and adjust them to the requirements of the troops. In view of the assumed extent of the German Reich with its 18 Flight Corps and its 22 large Air Gaue, this task is too large for one central authority to be able to handle it. Since preparations for attack are to be made for several fronts and for several possible contingencies, decentralization by means of intermediate command authorities is indispensable. These intermediate authorities can only be those, which are personally interested in leading the attack, i.e. (they must be) command authorities, which are in charge of attack forces in wartime and which must also be in charge of the respective ground organization and supply. How necessary this line of authority is, is shown by the fact that not a single Air Command is willing to rely on the Air Gaue concerned to

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"make its bed" "by order" of the Supreme Commander of the Air Force, and that each demands to be put in charge of the Air Gau or Airfield Regional Command concerned (see the subordination of the Airfield Regional Commands near the Bavarian Ostmark under Air Force Group 1 in the event of "Case Green" and the applications by Air Force Group 3 to be put in charge of Air Gaue XII, Giessen, in the event of "Case Red"). The channel for "applications via the Supreme Commander of the Air Force" simply is too long, there are too many day-to-day frictions and punctures. He who leads the attack will and must not be deprived of control, regardless of whether or not his formations on the ground are properly supplied. "Operational command" does not start in the air, but on the ground, and preparation by the ground organization is part of the operation, just as much as the tactical preparation of the flight.

. . . . . .

Thus the above discussion leads to the result that the Air Force Group Commands must be commands in charge of the attack force and at the same time commands in charge of the ground organization and supplies for this force.

Furthermore, they must be locally bound, because this enables them to make the most of the advantage flying troops have over all other troops, i.e. that they can push forward the preparations for war already in peacetime to such an extent that the highest degree of preparedness for action is achieved.

If it is assumed, as in the present study, that in peacetime the existing 18 Flight Corps are distributed over the whole Reich, while in war they operate, for instance, from the three Air Force Group Commands Nos. 2, 1 and 3 to fight against England, it immediately becomes clear that these 18 Corps Commanders cannot be let loose independently on these three Air Force Groups in order to make their preparations there in peacetime. Since the same preparations must be made on the other fronts, the Corps Commanders would be travelling most of the time, without there being any guarantee that their preparations are sufficient, since they have no command authority in the deployment area and cannot obtain such authority. Therefore they can only submit "requests" to the Supreme Commander of the Air Force; the fulfillment of these requests can hardly be handled, still less controlled, centrally.

The more the Reich grows in area and the more the Air Force grows in strength, the more imperative it becomes, to have locally bound commands which prepare the air way on their fronts according to the orders and instructions of the Supreme Commander of the Air Force, and which during the war have a responsible share in the leadership.

. . . . . .

b. War on several fronts, for instance, against France and Russia.

Assuming that the Supreme Commander of the Air Force intends to deliver the first blow against France, the 144 attack Geschwader will be deployed in Air Force Groups 3, 2 and 1, and the attack will be carried out as in a one-front war . The Air Force Groups 6 and 7 meanwhile make the last preparations in the way of ground organization, so that they can start with the attack as soon as the formations are transferred from the West.

This is a schematic procedure by which one adversary after the other is defeated by concentrating the attack on him. In this case operational mobility consists merely in a swift transfer from West to East, by which, however, it is by no means exploited to the full.

Since the operational Air Force is presumed to have a range of 6 - 8 000 km (individual German aircraft have reached this even today, cf. world record of the Do 18), it can theoretically fly from its home-port to Paris today and to Moscow tomorrow. It can therefore without difficulty operate against the East from operational airfields selected for an attack on France without changing airfields. Since, however, Air Force Group Commands 1-3 are oriented towards France and are the ones most strongly tied down, they cannot at the same time lead an attack against the East, bypassing the Eastern Air Force Group Commands. In such cases the Supreme Commander of the Air Force takes immediate charge of the Flight Corps concerned and directs the attack against the East himself. Air Force Group Commands 1-3 merely take care of preparations on the ground. The formations start from the operational airports they have used hitherto, they fly for instance against Moscow, and return to the airports whence they started. When the action against the East is completed, they are put once more at the disposal of Air Force Groups 1 - 3 to continue their attacks against the West.

. . . . . .

V. Conclusions drawn from the Study as to the organization of the Air Force according to the hitherto accepted final objective 1942.

For this compare Enclosure No. 3 (final objective 1942)

1. The following will exist in 1942 (without sea):

I. 3 Air Force Group Commands (Berlin, Brunswick, Munich)
1 Air Force Command East Prussia
1 Air Force Command Austria

II. 11 Air Gau Commands (Koenigsberg, Berlin, Dresden, Breslau, Hanover, Muenster, Wiesbaden, Nuremberg, Stuttgart, Munich, Vienna)

III. 18 combat Geschwader
6 dive bomber Geschwader
6 heavy fighter Geschwader

. . . . . .

VI. Conclusions drawn from the Study regarding the reorganization as of 1 October 1938.

For this compare Enclosure No. 4. (Interim Solution as of 1 October 1938)

1. The following will exist on 1 October 1938 (sea excepted):

I. 3 Air Force Commands (Berlin, Brunswick, Munich)
1 Air Force Command East Prussia
1 Air Force Command Austria

II. 11 Air Gau Commands (Koenigsberg, Berlin, Dresden, Breslau, Hanover, Muenster, Wiesbaden, Nuremberg, Stuttgart, Munich, Vienna)

III. 12 combat Geschwader)
3 divebomber Geschwader) (including the new
3 heavy fighter Geschwader (scheduled)) units to be set up at the end of the year)

2. It will not yet be possible to form mixed combat Geschwader, since the insufficient ranges of the divebombers will not permit this. Nor, will it be possible yet to form flight divisions, composed as assumed for the Final Solution, since the heavy fighter plane is only now in production.

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3. In view of the small number of defense forces and certain personnel reasons, it does not as yet seem justified to establish the Air Gau Commands at once as Corps Command Staffs (Commanding Generals and Commanders of the Air Gaue).

Therefore only an intérim solution can be chosen on 1 October 1938. This, however, must be of such a nature that the Final Solution is not obstructed, but prepared and enabled to grow out of it slowly and organically.

This results in the following Proposal for the Interim Solution as of 1 October 1938:

. . . . . .

d. The establishment of the flying formations will be carried out according to program, so far as their contents are concerned. For organizational reasons it is urgently desired that the establishment period be advanced to the time from 1 Nov. to 31 Dec. 1938, in order to achieve as soon as possible clear organizational and command relationships, which are the basis of any fruitful work. The disadvantage this entails from the point of view of training can be eliminated by letting the flying and part of the technical personnel continue its training at the parent units and schools as long as is necessary, and by not transferring it to the new formations until the middle of December.

This will make it possible to start the next mobilization year already on 1 Jan. 1939, and thus to cut short the extremely unpleasant period from October to the start of the new mobilization plan, whose foundations will be completely changed in all decisive points as of 1 Oct. 38.

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CERTIFICATE OF PARTIAL TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. L-43

21 November 1945.

I, ERNST M. COHN, Pfc, 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct partial translation of Document No. L-43.

ERNST M. COHN
Pfc, 33925738.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT L-51
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Before me, Capt. A.J. HACKL, being authorized a.s.o..... .... appeared Adolf ZUTTER, former adjutant in Mauthausen who, being by me a.s.o. ... ... statement in his own handwriting:

I, Adolf ZUTTER, born 10 February 1889, having been adjutant at Mauthausen since June 1942, make the following statement:

Colonel (Standartenfuehrer) ZIEREIS, the commander of camp Mauthausen, each time he had opened the secret mail, handed to me in my capacity as adjutant very many orders for executions which I had to pass on to 1st Lt. (Obersturmfuehrer) SCHULZ. These orders for executions were written out approximately in the following manner:

Organization.
(RSHA.-"Reichsicherheits-hauptamt": Reich Police Head Office. Or: "Reichs-kriminalpolizeiamt": Reich Criminal Police Head Office)

Berlin, 194

Subject: Executions.

Reference: Your letter from ..... , AZ.....

The above named prisoners

Name..... Born.....At.....

are to be executed by order of the Special Court of Justice (Sondergericht") - or: by order of the tribunal of the People, ("Volksgericht": Peoples Court) - - follows the designation of the seat of the court.

A report that the order has been complied with must be sent.

Signature

There were also orders for executions which did not contain the name of the court. Until the assassination of Heydrich these orders were signed by him or by his competent representative; later on the orders were signed by KALTENBRUNNER but mostly by his deputy, Lt. General (Gruppenfuehrer) MULLER.

Dr. Ernst KALTENBRUNNER who signed the above mentioned orders had the rank of SS General (Obergruppenfuehrer) and was the Chief of the RSHA.

Dr. KALTENBRUNNER is about 40 years old, about 1.78 to 1.80 meters tall, very obvious fencing scars.

As long as Dr. KALTENBRUNNER had been Higher SS and Police Officer in Vienna, he had visited the camp several times; later on, as Chief of the RSHA he also visited the camp though more seldom. At these visits, the commandant usually received him in front of the HQ-building and reported there. Concerning the American Military Mission which had landed behind the German main line of resistance in Slovakian or Hungarian territory in January 1945, I remember when in January 1945 it was brought to the concentration camp in Mauthausen. I suppose they were about 12 to 15 newcomers. They wore an American or Canadian

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uniform, of brown-green color, blouse, and cap made of cloth. Eight or ten days after their arrival the order for execution came in by radiogram or teletype. Colonel ZIERIS came to me in the office and said: now KALTENBRUNNER has authorized the execution. The letter was secret and had the signature signed KALTENBRUNNER. These people were then shot according to martial law and T/Sgt (Obersscharfuehrer) Niedermeyer handed their belongings over to me. In spring 1945, a written order based on an Army manual to destroy all files was received by the security officer in Mauthausen, 1st Lt. (Obersturmfuehrer) Reimer; this order had been sent by Lt (Untersturmfuehrer) Meinhardt, security officer of Section D in Oranienburg. Reimer forwarded this order personally in written form to the various sections and supervised the compliance with it. Among the files were also all the execution orders.

This declaration was made by me, on 3 pages, in my own handwriting, in Linz/Austria, on 2 August 1945, at 10.45 according to my own free will, without any compulsion. I swear that I shall say nothing but the plain truth, that I shall conceal nothing and add nothing. So help me God, the Almighty.

(Signed) Adolf Zutter
Police Jail Linz.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. L-51

6 November 1945

I, GOETZ MAYER, T/5, 33812169, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. L-51.

GOETZ MAYER,
T/5, 33812169

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Exhibit USA 540
Filed Jan. 4, 1946

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT L 52
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

COPY

The contents of this Memorandum are for the personal attention of the Commanders-in-Chief, and of the Chief-of-Staff, OKW, only.

They are responsible for its secrecy.

Distribution:

1) C-in-C, Army, Col-Gen. von BRAUCHITSCH.
2) C-in-C, Navy, Grand-Admiral Dr. (honoris causa) RAEDER.
3) C-in-C, GAF, Gen-Fieldmarshal GOERING.
4) C of S, OKW, Col-Gen. KEITEL.

Berlin, 9 October 1939

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Memorandum and Directives for Conduct of the War in the West

Berlin, 9 October 39

The dissolution of the First German Reich as ratified by the Treaty of Muenster (1648) resulted in that arrangement of European States, known as the "balance of power", which made possible the formation of the French and, above all, the British Empire. The decisive factor of this state of affaris (also desired by England) was the disintegration of the mass of the German people combined with the prevention by treaty-terms of its later reunification into one uniform state. Every attempt to form the German people into such a new state was therefore considered upsetting
P2 to the European equilibrium and was attacked. Even the British friendship
P2 with Prussia, for what it was worth, cooled-off the moment the latter became conscious of its German mission and attempted to reconstruct a Prusso-German Reich. The far-sighted Bismarck and Moltke recongized the probability of again having to defend their newly-formed Reich at a later stage against those interested in maintaining the European "balance of power", and the necessity of carrying this through. World War I, set in motion by a minor external event, was therefore supposed to divide the unity of the Reich again or to remove possible preconditions for a future greater unifi-
P3 cation. The present war of the Western Powers against the new Reich also serves the same ends. The aim of the Anglo-French conduct of war is to dissolve or disintegrate the 80-million state again so that in this manner the European equilibrium, in otherwords the balance of power, which serves their ends, may be restored. This battle therefore will have to be fought out by the German people one way or another. Nevertheless, the very great successes of the first month of war could serve, in the event of an immediate signing of peace, to strengthen the Reich psychologically and materially to such an extent that from the German view-point there would be no* objection *P4 to ending the war immediately, insofar as the present achievement with arms is not jeopardised by the peace-treaty.

It is not the object of this memorandum to study the possibilities in this direction or even to take them into consideration. In this paper I shall confine myself exclusively to the other case: the necessity to continue the fight, the object of which, as already stressed, consists so far as the enemy is concerned in the dissolution or distruction of the German Reich. In opposition to this, the German war aim is the final military despatch of the West, i.e. destruction of the power and ability of the Western Powers*P 5 ever again to be able to oppose the state consolidation and further development of the German people in Europe.

As far as the outside world is concerned, however, this internal aim will have to undergo various propaganda adjustments, necessary from a psychological point of view. This does not alter the war aim. It is and remains the destruction of our Western enemies.

The German situation

The German people enters this battle with a population more than double that of the French, and almost equal to that of FRANCE and ENGLAND together.

The military application of our people's strength has been carried through to such an extent that within a short time at any rate, it cannot be markedly improved upon by any* manner of effort. Any increase in military power *P 6 which is to be expected in the next few years will not be compensated by FRANCE, but by ENGLAND, which is constantly growing stronger. FRANCE, alone, on account of her weak call-up classes, is not in a position to undertake the setting up of new formations beyond a certain limit, unless she dispenses with all useful forms of replacements for incidental battle-casualties, which is improbable. ENGLAND is able, within the next few months or years, to set up a comparatively large number of formations, whose value however will be more defensive than strategically operational.* *P 7

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Time.

Time in this war, as in all historic processes, is in itself not a factor of intrinsic value, but one of which full account must be taken. In the present situation, under these conditions, time may be reckoned more probably as an ally of the Western Powers rather than of ours.

Reasons.

The successes of the Polish campaign have made possible first of all a war on a single front, awaited for past decades without any hope of realisation; that is to say, GERMANY is able* to enter the fight in the *P 8
WEST with all her might, leaving only a few covering troops.

The remaining European states are neutral either because they fear for their own fates, or lack interest in the conflict as such, or are interested in a certain outcome of the war, which prevents them from taking part at all or at any rate too soon.

The following is to be firmly borne in mind:

RUSSIA

By no treaty or pact can a lasting neutrality of Soviet-Russia be ensured with certainty. At* present all reasons speak against RUSSIA's *P 9
departure from this state of neutrality. In eight months, one year, or even several years this may be altered. The trifling significance of treaties of agreement has been proved on all sides in recent years. The greatest safeguard against any Russian attack lies in an obvious display of German superiority, viz: in a prompt demonstration of German strength.

ITALY

As long as the Italian Government sees the future of Italy as a reproduction of a great imperial Roman Empire*, its trend of politics will, in *P 10
general, fit in with Germany's. For this imperial conception is only to be realised at the expense of France or England. The realisation itself is probable only with the help of Germany, or is dependent on German success. Fascism is the bearer of this imperial idea, and in the front rank stands its creator, Benito Mussolini. A weakening of the Fascist influence in Italy, or even the death of the Duce, would lead to a strengthening of the influence of the Crown, and thus finally to the forsaking of these aims, inspired by the people, but dangerous and therefore distasteful to monarchies. As surely as Mussolini heads for a fight with the democracies and will take it on under generally favorable* conditions, so non-Fascist Italy, cand *P 11
the Crown in particular, will turn aside from these and similarly dangerous ideas. They will at least not be prepared, ever to take any active steps in the matter themselves. At the most, and in the most favorable circumstances, they will wait, and let events pass by. For a trifling payment or reward however these powers will also be prepared, merely because of their own stupid short-sightedness, to sell the birthright of the Italians in the Mediterranean, and then fall in with the enemies of Germany. The hope of Italian support for Germany* in its fateful battle is therefore dependent *P 12
on the continuation of fascist influence in that country, and therefore largely on the Duce's remaining alive. Time, here, can therefore under no circumstances be considered as an ally of Germany's. It can, in this case, at most to be a danger.

BELGIUM and HOLLAND

Both countries are interested in preserving their neutrality but incapable of withstanding prolonged pressure from England and France. The preservation of their colonies, the maintenance of their trade, and thus the securing of their interior* economy, even of their very life, depend *P 13
wholly upon the will of England and France. Therefore, in their decisions, in their attitude, and in their actions, both countries are dependent upon the West, in the highest degree. If England and France promise themselves a successful result at the price of Belgian neutrality, they are at any time in a position to apply the necessary pressure. That is to say, without

covering themselves with the odium of a breach of neutrality, they can compel Belgium and Holland to give up their neutrality. Therefore, in the matter of the preservation of Belgo-Dutch neutrality, time* is not a factor which might promise a favorable development for Germany. *P 14

The NORDIC STATES

Provided no completely unforeseen factors appear, their neutrality in the future is also to be assumed. The continuation of German trade with these countries appears possible even in a war of long duration.

The SOUTH-EASTERN STATES

At the moment their neutrality appears very probable but cannot be prophesied for the future with absolute certainty. Not only psychological* and propaganda influences, or general economic factors, but also financial personal bribery can lead to a change in the attitude of these states at any time. *P 15

AMERICA

The attempt of certain circles of the U.S.A. to lead the American Continent in a direction hostile to Germany, is definitely unsuccessful at the moment, but could still in the future lead to the desired result. Here, too, time is to be viewed as working against Germany.

EASTERN ASIA

Japan will definitely* act according to her own interests. It will be her aim to make use of every weakening of the European states in Eastern Asia with the minimum expenditure of her own power. Here, too, time cannot be considered as an ally of Germany; only success will be. *P16

The Dangers of the GERMAN Position

The first danger for Germany lies in the fact that in a war of long duration under certain circumstances, states may be drawn to the opposite side for reasons which may lie in their economic needs, or in the weakening of particular interests.* *P 17

The second danger is that, through a war of long duration, states which in themselves might be inclined to take sides with Germany, might, in retrospect of the last war, think that they see a warning in the duration of the war itself, and therefore abstain from a positive course of action favorable to Germany.

The third danger, in a lengthier war, lies in the difficulty, owing to the limited food and raw material basis, of ensuring the food supply of the people, and of finding the means for carrying on the war. The morale, at least of the people, will be affected by that.* *P 18

The greatest, and most difficlut danger lies in the following:

The essential factor for each victorious conduct of the war is to safeguard RUHR production. Each serious stoppage in production in this area cannot be made good elsewhere. Sooner or later this must lead to the collapse of the German war-economy, and thus of the capacity to resist.

But the enemy knows this too.

The first danger to the Ruhr is that of stoppages caused by air-attacks.

The possibilities of defense by day by means of AA and fighter-aircraft are still present in a high degree.* The possibility of defense by night is a limited one even now. The possibility of defense by reprisal at present seems to be the safest. It must, however, be taken into account that in a war of long duration any belligerent who considers he has attained absolute supremacy in a certain arm of the service will use this supremacy regardless of reprisals thereby incurred. The longer this war lasts, the more difficult *P 19

will be the preservation of German air-superiority. And of offensive air superiority in particular*. As long as neutral Belgium and Holland remain *P 20
as protective zones in front of the Ruhr, attack by air-craft is still somewhat difficult, bombardment by long-range artillery impossible. But, in the event of the cessation of Belgian-Dutch neutrality, the military boundary would be withdrawn to a distance which would bring at least the South-West Ruhr zone within the range of super-long-range guns, and Duesseldorf, even within the range, even of long-range batteries. From this moment the Ruhr, as an active factor of the German war-economy, would either drop out or at least be crippled. There is no means of replacing it.* *P 21

As this weakness is recognized just as clearly by England and France as by ourselves, an Anglo-French conduct of war aiming at the utter destruction of Germany will strive to reach this goal at all costs. Indeed, the less hope England and France have of being able to destroy the German armed forces in a series of actual battles, the more both states will strive to create the conditions for an effective long-drawn out war of attrition and annihilation. But this condition requires the moving up of Anglo-French forces to the German frontier with a consequent termination of Belgian-Dutch neutrality.* *P 22

The possible course of action

Under no circumstances are France and England compelled to violate the Belgian-Dutch frontier by attack, thereby attacking these countries. Their means of exerting pressure are, as already indicated, so vast and so forceful, that they will succeed at any time in causing both countries to give up their neutrality at any particular moment which seems suitable, or necessary to the English or French Governments.

As a motive for such a course of action* in the eyes of the rest *P 23
of the world (as far as that may be considered necessary at all), it is sufficient to portray the dangers of a German breach of neutrality and to make full propaganda value of that in order to cause Belgium and Holland to declare that they are threatened and to request Anglo-French assistance. And first of all, in such an event, Belgian forces will be transferred from the Belgian-French to the German-Belgian frontier; the defensive front, which would thus be gradually built up, could, without difficulty and in the shortest space of time, receive Anglo-French reinforcements which would cause any German counter-attack which might be undertaken to fail* Then, within *P 24
a few days, an extensive deployment of Anglo-French forces on the German-Belgian-Dutch frontier could take place thereby bringing the war near to the heart of our armaments industry.

The probability, indeed the certainty of such an Anglo-French decision is strengthened by the indisputable fact, that, from the opposite point of view, the possession of this area by Germany would be one of the few factors that would at all be of help to Germany in the event of a long war.* *P 25.

German Possibilities in the event of a long war

Germany's military means of waging a lengthier war are, as far as our main enemy is concerned, the Air Force and the U-boat arm.

The U-boat can, even today, if ruthlessly employed, be an extraordinary threat to England. The weaknesses of German U-boat warfare lie in the great distances to the scenes of action, in the extraordinary danger attached to these journeys and in the continuous threat to their home-bases. That England has not, for the moment, laid the great minefield*, as in the World P 26
War, between Norway and the Shetland Isles is possible connected - provided the will to wage war exists at all - with a shortage of necessary barrage materials. But, if the war lasts long, an increasing difficulty to our U-boats must be reckoned with in the use of these only remaining inward and outward routes. The creation of U-boat strongpoints outside these constricted home-bases would lead to an enormous increase in the striking-power of this arm.*
*P 27

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The German Air Force

The GAF cannot succeed in efficient operations against the industrial center of England and her South and SW ports, which have increased in importance in wartime, until it is no longer compelled to operate offensively from our present small North sea coast, by extremely devious routes involving long flights. If the Dutch-Belgian area were to fall into the hands of the English and French, then the enemy air forces would be able to strike at the industrial heart of Germany and would need to cover barely a sixth of the distance required by the German bomber to reach really important targets.* P 28 If we were in possession of Holland, Belgium, or even the Streets of Dover as jumping-off bases for German aircraft then, without a doubt, Great Britain could be struck a mortal blow, even if the strongest reprisals were attempted.

Such a shortening of air-routes would be all the more important to Germany because of our difficulties in fuel-supply. Every 1000 kg of fuel saved is not only an asset to our national economy, but means that 1000 kg more of explosive can be carried in the aircraft; that is to say, 1000 kg of fuel would become 1000 kg of bombs. And this also leads to economy in aircraft, in mechanical wear-and-tear of the machines, and above all in valuable airmen's lives.* *P 29

These very facts are reasons for England and France to secure for themselves these regions under all circumstances, just as they compel us, on the other hand, to prevent such an occupation on the part of France and England.

The German War Aim

In the event of a final clash with France and England, the German war aim can consist only in the annihilation of Anglo-French forces, which is desirable in all circumstances. Territorial gain will be of importance only to the extent and measure in which it helps to make possible the destruction of our enemies or because* of its strategic importance for *P 30 the same purpose in a prolonged war. The destruction of enemy forces is therefore to be aimed at primarily, the occupation of enemy territory comes only second. There is of course a compulsory relationship between both these aims.

The Possibility of a Military Clash with France and England

The German soldier was always superior to the French. The historically recognized defeats of Germany by France were the exclusive result of the necessity for isolated German cities or states, unaided by a Reich, to fight alone* and to depend entirely on their own resources against the French *P 31 centralized state. German lack of unity was the only reason for all French victories. On the other hand, the German people, particularly in the last war, proved its soldierly superiority countless times.

The achievements of commanders on the German side have also been greater and more obvious in their results than on the Anglo-French side. The German collapse which took place in spite of this derived from weaknesses which may be regarded as having been better overcome particularly in the present Reich than in the present day in France or England.* This feeling *P 32 of superiority is not only mine, personally, but is peculiar to all German people and German soldiers. This feeling of superiority is justified. It does not merely depend on the evaluation of earlier historical achievements, but also on the actual course of history in the last few years. The warlike equipment of the German people is at present larger in quantity and better in quality, for a great number of German divisions, than in the year 1914. The weapons themselves, taking a substantial cross-section, are more modern than is the case with any other country in the world at this time.* They *P 33 have just proved their supreme war-worthiness in a victorious campaign. In the case of the armaments of other countries, this has yet to be demonstrated. In some arms, Germany today possesses clear, indisputable superiority of weapons.

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The tank-arm and air force, at the present time, have not only achieved technical heights unattained by any other state as weapons of attack, but also in supplementary defense. Their operative commitment potential is ensured by means of their organization and well-practiced leadership, which is better than in any othercountry. Their ammunitioning cannot be judged from an absolute, but only from a relative standpoint*. Even today, after the *P 34
conclusion of the Polish war, it is at least two or three times as great per gun as at the beginning of the year 1914. The AA ammunition supply for AA can be described as over-prosperous. There is no evidence available to show that any country in the world disposes of a better total ammunition stock than the German Reich. The preponderance of weapons that France today possesses lies exclusively in the province of heavier, but also older, mortars; and heavier, but at the same time mostly older, long range artillery. These weapons are of no decisive significance whatsoever in mobile warfare. The superiority of Germany, on the contrary, consists as far as weapons are concerned, in its new light and medium caliber field* artillery, in the *P 35
great number of heavy infantry weapons, and in the overwhelming superiority in numbers of equipment with anti-tank weapons and devices, as well as the new machine gun and excellent ammunition.

The tank arm during operations in Poland surpassed the highest expectations. The airforce at present is numerically the strongest in the world; the standard of training of the pilots is a maximum one. The superiority of German aircraft has not only been demonstrated in Poland, but is also being revealed by the battles in the West. The AA artillery is not equalled by any country in the world. Its supply of ammunition is, as already indicated, more than ample*. *P 36

If it must be the aim of the German conduct of the war to destroy the active offensive and defensive forces of our opponents, then time is mostly in our favor so long as the development of British fighting power does not bring to France a new fighting element which would be psychologically and materially of great value to her. What must be prevented above all is that the enemy should make good the weakness of his own armaments particularly in anti-tank and AA, thereby creating a balance of power.

In this respect the passing of every further month represents a loss of time unfavorable to the German power of offensive. Also, from the psychological point of view, speed of action betokens a momentum, not to* P 37
be under-estimated, which is favorable to Germany and terrifying to her enemies. At present the German soldier is again the best in the world. His respect for himself is as great as the respect he commands from others. Six months of delaying warfare and effective propaganda on the part of the enemy might cause these important qualities to weaken once more.

The course of the campaign in Poland has not caused any kind of serious losses to the formations concerned. The losses in any unit do not even approach the average losses in one of the offensive or defensive battles in the West. This easily replaced casualty figure of at the most forty thousand men (of whom part of the wounded will soon* be fighting fit, and which in any case is easily replaceable), is offset by war experience of both officers and men which could never be learnt or replaced by any amount of peace-time manoeuvres. As regards numbers, the strenth of the German army forming up in the West is more favorable in proportion to that of the Anglo-French forces than was the case in the year 1914. This proportion, as already mentioned, can hardly grow less favorable to us in the future, as far as France is concerned, but it may well do so by the gradual arrival of English formations. Much as I refuse to overestimate the value of the present French army*, I must at the same time issue a warning against *P 39
under-estimating the British formations. After a certain time their armament program will be accomplished by the demands upon the International industry at their disposal. At the very worst, there is the possibility of their being able to fall back on stocks of weapons remaining from the world war. That they can be employed in a defensive role is certain; for this purpose the English mentality is particularly suited in practice. Practically the appearance of numerous formations of English origin will make the withdrawal of the French people from the war more difficult and above all will weaken the argument, at present so effective from a psychological* and *P 40
propaganda point of view, that France's sacrifice in human lives is greater than that of England.

Therefore, in all circumstances, attack is to be preferred to defense as the decisive war-winning method. The start, however, cannot take place too early. The coming months will not lead to any important increase of our own offensive strength, but to an important strengthening of the defensive strength of our enemies.* *P 41

The German Attack

The German attack is to be mounted with the object of destroying the French army; but in any case it must create a favorable initial situation which is a prerequisite for a successful continuation of the war. In these circumstances the only possible area of attack is the sector between LUXEMBURG in the SOUTH and NIJMEGEN in the NORTH, excluding the LIEGE fortress. The object of the two attacking groups thus formed is to attempt to penetrate the area LUXEMBURG - BELGIUM - HOLLAND in the shortest possible time, and to engage and defeat the opposing Belgian-French-English forces*. Meanwhile *P 42
an attempt should be made to maintain the assault on such broad fronts as will deny the formation of a coherent Anglo-British defensive front with their available forces. The policy will be to occupy only those towns and fortresses which are essential for the continuance of operations. The armored forces must be allotted tasks which will yield the best results, bearing in mind their characteristics. They are not to be lost amongst the maze of endless rows of houses in Belgian towns*. It is not necessary *P 43
therefore for them to attack towns at all, but it is essential for them to maintain the flow of the army's operative advance, to prevent fronts from becoming stable.by massed drives through identified weakly-held positions.

In view of the latest experiences gained in the Polish campaign I consider it valueless to launch an armoured formation about in a northerly direction towards Antwerp as suggested. The task of the armoured formations breaking through East and West of LIEGE will be one of mutual support, i.e., by using their mobility either for the Southern column to facilitate the canal* crossing for the Northern one, or for the Northern armoured *P 44
formations to assist the break-through of the armoured divisions perhaps struggling South of AACHEN by attacking the pill box lines from the rear, after having achieved their own break-through. More important than the assault on ANTWERP appears to me to be a rapid by-passing of it to the West, thereby preventing the withdrawal of the Belgian armed forces presumably concentrating there and thereby also severing the link between the British Expeditionary Corps probably operating there and the Belgian forces. As soon as ANTWERP is cut off from the WEST, the city will be forced to capitulate in a very short time. Its closing off can be left to second or third-rate troops*. *P 45

It is impossible at this early stage to work out a more detailed plan of operation or to envisage or lay down ensuing events and the subsequent decisions and actions to be taken. It is, however, possible and imperative to be aware of the major objective right from the start, namely to concentrate solely on the annihilation of the living enemy resources. If this should not succeed for reasons not clear at the moment, then the secondary objective will be to attempt to secure an area possessing favorable conditions for the successful conduct of a long drawn-out war - if possible - not only for the German Air Force, but also for the U-boat arm.* *P 46
Decisive for the distribution of forces is firstly the realisation that this plan of action under certain circumstances may result in a most rapid conclusion of the war, and that therefore there should be no limit to the number of troops employed in the operation and that second that third-rate troops will be required to fulfill many of the tasks originating during the operation. Secondly, that particularly in order to mount large-scale counter-attacks, the enemy will be forced to employ only his really first-rate formations and that after their subsequent repulse or even defeat, he will dispose of second or thrid-rate divisions only. Finally, German forces are to be disposed* so far as possible from the start with due attention to identified, estimated, or even likely enemy defenses or to the confirmed or estimated concentration of his defensive power. The holding and breaking of these counter-attacks is to be considered and ensured right from the planning stage of the complete operation, as far as personnel are concerned,

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by the allotment of weapons. The peculiar nature of this campaign may make it necessary to resort to improvisations to the uttermost, to concentrate attacking or defending forces at certain points in more than normal proportion (e.g., tank or anti-tank forces), and in subnormal concentrations at others. If necessary, mass commitment of AA for defense or attack must be used* P 48 The effect of such a concentration of massed effort - particularly of 8.8 cm - will be terrible on attacking enemy tanks, advancing infantry or artillery. The execution of the actual operation demands the highest protection of our own skies by AA defenses and air cover. The conditions experienced in POLAND are not to be compared with those which will occur in the West. On the other hand it will bethe German Air Force's task not only to destroy or at least put out of action enemy air forces, but also primarily to hinder or prevent the enemy High Command from putting its decisions into effect.* P 49

To this end, thorough planning for a scheduled employment of ammunition is to be made. In general, enemy transport will not be attacked at the stations but on open lines, where a maximum effect can be achieved by low-level attack and minimum of explosive. In this way the object can be attained without the destruction of rolling stock, which is undesirable from our point of view. Repair possibilities on open stretches of line are imcomparable harder than in stations because alternative tracks are lacking, and attacking aircraft are not subject to so much danger from AA fire. For this type of target the fastest types of aircraft, employed singly, if no others are available, are to be loaded with only few 10 or 50 kg bombs. The certain interruption* of a railway route is of more value than the shooting down of an enemy aircraft. Attacks on dense columns moving up from the rear, which are of no battle value but merely of supply value, do not need to cause demoralisation but only the destruction of the columns themselves. 10 kg bombs suffice to destroy vehicles, to damage or wound wagons and horses, thereby creating blockages on the roads and obstructing the supply system. The demoralising effect of bombs is to be employed mainly where required to break the enemy's offensive or defensive spirit. 50 kilogram or heavier bombs are to be used primarily in attacking gun positions, enemy infantry concentrations identified strong points*, crowded woods, and columns *P 51 moving forward to the attack. Attacks on actual towns are to be limited to an absolute minimum since it is not the intention to capture towns or fortresses immediately at all costs; artillery and bombers are to be employed with a maximum of economy. The object of all attacks is not the destruction of inert installations but the annihilation of living offensive of defensive forces. Reprisal raids for attacks on German cities will, initially at any rate, be carried out with very small numbers of aricraft. All those in charge of these impending operations must keep firmly fixed in their minds thefact that the destruction of the Anglo-French forces* P 52 is the main objective, the attainment of which will enable suitable conditions to obtain for later and successful employment of the German Air Force. The brutal employment of the GAF against the heart of the British will-to-resist can and will follow at the given moment.

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Time of Attack

The attack is to take place in all circumstances (if at all possible) this autumn. It is essential, therefore, to press on to the utmost with the refitting especially of the armoured and motorized formations. It must be realized that in actual warfare in the future it will be impossible to lay up motor vehicles for three months after they have been in action for four weeks.* Similarly, the replenishment of normal infantry divisions, with *P 53 such small casualty losses as was the case in POLAND, is to be limited to the shortest possible time. The advantage gained from a long rest period, in spite of all the training possible, will be less owing to the lack of actual battle-usage which would set in. The fresh "running-in" of formations by their staffs, and the embodiment of fresh personnel, is not to take longer than a fortnight in any division.

Most important is the maximum speed in setting-up the new formations already envisaged, risking the danger that they will not come up to standard of normal first-rate troops* One only needs to recall the condition of even *P 54 first-class divisions after a long-drawn out battle, to be prepared to expect more modest requirements of newly set-up formations without at the same time

doubting their employability in the field. The immediate withdrawal of the so-called fortress regiments and the Fortress Division TRIER is essential, to be followed by their conversion into six infantry divisions, if need be on only 2 regiments each, or 3 regiments of 2 battalions each, if the third regiment cannot be formed by increasing or reorganizing the existing ones. An expansion of this sort may not be turned down by any formal objection; it is the same* as the replacement of an infantry division which has *P 55 been badly knocked about in major operations, with one difference only - that during the world-war these had to receive not just a third but often two thirds of replacement personnel within a fortnight, with officer casualties far exceeding this proportion. The establishment of division artillery has to be effected in a similar manner if necessary, by completing several companies of the army artillery with men and material from the reserve army, so that such a process requires only a small percentage of the army artillery itself.

To facilitate the assembly of a material reserve to meet any eventuality, the Eastern Army in particular is to be rapidly equipped with captured Polish and Czech weapons*. *P 56

Preparation and disposition for this attack will be camouflaged by use of proven World War methods. For this purpose an accurate study of the methods used at that time and of the corresponding orders issued is recommended.

The time for the attack will be laid down according to the number of available formations and approximately suitable weather, the decisive factor being suitable conditions for tank and air warfare during the opening weeks. A successfully introduced offensive may be executed right into severe winter. The weather-endurance of the French soldier is no better than that of the German. Insofar as the campaign does not assume, or if it loses*, *P 57 the character of positional warfare, the ideas "defender" and "attacker" cease to apply and instead there are left on both sides only marching and fighting soldiers. The employment of colored troops is absolutely impossible in the bad season. The German Air Force will lose operational importance the moment the enemy air forces as such will have been badly hit or destroyed. Otherwise the climatic conditions will have an equal effect on both sides. But the German is still the best bad weather airman.

An offensive which does not aim at the destruction of the enemy forces from the start is senseless and leads to useless waste of human life. To attack with weak and insufficient forces is equally useless. In spite of this* - in the event of an early surprise attack by French formations against *P58 Belgian or Dutch territory - a line NORTH of AACHEN and in HOLLAND offering better defensive possibilities will be reached at all costs.

Finally at every hold-up, even during the big attack, construction of a defensive line in the rear will be begun, using the materials which otherwise would serve to reinforce the WEST WALL.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. L 52

14 November 1945

I, ERNST M. COHN, PFC, 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. L 52.

PFC ERNST M. COHN
33925738

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TRANSLTION OF DOCUMENT L79
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Top Secret
To be translmitted by officer only

Minutes
of a Conference on 23 May 39

Place: The Fuehrer's Study, New Reich Chancellery.

Adjutant on duty: Lt-Col. (G.S.) Schmundt.

Present: The Fuehrer, Field-Marshal Goering, Grand-Admiral Raeder.

Col.-Gen. von Brauchitsch, Col-Gen. Keitel, Col-Gen. Milch, Gen. (of Artillery) Halder, Gen. Bodenschatz, Rear-Adml. Schniewindt, Col. (G.S.) Jeschonnek, Col. (G.S.) Warlimont, Lt.- Col. (G.S.) Schmundt, Capt. Engel (Army), lieut-Comd. Albrecht, Capt. v. Below (Army).

Subject: Indoctrination on the political situation and future aims.

The Fuehrer defined as the purpose of the conference:

I) Analysis of the situation.
2) Definition of the tasks for the Armed Forces arising from the situation.
3) Exposition of the consequences of those tasks.
4) Ensuring the secrecy of all decisions and work resulting from these consequences.

Secrecy is the first essential for success.

The Fuehrer's observations are given in systematised form below.

Our present situation must be considered from two points of view:

I) The actual development of events between I933 and I939;
2) The permanent and unchanging situation in which Germany lies.

In the period I933-I939, progress was made in all fields. Our military situation improved enormously.

Our situation with regard to the rest of the world has remained the same.

Germany had dropped from the circle of Great Powers. The balance of power had been effected without the participation of Germany.

This equilibrium is disturbed when Germany's demands for the necessities of life make themselves felt, and Germany re-emerges as a Great Power. All demands are regarded as "Encroachments". The English are more afraid of dangers in the economic sphere than of the simple threat of force.

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT L 79
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL
(cont.)

A mass of 80 million people has solved the ideological problems. So, too, must the economic problems be solved. No German can evade the creation of the necessary economic conditions for this. The solution of the problems demands courage. The principle, by which one evades solving the problem by adapting oneself to circumstances, is inadmissible. Circumstances must rather be adapted to aims. This is impossible whithout invasion of foreign states or attacks upon foreign property.

Living space, in proportion to the magnitude of the state, is the basis of all power. One may refuse for a time to face the problem, but finally it is solved one way or the other. The choice is between advancement or decline. In 15 of 20 years' time we shall be compelled to find a solution. No German statesman can evade the question longer than that.

We are at present in a state of patriotic fervour, which is shared by two other nations: Italy and Japan.

The period which lies behind us has indeed been put to good use. All measures have been taken in the correct sequence and in harmony with our aims.

After 6 years, the situation is today as follows:

The national-political unity of the Germans has been achieved, apart from minor exceptions. Further successes cannot be attained without the shedding of blood.

The demarkation of frontiers is of military importance.

The Pole is no "supplementary enemy". Poland will always be on the side of our adversaries. In spite of treaties of friendship, Poland has always had the secret intention of exploiting every opportunity to do us harm.

Danzig is not the subject of the dispute at all. It is a question of expanding our living space in the East and of securing our food supplies, of the settlement of the Baltic problem. Food supplies can be expected only from thinly populated areas. Over and above the natural fertility, thoroughgoing German exploitation will enormously increase the surplus.

There is no other possibility for Europe.

Colonies: Beware of gifts of colonial territory. This does not solve the food problem. Remember - blockade.

If fate brings us into conflict with the West, the possession of extensive areas in the East will be advantageous. Upon record harvests we shall be able to rely even less in time of war than in peace.

The population of non-German areas will perform no military service, and will be available as a source of labour.

The Polish problem is inseparable from conflict with the West.

Poland's internal power of resistance to Bolshevism is doubtful. Thus Poland is of doubtful value as a barrier against Russia.

It is questionalbe whether miltary success in the West can be achieved by a quick decision, questionable too is the attitude of Poland.

The Polish government will not resist pressure from Russia. Poland sees danger in a German victory in the West, and will attempt to rob us of the victory.

There is therefore no question of sparing Poland, and we are left with the decision:

To attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity.

We cannot expect a repetition of the Czech affair. There will be war. Our task is to isolate Poland. The success of the isolation will be decisive.

Therefore, the Fuehrer must reserve the right to give the final order to attack. There must be no simultaneous conflict with the Western Poweres (France and England).

If it is not certain that a German-Polish conflict will not lead to war in the West, then the fight must be primarily against England and France,

Fundamentally therefore: Conflict with Poland - beginning with an attack on Poland - will only be successful if the Western Powers keep out of it. If this is impossible, then it will be better to attack in the West and to settle Poland at the same time.

The isolation of Poland is a matter of skilful politics.

Japan is a weighty problem. Even if at first for various r reasons her collaboration with us appears to be somewhat cool and restricted, it is nevertheless in Japan's own interest to take the initiative in attacking Russia in good time.

Economic relations with Russia are possible only if political relations have improved. A cautions trend is apparent in Press comment. It is not impossible that Russia will show herself to be disinterested in the destruction of Poland. Should Russia take steps to oppose,us, our relations with Japan may becaome closer.

If there were an alliance of France, England and Russia against Germany, Italy and Japan, I would be constrained to attack England and France with a few annihilating blows. The Fuehrer doubts the possibility of a peaceful settlement with England, We must prepare ouselves for the conflict. England sees in our development the foundation of a hegemony which would weaken England. England is therefore our enemy, and the conflict with England will be a life-and death struggle.

What will this struggle be like?

England cannot deal with Germany and subjugate us with a few powerful blows. It is imperative for England that the war should be brought as near to the Ruhr basin as possible. French blood will be spared (West Wall). The possession of the Ruhr basin will determine the duration of our resi stance.

The Dutch and Belgium air bases must be occupied by armed force. Declarations of neutrality must be ignored. If England and France intend the war between Germany and Poland to lead to a conflict, they will support Holland and Belgium in their neutrality and make them build fortifications, in order finally to force them into cooperation.

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Albeit under protest, Belgium and Holland will yield to pressure.

Therefore, if England intends to intervene in the Polish war, we must occupy Holland with lightning speed. We must aim at securing a new defense line on Dutch soil up to the Zuider Zee.

The war with England and France will be a life-and death s struggle.

The idea that we can get off cheaply is dangerous; there is no such possibility. We must burn our boats, and it is no longer a question of justice or injustice, but of life or death for 80 million human beings.

Question: Short or long war?

Every country's armed forces of government must aim at a short war. The government, however, must also be prepared for a war of 10-15 years, duration.

History has always shown that the people have believed that wars would be short. In 1914, the opinion still prevailed that it was impossible to finance a long war. Even today this idea still persists in many minds. But on the contrary, every state will hold out as long as possible, unless it immediately suffers some grave weakening (e.g. Ruhr basin). England has similar weaknesses.

England knows that to lose a war will mean the end of her world power.

England is the driving force against Germany.
(Literally: England: is the motor driving against Germany). Her strength lies in the following:

I. The British themselves are proud, courageous, tenacious, firm in resistance and gifted as organisers. They know how to exploit every new development. They have the love of a adventure and bravery of the Nordic. race. Quality is lowered by dispersal. The German average is higher.

2. World power in itself. It has been constant for 300 years. Extended by the acquisition of allies, This power is not merely something concrete, but must also be considered as a psychological force embracing the entire world. Add to this immeasurable wealth, with consequental financial credit.

3. Geopolitical safety and protection by strong sea power and a courageous air force.

England's weakness:

If in the World War I we had had two battleships and two cruisers more, and if the battle of Jutland had begun in the morning, the British fleet would have been defeated and England brought to her knees. It would have meant the end of World War. It was formerly not sufficient to defeat the fleet, landings had to be made in order to defeat England. England could provide her own food supplies. Today that is no longer possible.

The moment England's food supply routes are cut, she is forced to capitulate. The import of food and fuel depends on the fleet's protection.

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(cont.)

If the German Air Force attacks English territory, England will not be forced to capitulate in one day. But if the fleet is destroyed, immediate capitulation will be the result.

There is no doubt that a surprise attack can lead to a quick decision. It would be criminal, however, for the government to rely entirely on the element of surprise,

Experience has show that surprise may be nullified by:-

I) Betrayal from the wider circle of military experts.

2) Mere chance, which may cause the collapse of the whole enterprise.

3) Human incompetence

4) Weather conditions.

The final date for striking must be fixed well in advance. Beyond that time the tension connot be endured for long. It must be borne in mind that weather conditions can render any surprise intervention by Navy and Air Force impossible.

This must be regarded as a most unfavourable basis of action.

I) An effort must be made to deal the enemy a significant or the final decisive blow right at the start. Considerations of right and wrong, or treaties, do not enter into the matter. This will only be possible if we are not involved in a war with England on account of Poland.

2) In addition to the surprise attack, preparations for a long war must be made, while opportunities on the Continent for England are eliminated.

The army will have to hold positions essential to the Navy and Air Force. If Holland and Belgium are successfully occupied and held, and if France is also defeated, the fundamental conditions for a successful war against England will have been secured.

England can then be blockaded from Western France at close quarters by the Air Force, while the Navy with its submarines can extend the range of the blockade.

Consequences:

England will not be able to fight on the Continent;
Daily attacks by the Air Force and Navy will cut all her life-lines;
Time will not be on England's side;
Germany will not bleed to death on land.

Such strategy has been shown to be necessary by World War I and subsequent military operations. World War I is responsible for the following strategic considerations which are imperative:-

I. With a more powerful Navy at the outbreak of the War, or a wheeling movement by the Army towards the Channel ports, the end would have been different.

2. A country cannot be brought to defeat by an Air Force, It is impossible to attack all objectives simultaneously and the lapse of time of a few minutes would evoke defensive counter-measures.

3. The unrestricted use of all resources is essential.

4. Once the army, in cooperation with the Air Force and Navy, has taken the most important positions, industrial production will cease to flow into the bottomless pit of the Army's battles and can be diverted to benefit the Air Force and Navy.

The Army must therefore be capable of taking these positions. Systematic preparation must be made for the attack.

Study to this end is of the utmost importance.

The aim will always be to force England to her knees.

A weapon will only be of decisive importance in winning battles, so long as the enemy does not possess it.

This applies to gas, submarines and the Air Force. It would be true of the latter for instance, as long as the English Fleet had no available counter-measures; it will no longer be the case in 1940 and 1941. Against Poland, for example, tanks will be effective, as the Polish Army possesses no counter-measures.

Where straight forward pressure is no longer considered to be decisive, its place must be taken by the elements of surprise and by masterly handling.

<u>This is the plan of attack.</u>

The plan demands:-

I. A correct estimate of weapons and their effectiveness:- e.g. (a) Battleship or aircraft carrier; which is the more effective? Individually or considered as a whole? The aircraft carrier is the better protection for a convoy.

(b) Is air attack more important on a factory than on a battleship? Where are bottle-necks in production located?

2. Immediate preparedness on the part of the Army. The Army must move straight from its peace stations to overrun neighbouring states. (Literally: Neighbouring states must be overrun direct from barracks).

3. A study of the enemy's weak points.

These studies must not be left to the General Staffs. Secrecy would no longer be guaranteed.

The Fuehrer has therefore decided to order the formation of a small planning staff at OKW. It will keep the Fuehrer informed and report to him.

The planning staff is responsible for the planning of operations on the highest level, and of the technical preparations and organization necessarily required by the decision taken.

The purpose of certain regulations concerns no-one outside the staff.

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OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL
(cont.)

However great are the increases in the armaments of our adversaries, they must ,at some time, come to the end of their recources, and ours will be greater. French recruiting - I20,000 men in each age class.

We shall not be forced into a war, but we shall not be able to avoid one.

Secrecy is the decisive requirement for success. Our object must be kept secret even from Italy or Japan. The break-through through the Maginot line is still a possibility for Italy, and must be studied. The Fuehrer considers that such a break-through is possible.

The close combination of the services, for the study of the problem in its entity, is important.

The object:

I. Study of the problem in its entity.
2. Study of the procedure.
3. Study of the necessary requirements.
4. Study of the necessary training.

The staff must include men with great imaginative power and the best technical knowledge, as well as officers of sober and sceptical judgement.

Working principles:

I. No-one must be admitted who is not concerned.
2. No-one may know more than it is necessary for him to know.
3. When must the person concerned know, at latest? No-one may know of a matter earlier than is necessary for him to know of it.

At the request of Field Marshal Goering, the Fuehrer decrees that:

a) The various services shall decide what construction is to be undertaken.
b) There shall be no alterations in the shipbuilding programm.
c) The armaments programs are to be considered with regards to I943 or I944.

Certified correct record
(Sgd) Schmundt, Lt Col.

I8 Nov. I945

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLAION
OF DOCUMENT L 79

I, GOETZ MAYER, T/5 338I2I69, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document L 79.

GOETZ MAYER
T/5 338I2I69

Introduction

I. Review of the most important questions of development up to the present.

II. The Italian betrayal, how it was parried, and its consequences.

General Outcome:

III. The present situation

Consideration of the individual theatres of war and their characteristic features.

Finland

Norway

Denmark — Keystone of communications with Norway.

France with the Netherlands and Belgium — the battlefield of the year '44.

Italy — a narrow front with deep flanks.

The Balkans — Guerilla warfare - Supply

TheEAST — Comparison with the Western front 1917/18

IV. The enemy - his resources and their grouping.

His further strategic intentions.

V. The morale of the confederates and Neutrals.

VI. The problems of the German Command in this situation of the struggle along the inner line.

(a) The distribution of forces throughout the theatre of war as a whole.

(b) The formation of operative reserves.

(c) Comparison between requirements in soldiers and munitions-workers.

(d) Exhaustion of man-power reserves in the territories under our domination.

The problem of the Confederates and of alien soldiers.

(e) Mastering the enemy terror raids from the air.

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(f) The renewal of effective U-boat warfare.

VII. The foundations of our morale and our confidence in victory.

(a) The German people and its leadership.

(b) The German armed forces.

(c) The ethical and moral foundation of our struggle.

(d) The unified political and military aim of the Confederates ("VERBUNDETEN"), protection from Bolshevism.

(e) Unified political and military Command.

(f) The diverging political, military, social and economic tendencies of our opponents, the moral inferiority of our opponents in the WEST and the purely materialistic foundations of their struggle.

(g) The genius at the head of the Command.

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page 1
of original

The Strategic Position in the beginning of the 5th Year of War.

Lecture
by the Chief of the General
Staff of the Armed Forces (West)
to the Reichs- and Gau- leaders,
delivered in MUNICH on 7 Nov.
1943.

Introduction

ReichsLeiter BORMANN has requested me to give you a review to-day of the strategic position in the beginning of the 5th Year of War.

I must admit that it was not without hesitation that I undertook this none too easy task. It is not possible to do it justice with a few generalities. It is not necessary to say openly what is. No-one - the FUEHRER has ordered - may know more or be told more than he needs for his own immediate task, but I have no doubt at all
page 2 in my mind, Gentlemen, but that you need a great deal in order to be able to cope with your tasks. It is in your GAUS, after all, and among their inhabitants that all the enemy propaganda, the defeatism, and the malicious rumours concentrate that try to find themselves a plan among our people. Up and down the country the devil of subversion strides. All the cowards are seeking a way out, or - as they call it - a political solution. They say, we must negotiate while there is still something in hand, and all these slogans are made use of to attack the natural sense of the people, that in this war there can only be a fight to the end. Capitulation is the end of the Nation, the end of Germany. Against this wave of enemy propaganda and cowardice you need more than force. You need to know the true situation and for this reason I believe that I am justified in giving you a perfectly open and uncoloured account of the state of affairs. This is no forbidden disclosure of secrets, but a weapon which may perhaps help you to fortify the morale of the people. For this war will not only be decided by force of arms but by the will to resist of the whole people. Germany was broken in 1918 not at the front
page 3 but at home. Italy suffered not military defeat but morale defeat. She broke down internally. The result has been not the peace she expected but - through the cowardice of these criminal traitors - a fate a thousand times harder than continuation of the war at our side would have brought to the Italian people. I can rely on you, Gentlemen, that since I give concrete figures and data concerning our own strength, you will treat these details as your secret; all the rest is at your disposal without restriction for application in your activities as leaders of the people.

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I

page 4 The necessity and objectives of this war were clear to all and everyone at the moment when we entered upon the War of Liberation of Greater Germany and by attacking parried the danger which menaced us both from Poland and from the Western powers. Our further incursions into Scandinavia, in the direction of the Mediterranean and in that of Russia - these also aroused no doubts concerning the general conduct of the war so long as we were successful. It was not until more serious set-backs were encountered and our general situation began to become increasingly acute, that the German people began to ask itself whether perhaps we had not undertaken more than we could do and set our aims too high. To provide an answer to this questioning and to furnish you with certain points of view for use in your own explanatory activities is one

page 5 of the main points of my present lecture. I shall divide it into three parts:

I. A review of the most important questions of development up to the present.

II. Consideration of the present situation.

III. The foundations of our morale and our confidence in victory.

In view of my position as military adviser to the Führer, I shall confine myself in my remarks to the problems of my own personal sphere ofaction, fully appreciating at the same time that in view of the protean nature of this war, I shall in this way begiving expression only to one side of events.

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page 6

I. Review

1. The fact that the National-Socialist movement and its struggle for internal power were the preparatory stage of the outer liberation from the bonds of the Dictate of Versailles is not one on which I need enlarge in this circle. I should like however to mention at this point how clearly all thoughtful regular soldiers realize what an important part has been played by the National-Socialist movement in re-awakening the will to fight ("WEHRWILLEN"); in nurturing fighting strength ("WEHRKRAFT") and in rearming the German people. In spite of all the virtue inherent in it, the numerically small REICHSWEHR would never have been able to cope with this task, if only because of its own restricted radius of action. Indeed, what the Führer aimed at - and has so happily been successful in bringing about - was the fusion of these two forces.

page 7

2. The seizure of power in its turn had meant in the first place the restoration of fighting sovereignty ("WEHRHOHEIT") (conscription, occupation of the Rhineland) and re-armament with special emphasis being laid on the creation of a modern armoured and air arm.

3. The Austrian "Anschluss", in its turn, brought with it not only the fulfilment of an old national aim but also had the effect both of reinforcing our fighting strength and of materially improving our strategic position. Whereas up till then the territory of Czechoslovakia had projected in a most menacing way right into Germany (a wasp waist in the direction of France and an air base for the Allies, in particular Russia), Czechoslovakia herself was now enclosed by pincers. Its own strategic position had now become so unfavourable that she was bound to fall a victim to any attack pressed home with rigour before effective aid from the WEST could be expected to arrive.

page 8.

This possibility of aid was furthermore made more difficult by the construction of the WEST WALL, which, in contra-distinction to the MAGINOT Line, was not a measure based on debility and resignation but one intended to afford rear cover for an active policy in the EAST.

4. The bloodless solution of the Czech conflict in the autumn of 1938 and spring of 1939 and the annexation of Slovakia rounded off the territory of Greater Germany in such a way that it now became possible to consider the Polish problem on the basis of more or less favourable strategic premises.

page 9

5. This brings me to the actual outbreak of the present war, and the question which next arises is whether the moment for the struggle with Poland - in itself unavoidable - was favourably selected or not. The answer to this question is all the less in doubt since the opponent - after all not inconsiderable in himself - collapsed unexpectedly quickly, and the Western Powers who were his friends, while they did declare war on us and form a second front, yet for the rest made no use of the possib lities open to them of snatching the initiative from our hands. Concerning the course taken by

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the Polish campaign, nothing further need be said beyond that it proved in a measure which made the whole world sit up and take notice a point which up till then had not been certain by any means, i.e., the high state of efficiency of the young Armed Forces of Greater Germany.

page 10 6. The main effect of this success was however that we now had no opponent in the EAST and that in view of the agreements with Russia the two-front problem might be regarded as for the time being solved.

7. As a result of all this the point of gravity in the conduct of the war naturally shifted to the WEST where the most urgent task was clearly defined as the protection of the RUHR area from the invasion of Holland by the British and French. Even before the Polish campaign had been concluded the FUHRER had already decided upon an attack against this enemy the aim ofwhich could only be complete subjection of the opponent. The circumstance that this decision was not carried out - as originally planned - i.e., in the late autumn of 1939 - was mainly due to weather conditions but in part also influenced by our situation with regard to armaments.

page 11 8. In the meantime, however, we were confronted by yet another problem which must be settled promptly: the occupation of Norway and Denmark. The point here lay in opening up a theatre of war which while it lay outside the zone of immediate danger yet possessed two-fold importance from the point of view of our general conduct of the war. In the first place there was danger that England would seize Scandinavia and thereby besides effecting a strategic encirclement from the NORTH would stop the import of iron and nickel which was of such importance to us for war purposes. Secondly, it was realization of our own maritime necessities which made it imperative for us to secure for ourselves freeaccess to the ATLANTIC by a number of air and naval support points on the Norwegian coast. Here too, therefore, defensive and offensive requirements combined to form an indissoluble whole.

The course and conclusion of this campaign are known. In the main in was completed in such good time that it was possible to start upon the campaign in the WEST with the setting in of the most favourable season of the year, in May, 1940.

page 12 9. The decisive success of this campaign improved our position in the best possible way. We gained possession not only of the French potential of armaments - destined to do us importantservice in the further course of the war - but above all the entire ATLANTIC Coast fell into our hands with its naval ports and air support points. Direct threat to the British Motherland had by this means become possible.

The question now arose whether or not we should carry the war into England by a landing on the grand scale. Furthermore - in view of the possible eventuality of the USA entering the war - it was necessary to take into consideration the occupation of a number of advanced support points in the ATLANTIC (for instance, Iceland and the AZORES on which in the meantime the enemy had laid

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page 13 his hand). From these islands we should be able both to carry on particularly effectively the fight against British supplies and to defend the territory of Europe in exactly the same way as Japan now holds Greater East Asia secure by means of its island advanced bases in the Pacific. However, very wisely the FUHRER refrained from adopting these objectives. Not alone their initial execution but the subsequent maintenance of communications by sea would have involved a measure of strength which our naval and air equipment could not have provided permanently.

10. Instead of these considerations the winter of 1940/41 provided another opportunity of combating England. Although outwardly our action only took the form of aid to our Italian ally, yet ultimately the point at issue was British command of the seas in the Mediterranean which in its turn represented a heavy menace to the Southern flank of the European continent.

page 14 In the measure as the weakness and failure of Italy became more and more manifest, North Africa became more and more a German theatre of war. Employing our forces in this way -- incidentally, no great force was involved -- appeared to be all the more justified since by this means strong British land, sea, and air forces, and a very considerable tonnage in the way of sea-transport would be kept tied down, away from German "living space" (LEBENSRAUM).

11. What was however less acceptable was the necessity of affording our assistance as an Ally in the Balkans in consequence of the unnecessary expedition of the Italians against Greece. The attack which they launched in the autumn of 1940 from Albania with totally inadequate means was contrary to all agreement but in the end led to a decision on our partwhich - taking a long view of the matter - would have become necessary in any case sooner or later. The planned attack on Greece from the NORTH was not executed merely as an operation in aid of an ally. Its real purpose was to prevent the British from gaining a foothold in Greece and from menacing our Roumanian oil area from that country.

page 15 12. Parallel with all these developments realization was steadily growing of the danger drawing constantly nearer from the Bolshevik East - that danger which has been only too little perceived in Germany and latterly, for diplomatic reasons, had deliberately to be ignored. However, the FUHRER himself has always kept this danger steadily in view and even as far back as during the Western Campaign had informed me of his fundamental decision to take steps against this danger the moment our military position madeit at all possible.

13. Following on the interlude of the overthrow in Yugoslavia, the Balkan campaign which followed this, and our occupation of CRETE; this decision was translated into action. If put into effect at all, it had of necessity to take us deep into Russian territory - a circumstance entailing dangers to an extent not yet encountered in our previous campaigns.

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page 16 14. In spite of the fact that we were not able either in 1941 nor in 1942 completely to annihilate the enemy's fighting forces and thereby to force Russia to her knees, yet we can definitely claim it as a positive result that the Bolshevist danger has been driven back far from our own frontiers.

If today, in view of the repeated and prolonged setbacks of the year 1943, the question comes up again and again, whether we had not thoroughly under-estimated the strength of the Bolshevik opponent, the answer to this question in regard to the execution of individual part-operations, may certainly be said to be 'Yes'. But as regards the decision to attack as a whole and that of holding on to this decision for as long as possible, there can be no doubts. As in politics so in the conduct of war - the issue is not merely one of arithmetical sums, and one of the most important lessons taught by war is that correct estimation of the opponent is one of the hardest of alltasks, and that even when everything has been correctly summed up, there still remains much
page 17 that is imponderable and only becomes clear in the course of the battle itself.

One clarification of the situation is however to be perceived in that, as a result of our advance into the dark unknown which is Russia, we have taken the measure not only of the strength in personnel involved but also of a standard of equipment which has forced us in our turn to institute a state of totalitarian warfare and a technical counter-blast such as left to ourselves we were hardly likely to have produced. One can only think with a shudder of what would have happened if we had adopted a waiting attitude in the face of this danger and, sooner or later, have been overrun by it.

15. Within the framework of this short sketch of the sweep of our strategy all that remains to mention is the occupation of TUNIS effected as a counter-measure to the landing of Anglo-American forces on the NORTH and WEST coasts of French North Africa, the rapid loss again of which position is probably specially likely to evoke doubt in the correctness of our wider strategy.

Taking it all in all, however, fighting along the periphery has built up for us a capital sum of space which we are now living upon.

page 19 In recapitulation, a brief summary of the course of the great tactical events up to the autum of 1943:

The first two years of war saw Germany and its later Allies running a victorious course almost unparalleled in history. The campaigns in Poland, Norway, France, in North Africa, in the Balkans, and the attack on Russia as far as the DONETZ, up to the gates of MOSCOW and up to the VOLKHOV created a wide forefield for the defense of Europe and as a result of the occupation and making safe of rich areas of raw materials and food, providedthe premises for a long war. Superior leadership, better employment of the modern means of war, a superior air arm and the exceptionally high fighting

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value and morale of our troops faced by opponents inferior on each of these counts have produced these successes. Nevertheless, during this period of the war, in which our superiority on land was undisputed, and our superiority in the air was able to make good, at all events in the coastal districts, our hopeless inferiority at sea, in our last grasp at the palm of victory success has eluded us. The landing in England,
page 20 prepared for down to the smallest detail but with improvised transport resources only, could not be dared while the British Air arm had not been completely beaten. And this we were not able to do, just as we have not been able completely to shatter the Soviet Armed Forces. Later generations will not be able to reproach us with not having dared the utmost and spared no effort to achieve these aims which would have decided the war.

But no one could take it upon himself to allow the German air arm to bleed to death in the Battle of Britain in view of the struggle which still lay before us against Soviet Russia.

In the EAST however, the natural catastrophe of the winter of 1941 imposed an imperative halt on even the sternest resolution.

(Following paragraph struck out)

Our third objective, that of drawing Spain into the war on our side, and thereby creating the possibility of seizing GIBRALTAR, was wrecked by the resistance of the Spanish or, better say, Jesuit Foreign Minister, SORANO SUNJER.

page 21 It therefore became clear that we could no longer count upon an early end to the war, but that it would be hard and difficult and confront the whole nation with great hardships*.

After the first set-backs on the Eastern front and in the North African theatre of war in the winter of 1943, the Reich and its Allies once again gathered together all their strength in order to defeat this Eastern opponent finally by a new assault and to deprive the British of their Egyptian base of operations. The great operation against the CAUCASUS and the DELTA of the NILE failed, however, owing to insufficient strength and inadequate supplies. For the first time our Western opponents showed themselves to be superior both on the technical side and numerically in the air over the Mediterranean. The Soviet Russian Command also continued to stabilize

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* For - says CLAUSEWITZ - every attack which does not lead either to an armistice or to peace must of necessity end in defense.

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the front at STALINGRAD and before the CAUCASUS, and after that in wintertime using newly-formed strong reserves continued to break-through the petrified over-extended fronts on the VOLGA and along the DON - largely occupied moreover by the troops of our Allies. The 6th Army,
page 22 consisting of the best German formations, inadequately supplied and exposed to the storms of winter, succumbed to enemy superiority.

Similarly, the Western Powers were able to bring together in Egypt a concentration of land, sea and air forces which held us up at the very gates of Egypt and after the battle of EL ALAMEIN forced us to retreat, and finally, following on the landing of strong Anglo-American armies in French North Africa, to surrender the entire African position. Again some of the best German divisions fell a victim to the stranglehold of a superior enemy air force on our supplies by sea, although not before they had won for us a certain gain in time which was worth every sacrifice.

At the end of the winter fighting of 1942/43 and after the loss of the African Army the armed forces of Germany and her allies were strained to the utmost. It proved possible to re-form the 5th Armoured Army and the 6th Army - but four armies of our allies were lost for good.

The tactical reserves in the East would, it is true be exceptionally well equipped, but their numbers would no longer be increased to such a pitch as to make it possible to envisage any extensive operations. Gone
page 23 was the great mobility of the Army and, excepting on the Russian theatre of war, gone also our superiority in the air. The superior economic strength of our opponents and their greater reservoir of man-power, concentrated to form a point of gravity against Europe, was beginning to tell. The complete failure of Italy in all demains and the absence of any munitions production worthy of the name among our other Allies could not be adequately compensated by the tremendous efforts made by Germany.

Of necessity therefore the initiative was bound to passover to the opposing side and the Reich, and the European nations fighting at Germany's side, to go over to the defensive.

So when the positions pushed out beyond the European front to the SOUTH had been taken by the enemy, in July 1943, the enemy attack started: In the EAST to regain the territories lost there and in the SOUTH against the Fortress Europe proper at its weakest point. In the meantime the air arms of the Anglo-Americans had already begun the grand assault on the production hearths and morale of our people at home.

In the Far East Japan's struggle has developed on much the same lines, with the difference, however, that the Japanese had pushed their advanced positions very much further away from the Motherland proper and the Anglo-Saxons did not here undertake any attacks on a large-scale for the reason that they had directed their point of gravity against Europe.

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page 25 It was at this stage of the war that the Italian betrayal took place. Its main features will be known to you from what appeared in the press. Actually it was even more dramatic than the newspapers showed. For the Supreme Command it was perhaps one of the hardest problems which it had as yet had to master. That the removal and arrest of the DUCE could not end otherwise than by the defection of Italy was completely clear to the FUHRER from the first, although many politically less well-trained eyes thought to see in it rather an improvement in our position in the Mediterranean and our cooperation with the Italians. There were many personages at this time who failed to understand the Fuhrer's GHQ in its political and military actions. For these were directed towards overthrowing the new Government and liberating the DUCE. Only the smallest possible circle might know of this. On the military side in the meantime, everything was to be done to stop enemy penetration of the Southern front as far SOUTH as possible, i. e. on SICILY.

page 26 That the enemy would bring this point of gravity to bear on some point further EST in the Mediterranean - of that there was not the slightest doubt; the distribution of his shipping and landing space made this clear. Where however would this point be? On SARDINIA, on CORSICA, in APULIA, in CALABRIA, or - if the thesis of betrayal were true - why not in ROME itself, or near LEGHORN or GENOA? If he did not do this, then our job was to hold as much of Italy as possible in order not to let the base of the enemy air forces come near to the Alps. If the enemy is successful in a landing in Northern Italy then all the German formations in Central and Southern Italy would be lost. Moreover no grounds must be given which might serve the Italians as a moral pretext for their betrayal, or
page 27 by premature hostile action to commit the betrayal ourselves. In the meantime the traitors simply oozed with amiability and assurances of faith, and even got as far as to make some of our officers who came into contact with them daily doubtful of the truth of the betrayal-hypothesis. This was nothing to be wondered at, for to the German officers such depths of infamy were simply incomprehensible.

The situation became more and more difficult. It was perhaps the only time in this war when at times I myself hardly knew what I should suggest to the FUHRER. The measures to be taken in the event of <u>open</u> betrayal had been decided in every detail. The watchword 'Axis' would set them in motion. In the meantime however all the divisions, which the FUHRER at once caused to be moved from the WEST to Upper Italy, were operatively idle there - and that at a time when the EAST front, subjected to severe assault, was begging for reserves more urgently than ever.

How much meanwhile we had been able to find out through our troops and through the bordering GAU's - keen as sleuth-hounds on the track of Italian machinations - in the matter of manifestly hostile actions and preparations
page 28 is known to you all. However, somehow or other the Italians explained it all way, either as a misunderstanding or with excuses.

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In this insupportable position the FUHRER agreed to slash through the Gordian knot by a political and military ultimatum. Then on the morning of the 7 September the enemy landing fleet appeared at SALERNO and on the afternoon of September 8th news of the Italian capitulation flew through the other. Even now however, at the last moment, the freedom of action of the Command was still held up: the Italians refused to admit the authenticity of the wireless message. The password itself therefore would not be given but only the 'stand-by' for the troops, until at last at 19.15 this most monstrous of all betrayals in history was confirmed by the-Italian political authorities themselves. What followed was both a drama and a tragedy. Only at a later date will it be possible to gather together and set forth all the grotesque details. The more disillusioned the troops and the German Command, the harder the reaction.

General Outcome: Appendix

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(Unnumbered)

WFST/ORG/1st STAFFEL
Armed Forces Operation Staff/Organization/1st Section

List of Italian Booty

1. Arms:

Rifles	1255606
Pistols	17703
M.P.	13627
A.T. rifles	167
MG	38383
Mortars	8606
A.T. guns	961
A.A. guns	3679
Army guns	5346
Ammunition (tons)	287502
Motor cycles	2295
Armoured cars	1938
Lorries	12708
Motor busses (KOM)	90
Trailers	471
Tractors	293
Tanks and assault guns	970
M.T. fuel	123114
Horses, mules	07600

2. Aircraft

Fighters	1379)	
Bombers	886)	Front line
Reconnaissance	512)	aircraft
Transports	363)	
Seaplanes	90)	2nd line
Passenger planes	125)	aircraft
Training craft	1198)	
Aircraft engines	499)	

3. Ships

Torpedo boats	8)	
Destroyers	2) 10	
Corvettes	2)	
S-boats	14)	
Anti-submarine boats	6)	
Mine-layers	4)	51
Mine-detectors	7)	
Escort vessels	7)	
R-boats	13)	
Other small war vessels	11	
Merchant ships	34	

4. Clothing

Overcoats	551000
Capes	408000
Tunics	524000
Pullovers	552000
Trousers, prs	494000
Shirts	1139000
Pants, prs	4243000
Shoes, prs	3286000
Caps	486000
Tent squares	509000
Cloth, metres	352000
Linen (in m^2)	3036000
Blankets	2522000

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5. Raw materials. (Note in ink: "In far larger quantities than might have been expected)

Iron and steel	196,200 tons
" " " scrap	16,900 "
Non-ferrous metals	78,780 "
Minerals	500 "
Coal	41,000 "
Timber	90,000 cbm.
Mercury	3,400 tons
Asbestos	100 "
Buna	462 "
Chem. Products (Chloric acid, hydrochloric acid)	1,900 "
Industrial oils and fats	240 "
Tanning materials	515 "
Alcohol	400 "
Hides and tallow	21,925 pieces
Leather	200 tons
Tyres (cars and cycles)	21,000 pieces
Raw material for textiles	493 tons
Quinine	13 tons
Raw Tobacco	8,800 tons

6. Prisoners of war or military internees:

Italians	547,531 of whom	24,744 officers
British	34,160 of whom	2,615 officers
Americans	1,427 of whom	201 officers

(Unnumbered)

Italian Booty

Arms		
Rifles	1,255,660	
Machine guns	38,383	
Guns	9,986	
M. T. vehicles	15,500	
Tanks and assault guns	970	
MT Fuel (cubic metres)	123,114	
Horses, mules	67,600	
Aircraft		
Front line aircraft	2,867	
Other aircraft	1,686	
Ships		
Torpedo-boats and destroyers	10	
Other small vessels of war	51	
Clothing for	500,000 men	
Rawmaterials in far larger quantities than might have been expected in view of the constant economic demands.		
PWs or military internees:		
Italians	547,531	of whom 24,744 officers
British	34,160	of whom 2,615 officers
Americans	1,427	of whom 201 officers

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Unnumbered

Disarmed Italian Divisions

Definitely disarmed	51 divisions
Probably disarmed	29 divisions
Not disarmed	3 divisions

(Unnumbered)

Disarmed Italian Divisions

South-East

Disarmed:

Rhodes	:	REGINA Division	1
Crete	:	SIENA Division	1
Greece	:	CAGLIARI, PIEMONTE, FORLI, PINEROLO, CASALE, MODENA, AQUI Divisions	7
ALBANIA	:	BRENNERO, AREZZO, PARMA, FIRENZE, PUGLIE, EMILIE Divisions	6
MONTENEGRO	:	PERUGIA, VENEZIA, FERRARA, TAURINENSE divisions	4
CROATIA	:	MURGE, MARCHE, MESSINA, BERGAMO, ZARO, LOMBARDIA Divisions	6
			25

NOT yet disarmed up to the present;

Main part of CUNEO Division

(SAMOS) and RE Division and

MACERATA division (North-West Croatia)

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(Unnumbered)

Disarmed Italian Divisions

South

Disarmed:

Area of Army Group C:

a) Main portion of divisions probably disarmed:

JULIA, TRIDENTINA, CUNEENSE, ROVIGO, ALPI GRAIE, 201st Coastal Division, ERSATZ BRENNERO Division, ERSATZ FIRENZE Division, ERSATZ PISTOIA Division, ERSATZ RAVENNA Division 10

b) Main portion of divisions probably disarmed:

206th Coastal Division, PRINCIPE AMEDEO DUCA d'AOSTA division, COSSERIA, TRENTO, ASSIETA, LIVORNO, and TORINO divisions 7

c) Some parts of the divisions probably disarmed:

VENETO, VICENZA, NAPOLI and AOSTA divisions 4

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In addition a considerable number of special units not forming part of a divisional formation were disarmed.

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Area of Supreme Command South ("OB. SUD")

a. Main portion of divisions definitely disarmed:

221st Coastal divisions, PIAVE, GRENATIERI DI SARDEGNA, SASSARI, PIACENZA, CENTAURO, ARIETE divisions, 220th Coastal divisions, 215th Coastal Division, RAVENNA 10

b. Parts of the divisions definitely disarmed:

211th Coastal, MANTUA, 212th Coastal, 227th Coastal, 214th Coastal, PICINO, 210th Coastal, 200th Coastal, 222nd Coastal, PASUBIO, LEGNANO 11

c. Parts of divisions probably disarmed:

PRIULI, CREMONA, CALABRIA, 204th Coastal, BARI, 200th Coastal, SABAUDA, (on Corsica and SARDINIA) 7

28

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(Unnumbered)

Disarmed Italian Divisions

West:

Disarmed:

Main portion of divisions definitely disarmed:

EM. FILIBERTO, PUSTERIA, TARO,
LUPI DI TOSCANA, 223rd Coastal division,
224th Coastal division

In all 6 divisions

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III

I should like briefly to set out the characteristic features of the individual theatres of war.

See Appendices:

(Note in pencil: "Delivered extempore with the help of maps")

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To III

Finland

The Finnish front, the Northern abutment of the European defence system. The outermost wing of the East Front, and at the same time the rear cover of the Norwegian front.

Total length of front approx 1400 km (= 2/3 of the total length of the East front), occupied along wide stretches only by means of support points.

Terrain: South-East: forest and swamp; North-East: treeless partly rocky TUNDRA.

Weather: Very various over the terrain as a whole. (Temperatures on 1. 11. from + 8 to - 18 degrees). In the North long polar night, mud period not materially important.

War Supply: Important nickel mines at KOLOSJOKI near PETJAMO (32% of the total European output).

Total population: 3.8 millions.

Operational possibilities:

No operations on a grand scale possible owing to absence of roads. High capacity lines of communication for supplying own offensive do not exist (only one railway in North - South direction as far as ROVANIEMI, branch line Eastwards (KANDALAKSHA) still under construction. Only one high capacity trunk road running North - South HELSINKI - PETJAMO). As against this, on the Russian side, high-capacity MURMANSK line.

Conduct of war: Consequently, in the main, confined to assault unit activities and enterprises by JAGER detachments, action along the flanks and for roads of special importance. Nevertheless because of the great length of front a strong own (German) force of 176,800 is tied to this front, consisting of the best troops capable of withstanding the nature of the country. Own divisions in good fighting trim, fully equipped, trained as in peacetime, good body of officers.

For air activity on the whole very unfavourable Terrain affords few possibilities for laying out airfields.

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Norway

Protection of the North-Western flank of Europe. Total front length 2,800 km (about equal to East front). Part of the front occupied only by support points, islands not all occupied.

Terrain: Medium-mountain and alpine in nature deeply indented by fjords and valleys.

War Supply: Transportation of Swedish ore via NARVIK (22% of total European output). Emphasis in supply lies on communications by sea. Several good big and small ports suitable for distribution traffic.

Coastal district suitable for enemy landings with limited objective.

Operations - on land only possible with limited forces. Railway and road systems very widely meshed, of low capacity, easily blocked (bridges, tunnels). For these reasons the British operations 1940 (plus absence of bigger harbours) were greatly hampered.

Own forces in Norway are 380,000 men.

The greater portion of the 13 divisions are employed in coastal defence, partly permanently posted.

(In Norway about 1,000 guns of over 10 cm. cal. are employed in coastal defence).

Counter-attack reserves: 1 Inf. Div. in Central Norway, 1st Infantry and 1 Armoured Divisions in South Norway.

Opportunities of action of own air arms dependent to a very high degree on weather, particularly in North Norway.

Navy: Important U-boat support points, berths for heavy naval combat forces. Supply for the AOK (Army Command) depends on the security of sea communications. Mean supply efficiency per month by sea = 190,140 BRT.

H1144-0119

Denmark

Key position at entrance to the Baltic the possession of which would make possible far-reaching enemy operations both in the direction of Scandinavia and in that of Germany and extend their influence into the Baltic.

Total length of front: approx. 700 km.

Terrain: For landings from the sea on a large scale the Western coast is little suited (storms, surf); East Jutland and the islands are better suited (but owing to long approach routes and good defensive possibilities unlikely).

Especially open to the danger of a landing: ESBJERG (West Jutland) and AALBORG (North-West Jutland).

For tanks - possible almost everywhere. Landings from the air possible in the open as well as on the well-developed airfields.

Coastal defence - by support points. Coastal defence forces - 3 divisions, of limited fighting value. In addition, counter-attack reserves. Reinforcements have been ordered.

Total formations of the WEHRMACHT employed - 106,500 men.

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West

1. Terrain:

In all 2,100 Km. of coastal front on the Channel and Atlantic and 500 Km on the Mediterranean all of which - in contra-distinction to the coast in Norway - with a few inconsiderable exceptions admit of landings with modern resources.

The interior of the country offers no obstacles to the employment of all formations including tactical armoured formations (Western campaign).

A good well-developed communications system both by rail and road enables our resources to be moved rapidly but will also benefit the enemy once he has gained a footing.

Weather conditions do not completely exclude landing operations with modern equipment at any time of the year. In the autumn and winter however storms may make a landing on the grand scale a difficult matter.

2. Own possibilities:

The position as described makes it necessary to repel and destroy the enemy before he can reach the coast. For this reason - construction of the ATLANTIC Wall. This construction has been in hand for a long time; it is however impossible along a front of 2,500 Km to reinforce the coastal front with a system of fortifications in depth at all points. Nevertheless the number of positions and built-in weapons is greater than in any other construction as yet known, including the West Wall and the MAGINOT Line.

2,692 guns of cal. 7.5 cm. up the the heaviest long-range batteries, not including the AA guns and the artillery of the divisions employes. 2,354 medium and heavy A.P. weapons alone, without counting the equipment of the employed divisions. 8,500 (8,449) positions of the permanent construction type have been handed over to the troops. In all over 5.3 million cubic metres of concrete have been used on the constructions.

A belt of fortifications of this kind has the effect however of tieing down considerable forces of one's own. For this purpose we have put in fortress divisions of whom however, needless to say, only a small section in every case can be effective against the enemy. For this reason it is essential to have strong, mobile and especially well equipped reserves in the West for the purpose of forming points of gravity. Any weakening of these tactical reserves required in the West is a risk and acutely endangering the general situation.

Strength in the West: In all 1,370,000 men.

Italy

1. Ground conditions

Along the front:- mountains some of which are Alpine in nature. Less steep country only along the West and above all the East coast. As a result it is possible in part to cut out some sectors of the Alpine regions; on the other hand infantry must be employed in strength to prevent infiltration. Transverse movements behind the front are very difficult. Good possibilities of blocking roads for a long time.

In addition to these conditions along the front (Length app. 150 km.), the factor determining the employment of own troops is the double coast-line (on both sides), total length approx. 1,600 km. In addition to landings directly behind our front, the sectors especially threatened are GENOA, LA SPEZIA, Rome, and the whole of the East coast south of RAVENNA.

2. The point of next importance to the terrain in determining tactical conditions in Italy is the superiority of the enemy on land, in the air, and on the sea. This enables him to advance methodically, taking no undue risks, supported by a number of smaller and greater landings directly behind our front. Strong enemy artillery action.

Absolute supremacy in the air. In addition to direct and heavy effect on the troops this air superiority also means constant interference with traffic (especially on the railroads) in the rear areas. Troop movements and supply are affected right far back into the Hinterland.

The enemy's rearward communications across the sea are practically unhampered as our own sea and air forces are nothing like strong enough.

3. In view of these conditions our own troops are confronted with an immense task.

In spite of the fact that our forces are hampered at the coast and in the back areas (total ration strength of all branches of the Armed Forces and auxiliaries rather over 400,000), we have so far contrived to delay the enemy advance very considerably and to keep down our own losses in men and equipment to a minimum since the islands were evacuated. This may be regarded as a success, since, apart from his having gained a foothold in Europe proper, the enemy has not up to the present gained any decisive tactical success. However, it will not be possible in the near future to wrest the initiative from the enemy as he is in a position to supply and reinforce his formations in practically unlimited measure.

Own air arm - in a difficult position owing to the multivariousness of its duties and the vast extent of the tactical theatres of war - must confine itself to forming points of gravity.

Navy: Apart from the employment of a few U-boats and speed-boats, possesses few possibilities of becoming effective against the enemy.

4. Along the coasts - preparations for defence.

H1144-0121

(Unnumbered) III

Finland: Total length of front about 1,400 km.
(= 2/3 of total length of Eastern front.
Important: Nickel mines KOLOSJOKI
near PETSAMO (32% of total European output)
Total number of inhabitants 3.8 millions.

Own strength: 176,800 men

NORWAY: Total length of front 2,000 km (equal to length of Eastern Front).

NARVIK: Clearing port for Swedish ore (22% of total European output).

Own strength: 315,000 men

Approx 1,000 guns over 10 cm.

DENMARK: Total length of front: approx 700 km.
Own strength 106,500 men.

WEST: In all 2,100 km of coastal front along the channel and the Atlantic and 500 km. along Mediterranean.

Atlantic Wall: 2,692 guns of cal. 7.5
up to the heaviest long range batteries
2,354 medium and heavy A.P. weapons
8,500 positions, constantly being extended.

Over 5.3 million cbm of concrete laid.

Own strength: 1,370,000 men.

ITALY: Length of front: spprox. 150 km.
Both coasts : in all approx, 1,600 Km.
Own strength : 329,000 men.

South-East: Balkans 50% of European output in mineral oil.

100% of European output in chromium ore.

60% of European output in bauxite.

29% of European output in antimony.

21% of European output in copper.

Length of coast-line (incl. CRETE and RHODES):

approx. 4,200 km., or twice the distance from LENINGRAD to the Black Sea.

Own strength: 612,000 men.

EAST: Length of front: 2,100 km.

In view of the length of front our own strength is inadequate for a continuous line of positions as in the last world war.

H1144-0122

Artillery: Monthly production 1,200 guns.

Tanks : At the outbreak of the war 21,000 tanks, mainly light and out of date.

Russian losses in tanks from June 1941 to October 1943:

52,000.

Railway sabotage: July 1560, August 2,121, September 2,000 line demolitions with great effect on operations and on evacuation transport.

Reinforcement of the Red Army (lowest point) 1.12.1941:

2.3 millions

Today highest point up to date

5.5 millions

Own strength: 3,900,000

South-East

1. Importance of the South-East

Domination of the Balkans as an integral part of the Fortress of Europe is decisive from the point of view of winning the war for tactical, military-political and economic reasons.

The Balkans provide:

50%	of	the	total	European	output	in mineral oil
100%	"	"	"	"	"	in chromium ore
60%	"	"	"	"	"	in bauxite
29%	"	"	"	"	"	in antimony
21%	"	"	"	"	"	in copper

2. Tactical possibilities

In view of the coast length (including Crete and Rhodes) of approx 4,200 Km, i.e. twice the distance from LENINGRAD to the Black Sea, in the event of an attack by the enemy our own troops would have the following advantages and disadvantages:-

Advantages

For coastal defence in general all that is necessary is to occupy the harbours and river-mouths on the point of gravity principle.

Should the operations move inland, the hill offer good opportunities for blocking and defence.

Disadvantages

A sparse rail and road system involves difficulties in the matter of supply and the movement of reserves.

Grave danger from the air on all the few roads and mountain railway lines all of which possess many artificial constructions. (To Greece only one single-track railway line with an efficiency of 12 trains per day).

Difficulties in supplying the many islands of the AEGEAN (Low own tonnage, shortage of naval tactical forces - only a few Italian torpedo-boats - very few security vessels. Ration strength on Crete 47,000, on Rhodes 8,000 and 30,000 Italian military internees).

3. Present position

Army:

In the parts of the Balkans occupied by us guerilla warfare is now being waged against guerilla bands - some of them well-armed - supported by the Anglo-Saxons to a total strength of approx 140 - 150,000 men. The bands are allanti-German, but disunited amongst themselves. A distinction should be made:

H1144-0124

a. In Croatia and Serbia between:

aa. Communist bands under the command of TITO to a strength of approx 90,000 men.

bb. CHETNIKS under the command of DRAZA MIHAILOVIC, to a strength of 30,000 men.

b. In Greece:

Nationalist bands under the command of ZERVAS to a strength of 10,000 and approx 15,000 Communists.

For the defence against ANGLO-SAXON attack and for putting down the guerilla bands we have at our disposal at the present time own forces to the strength of 612,000 men.

Landings of any size in the winter time are unlikely so that the main task of these forces is to put down the guerillas in order to be able in the spring of 1944, after defeating and destroying the larger bands, to employ the largest possible forces in coastal defence.

From the forces of the confederates stationed in the South-East - with the exception of the Bulgarian formations who however are requested to defend Bulgaria - no material assistance may be expected.

Air arm:

At present, in view of the great distance to their jumping-off bases, the numerical superiority of the ANGLO-SAXON air arm has not made itself felt excepting in the Western Balkans where the fact that Southern Italy is occupied by the enemy has become noticeable.

H1144-0125

East

Length of front: 2,100 Km. (distance from frontier to Reich to Moscow 900 km., to Urals 2,300 Km.)

Terrain: Flat plateau, swamp and forest in the North, deeply indented (steppe ravines) in the South. In view of the great length of the front the ratio of our own strength is not sufficiently high to admit of a continuous line of positions as in the World War and makes it necessary to occupy by a system of support points and mobile warfare in which threats to the flanks and rear must be accepted. Our line of fefence is therefore rather thin and there is difficulty in forming larger gravity points. Where we are opposed by enemy concentrations our forces are always locally inferior.

Russian infantry's fighting value has sunk to a still lower level although their training is noticeably better; on the other hand their equipment is rapidly improving (automatic and heavy infantry weapons). The Russian artillery is being built up on a grand scale. Monthly output 1,200 guns.

Armoured troops: On the outbreak of war 21,000 tanks, mainly light and out-of-date.

Strength on 1.10.43: 9,000 heavy tanks of the most modern types. Monthly production 1,700.

Russian tank losses from June 1941 to October 1943: 52,000. Creation of tactical tank formations for extensive tasks (thrust into the depth of the enemy's terrain and destruction by envelopment) employment in the form of points of gravity.

Formations of special units on a large scale (A.T. regiments, mortar regiments).

Railway sabotage:

July 1560, August 2121, September 2000 line demolitions with far-reaching effect on operations and evacuation transport.

Guerilla warfare: The purpose of this is to impede German supply, to make it impossible to use the land, to subvert the territorial formations, organise an armed popular rising, reconstruct the Party organisation in occupied territory. Although losses in personnel have been high, remorseless exploitation of all the provisions re. fitness for service and extreme restrictions have brought about a gradual reinforcemtnt of the Red Army (Lowest level on 1.12.1941: 2.3 millions to-day highest level as yet known 5.5 millions), in addition to this, continuous calling-up of replacements (ERSATZGESTELLUNGEN) and the creation of tactical winter reserves (approx. 50 divisions).

Total strength of Russian formations:

327 rifle divisions
51 armoured divisions
Own strength in the EAST: 200 German,
10 Roumanian
6 Hungarian divisions -
4,183,000 men

H1144-0126

EAST

Armed Forces Operations Staff/Op (H)/North

No 006650/43 TOP SECRET

FUHRER's GHQ
31.10.1943

3 copies

Subject: Lecture by Chief of Armed Forces Operations Staff - copy

EAST

Length of Front: 2,100 km (Distance of frontier of Reich to Moscow 900 Km., to Urals 2,300 Km.)

Terrain: Flat table land, swamp and forest in the North, deeply indented (steppe ravines) in the South. Owing to the length of the front ratio of own strength does not admit of continuous line of positions as in the World War and makes it necessary to occupy by means of support points and mobile warfare, in which threats of defense therefore rather thin. Great difficulty in forming larger points of gravity. Where opposed by enemy concentrations own forces always locally inferior.

Russian infantry's fighting value sunk to still lower level although their training noticeably improved; on the other hand their equipment with weapons is rapidly rising (automatic and heavy infantry weapons). Large-scale building up of Russian artillery. Monthly production 1,200 guns.

Principles of employment: Fire concentration on narrow sector on the German pattern. For this, fresh formation of artillery brigades and artillery corps. Maximum employment of ammunition.

Armoured troops: At the outbreak of war 21,000, mostly light and out-of-date tanks. Strength on 1.10.43 9,000 heavy tanks of the latest types. Monthly production 1,700. Russian tank losses from June 1941 to October 1943: 52,000. Creation of tactical armoured formations for extensive tasks. (Thrust in depth and destruction by envelopment). Employment by points of gravity.

Formation of special units on grand scale (A.T. regiments, mortar regiments).

Own Air Arm: Length of front in comparison with available forces makes it necessary to concentrate own air arm at the focal points. As a result it is unavoidable that on many sectors of our own land front own troops see little of the activities of their own air arm. However the air arm is there, in spite of this, and cintributes very materially to the successes of the defence.

H1144-0127

The Russian air arm: remains as before far inferior to or own, but it must be admitted that its command, organization and equipment have greatly improved. The command is manoeuvreable and strict, organization admits of rapid displacement or follow-on of the formations. Specially unpleasant for our own troops on land is the new Russian battle aeroplane now appearing in large numbers. The Russian air arm is being employed almost exclusively in support of the army; so far operational employment has been quite secondary. Since 1941 the Soviet Russian Command has adapted itself to the principles of the German command. As against the principle "Not a step back!" of the year 1941, since the summer of 1942 tactical withdrawal movements have been the rule. The command has become more mobile, quickly seizes any moment of weakness and makes good use of initial successes. The situation with respect to communications is very bad (wide-meshed low efficiency rail and road system, during the mud season the roads cannot be used at all) so that it is difficult for us to move our reserves. Add to this steadily increasing sabotage on the railways: July 1560, August 2121, September 2000 line demolitions with great repercussions on operations and evacuation transport.

Guerilla warfare: Purpose is to impede German supply, prevent use of the land, the organization of armed popular risings, reconstruction of the Party organizations in occupied territory.

In spite of high losses in personnel, remorseless exploitation of all provisions re fitness for service and extreme restriction have made it possible gradually to reinforce the Red Army (lowest level 1.12.1941: 2.3 millions, present day highest level so far 5.5 millions); in addition continuous calling up of recruits and the formation of tactical winter reserves (approx. 50 divisions). Own strength in East *) 4,183,000.

Munitions industry: Evacuation (methodically prepared for beforehand) made it possible by the summer of 1942 to return again to the production level of the previous period.

At the present time the Russian food situation cannot be regarded as likely to decide the fate of the war.

Economic losses due to the withdrawal of the front:

Pig iron products	338,000 tons
Loss in coal production	460,000 tons
Loss in grain and oil crops	1,854,000 tons
Production of raw timber	6.2 fm (million fathoms?)
Loss of steel products	10,000 tons
Potatoes approx.	1,000,000 tons
Meats and fats	50,000 tons
Men fit for service	677,000

*) Div: 200 German
10 Roumanian
6 Hungarian

H1144-0128

Finland

The Finnish front is the Northern abutment of the European system of defence. Outer wing of the East front and at the same time rear corner of the Norwegian front. Total length of front approx 1,400 Km (2/3 of the total length of the Easy front), wide stretches of the front occupied by means of support points only.

Terrain: South-East: forest and swamp; North East: treeless and partly rocky TUNDRA.

Weather: Varies greatly over the area as a whole (Temperatures 1.11 from + 8 to - 18 degrees!), in the North long polar night, mud period is in considerable.

War Supply: Important nickel mines at KOLOSJOKI near PETSAMO (32% of the European production).

Total number of inhabitants: 3.8 millions.

Tactical possibilities: Operations on a large scale impossible owing to absence of roads. High capacity lines of communication for feeding an offensive are lacking (only one in North-South direction as far as ROVANIEMI branch line Eastward (KANDALAKSHA) still under construction. Only one high capacity trunk North-South road HELSINKI - PETSAMO). As against this on the Russian side the high capacity MURMANSK railway.

Conduct of war therefore limited in the main to activities of assault troops and enterprises by JAGER detachments. Fighting on the flanks and for roads of special importance. In spite of this owing to the length of the front strong own forces (Mountain Army Command 20 : 212,000 men) formed of the best human material capable of standing up the the nature of the terrain are tied down to it. Own division in excellent fighting trim, fully equipped, trained as in peace time, good body of officers.

With respect to air activity, on the whole very unfavourable conditions. Terrain affords few possibilities for laying out airfields. In winter time, owing to the short hours of daylight flying activities are very restricted. Supply in the purview of the air arm very difficult.

Our own air arm is highly superior in value to the Russian, as is regularly proved in all air battles fought in the course of Russian attacks on German convoys by the specially high numbers of aircraft brought down.

Coastal defence is equal to the Russian forces. Combined Anglo-American-Russian landing operations in the area of the VARANGER fjord - PORSANGERFJORD unlikely for political reasons. Collaboration with Finns (trained in forest and winter fighting) good, as before.

H1144-0129

H1144-0130

Norway

Protection of the North-West flank of Europe. Total length of front 2,500 km (about the same length as the East front). In part occupied only by support points. Some of the island unoccupied.

Terrain: Medium mountains and Alpine in nature, deeply indented by Fjords and valleys.

War Supply: Transport of Swedish ore via NARVIK (22% of the total European output).

The points of gravity of supply rests on communications by sea. Several good big ports and many small ones suitable for distribution traffic. Coastal areas suitable for enemy landings with limited objectives.

Operations: On land possible only with limited forces. Rails and road system very widely meshed, of low capacity and easily blocked (bridges, tunnels). These factors (plus the lack of larger harbours) greatly impeded British operations in 1940. Own forces in Norway number 380,000. The main body of the 13 divisions occupied in coastal defence, partly permanently employed. (In Norway approx. 1,000 guns over 10 cm. caliber employed in coastal defence).

Counter-attack reserves: 1 Inf Div in Central Norway, 1 Inf and 1 Armoured divisions in South Norway.

Possibilities of action of our own air arm greatly dependent on the weather, especially in North Norway. Tactical activities directed in the first place above the sea against enemy ships. Possibilities with regard to laying out airfields limited owing to the nature of the terrain, supply difficult. Possibilities of action on the part of the enemy equally restricted owing to the great distance to their flying bases. In central and North Norway fighters can be employed only from aircraft carriers.

Navy: Important U-boat support points, births for heavy naval fighting forces. Supplies for the Army Command depend on sea communications (illegible note in German script).

DENMARK

Key-position at entrance to Baltic, the possession of which would make possible extensive operations in the direction of Scandinavia as also in the direction of Germany and make it possible to influence the area of the Baltic.

Total length of front: approx 700 km.

Terrain: West coast little suited to landing operations on a grand scale (storms, surf), East Jutland and the Islands vetter adapted (but improbable, owing to long approach routes and possibilities of defence.) Specially threatened by landings EBSJERG (West Jutland) and Aalborg (North-West Jutland). Passable by armour almost everywhere. Air landings also possible off the air-fields which are very well laid out: Coast protected by support points. Coastal defence forces 3 divisions of very limited fighting value. In addition counter-attack reserves. Reinforcements ordered. Conditions for the employment of own air forces are good. Communications good. Supply secured. Total strength of all formations of all branches of arms: 110,000.

The defence of Denmark is largely determed by the attitude of Sweden.

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H1144-0131

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Armed Forces Operations Staff/ Op. H/South
No 006652/43 Very Secret

FUHRER's G.H.Q.
2nd November, 1943

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Material for the Lecture by the Chief of Armed Forces Operations Staff on 7.11.43

Position in Italy

1. Ground conditions

Along the front mountains, partly Alpine in character, only on the West and above all on the East coast rather less steep terrain. This makes it possible in places to cut out sectors in the Alpine area but also makes it necessary to employ strong Infantry forces in order to avoid infiltration. Troops movement along the front line very difficult. Good possibilities of blocking roads durably. - Opponents, mainly Canadians, clever at making use of terrain.

In addition to the above conditions at the front (length approx. 150 Km.) the employment of own forces is also determined by the long coast lines on both sides (Total length approx. 1600 Km.). Besides landings directly behind our front the sectors mainly threatened are GENOA, LA SPEZIA, Rome and the whole of the East coast South of RAVENNA.

2. Next to ground configuration the factor determining tactical conditions in Italy is the tremendous* superiority of the opponent on land, in the air and on the sea. This enables him to advance methodically, taking no undue risks, supported by repeated landings small and great directly behind our front. Strong enemy artillery active.

Absolute superiority in the air. In addition to heavy direct action on the troops, continued interference with communications, especially by rail, in the back areas. Troop movements and supply affected to a great depth in the HINTERLAND. River communications of enemy overseas practically undisturbed, as our own naval and air tactical forces are far too small.

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* "GEWALTIG" - struck out in pencil

H1144-0132

3. In view of these conditions our own troops are confronted with immense task. In spite of the fact of our troops being hampered at the coast and in the back areas (Total ration strength of all branches of arms with auxiliaries rather over 400,000), we have so far contrived to delay the enemy advance very considerably and to keep down to a minimum our own losses in men and material since the islands were evacuated. This may be regarded as a success, as -apart from his having gained a foothold in Europe proper up to the present the enemy has not gained any decisive tactical success. However it will not be possible in the near future to wrest the initiative from the enemy, he being in a position to supply and reinforce his formations in practically unlimited measure.

Own air arm - in a difficult position owing to the multivariousness of its duties and the vast extent of the tactical theatres of war -- must confine itself to forming points of gravity.

Navy: Apart from employing a few U-boats and speed-boats, no great opportunities of becoming effective against the enemy.

4. Along the coasts - preparations for defence.

5.* In the Hinterland mopping up operations on considerable scale have been in progress for some time past in the guerilla-infested areas of Slovenia and Istria influenced from the Balkans. When these operations have been concluded it will still be necessary to keep forces here to maintain pacification. The guerilla activities which break out again from time to time in several other areas are of no great importance. The Italians are not in a position to maintain law and order with their own forces.

6. Disarmament of the Italians after some short and in some cases sharp fighting in spite of our being outnumbered (51 Italian divisions disarmed by 17 German divisions and 2 German brigades) also represents a thwarting of enemy plans which aimed at cutting off the German forces.

7. The enrollment of Italian forces for service at present in progress in collaboration with the Italian Government is made more difficult by indifference and war-weariness.

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* This point and the two following struck out in pencil.

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H1144-0134

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. L-172 (Cont'd)
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Armed Forces Operations Staff/Op(H) South-East

No. 006651/43 Very Secret.

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1.11.1943

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Material South-East for Lecture by Chief of Armed Forces Operations Staff on 7.11.1943

1. Importance of the South-East:

Domination of the Balkans as an integral part of the Fortress of Europe is decisive from the point of view of winning the war for tactical, military-political and economic reasons.

The Balkans furnish:

50%	of	the	total	European	production	of	mineral oil
100%	"	"	"	"	"	"	chromium ore
60%	"	"	"	"	"	"	bauxite
29%	"	"	"	"	"	"	antimony
21%	"	"	"	"	"	"	copper

2. Tactical possibilities

In view of a length of coast (with CRETE and RHODES) of approximately 4,200 km, equal to two times the distance from LENINGRAD to the BLACK SEA, the enemy, in the event of an attack on their own troops is confronted by two main directions of attack:

(a) Making use of South Italy as jumping-off place for a landing on the Dalmatian coast.

(b) After breaking through the island belt position in the AEGEAN, to advance on SALONIKI and the Thracian coast.

This would afford the following advantages and disadvantage:

(a) For the enemy:

Advantages: Support by the guerilla bands.

Disadvantages: The coast with the exception of the ports and river mouths is generally unsuitable for a landing (steep coast, lagoons). After landing the terrain is generally speaking mountainous and short

/ or ...

of water, with a sparse system of roads and railways.

Troops who presumably will be unused to fighting in the hills.

(b) For own troops:

Advantages: The coast can be defended, generally speaking, merely by occupying the ports and river mouths.

In the event of operations advancing, good opportunities for blocking and defence in the hills.

Disadvantages: Only a sparse road and rail system. Supply difficulties and poor conditions for moving reserves.

Grave danger from the air on all the few roads and mountain railway lines all of which possess many artificial constructions. (To Greece only one single-track line with capacity of 12 trains per day).

Difficulties in supplying the many islands in the AEGEAN (Own tonnage is low - shortage of naval tactical forces - only a few Italian torpedo-boats - very few security vessels. Ration strength on CRETE 47,000, on RHODES 8,000 and 30,000 Italian military internees).

Further possible enemy operations from the European bridge-head of Turkey and operations against the Bulgarian-Roumanian BLACK SEA litteral would have to be taken into account should Turkey change the attitude of neutrality she has maintained up till now, or if the unfavourable position in the EAST should develop still further.

3. Present position

Army: In the part of the Balkans occupied by ourselves, guerilla warfare is rife against bands of whom some are well-armed - supported by the Anglo-Saxons - to a total strength of 140 - 150,000 men. The bands are all anti-German, but not in agreement among themselves. A distinction should be made between:

(a) Croatia and Serbia:

(aa) Communist bands under the command of TITO to a strength of about 90,000.

(bb) CHETNIK's under the command of DRAZA MIHAILOVICH to a strength of 30,000.

(b) Greece:

Nationalist bands under the command of ZERVAS

/ to ...

H1144-0135

H1144-0136

to a strength of 10,000 men and approximately 15,000 Communists.

For the defence against Anglo-Saxon attack and for putting down the Guerilla bands we have at our disposal at the present time own forces to the strength of in all of 24 divisions *with a total strength of 408,000 men.

Landings in any strength during the winter are unlikely, so that the main task of these forces is to put down the guerillas in order to be able in the spring of 1944, after having defeated and destroyed the larger bands, to employ the largest possible forces in coastal defence.

From the confederate forces stationed in the South-East area, with the exception of the Bulgarian formations who however are required for the defence of Bulgaria, no material assistance may be expected.

Air Arm:

At the present time, in view of the great distance to their starting bases, the numerical superiority of the Anglo-Saxon Air Arm has not yet become effective excepting in the Western Balkans where the fact that South Italy is occupied by the enemy is beginning to make itself felt.

4. In September units of twelve German divisions, in spite of some sharp resistance on the part of the Italian formations and great difficulties connected with the terrain, continued to disarm 25 Italian divisions, including Corps and Army units.

Up to the present in all 304,098 Italians (including 12,575 officers and 291,519 men) have been evacuated from the area High Command South-East.

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* The words "24 divisions" struck out; pencil note in margin '612,000 men'.

H1144-0137

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. L-172 (Cont'd)
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Very Secret

Armed Forces Operations Staff/Op Army/WEST

FUHRER's GHQ
2nd November, 1943

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Western Theatre of War including the

Netherlands and Belgium

Subject: Lecture by Chief of Armed Forces Operations Staff.

1. Terrain:

In all 2100 km of coastal front on the Channel and the Atlantic and 500 km on the Mediterranean, which - in contradistinction to the coast in Norway - admit of landings with modern resources.

The interior of the country presents no difficulties to the employment of all formations including tactical armoured formations (Western Campaign).

Good system of communications, road and rail, highly-developed, enables own reserves to be moved quickly but will also aid the enemy should he continue to gain a footing.

Weather: does not exclude landing with modern resources at any time of the year. However in the autumn and winter storms may make a landing on the grand scale difficult since this requires continuous good weather at sea for some days. The possibilities of employing the air arm are sometimes restricted in the autumn and winter owing to presence of extensive fields of fog, particularly over England.

2. The enemy:

The enemy possesses possible starting bases along an almost continuous circle from Eastern England via the USA, North Africa to CORSICA and SARDINIA with at some points shortest possible approach routes to the Continent. In all areas the opponent has at his disposal locally superior forces. The enemy formations are fresh and have gained experience in the campaigns in North Africa, Sicily and Italy. He has developed his landing technique and tactics to a high level, so that we must now reckon at all times - with the afore-mentioned reservations - with a landing on the grand scale.

Enemy Air Arm: Numerically greatly superior. Will enable the enemy both to defend his own forces and their supply and to effect the employment of air landing forces on a big scale.

/ Possibilities ...

Possibilities for the enemy:

A demand on the part of Russians for the establishment of a Second Front in the West and the endeavour on the part of the Anglo-Americans to acquire more weight in opposition to the Russian political demands by gaining a thorough military success are the leading features of the position in the West. Successful penetration of the Western defences would very soon break through to the Belgian, North -French and West-German industrial areas and so prove fatal. At the same time this operation would also cut off the U-boat support points in the Atlantic.

Even a minor enemy success involving the creation of a bridgehead would spell danger, since in view of the enemy's superiority in equipment and personnel he would have no difficulty in extending this bridgehead into a breach of our defences.

3. Our possibilities: The position as described makes it essential to repel and destroy the enemy before he can reach the coast. For this reason - construction of the Atlantic Wall. The work has been in hand for a long time; it is however impossible to provide a coastal front of 2,600 km. at all points with a system of fortifications in depth. Nevertheless the number of positions and built-in weapons is greater than any other construction as yet known, including the West Wall and the MAGINOT Line, for instance 2,692 guns of 7.5-cm.-cal. up to the heaviest long range batteries, not counting the AA guns and the artillery of the employed divisions. * 2,354 medium and heavy A.P. weapons alone, not reckoning the equipment of the employed divisions. 8,449 installations of the permanent construction type have been handed over to the troops. (In pencil: In all ..... cbm concrete have been used in the construction).

A belt of fortifications of this type however has the effect of tying down considerable forces of one's own. We have put in for this purpose fortress divisions, of which however, naturally, only a small proportion in each case can be effective against the enemy. Because of this it will be essential to have strong, mobile and particularly well-equipped reserves in the West. Any weakening of these tactical reserves required in the West is a risk and will acutely endanger the situation as a whole.

X However in the event of an attack in force in the West, even if the said tactical reserves are there, the forces at our disposal will not be adequate. It will be necessary in this event which will decide the war to employ every German man able to bear arms, laying the home country largely bare.

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* Illegible scribbled question in margin and note - '5.3 millions'.

X Pencilled note "370,000 men".

H1144-0138

4. Internal security

The British are continually trying to form organizations intended to engage in sabotaging the French industries working for the German munition industry and the lines of communication. They are supplied by air. The Army units employed in security duties, the SD (Security Service), and the French police as well have been able to keep these organizations under control. In the period from the 20th to the 30th October alone these terrorists lost 12 dead and 380 prisoners.

Strong forces of the ERSATZ Army have been transferred to France for the pacification of the country.

5.* Disarmament of the 6 Italian divisions numbering approximately 50,000 men employed along the coast of the Mediterranean is proceeding smoothly. The employment of units of 2 divisions proved sufficient to nip all will-to-resistance in the bud.

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* Illegible marginal note.

H1144-0139

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. L-172 (Cont'd)
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Very secret

Armed Forces Operations Staff/Op (Army) West

FUHRER's G.H.Q.
3rd November 1943

4 copies
1 copy

Strength of Army Command West

(to date 1.11.43)

1. Employed in coastal defence: 27 divisions & 2 Rgt.

2. Employed in 2nd line : 1 Inf Div
2 Inf div being formed
3 Tactical groups (I.D.)
1 Armoured div
3 SS armoured divisions) being formed
4 Armoured grenadier divisions)
3 Reserve armoured divisions

3. In addition : 5 Reserve divisions

46 Divisions / 2 Regts.

4. New formations ordered (no formations HQs and cadres available as yet) : 5 Inf divisions
3 Parachute Jäger divisions
1 SS armoured grenadier division

7 divisions

5. Ration strength (without armed forces auxiliaries and PWs) 1,370,708

Ration strength including armed forces auxiliaries and PW's 1,708,990

Distribution:

Chief of Armed Forces Operations Staff	1st copy
Deputy Chief	2nd copy
Op (Army)/West	3rd copy
KTb (?)	4th copy

H1144-0140

IV

How are the resources of our opponents distributed at the present time, and what are his strategic and tactical intentions likely to be?

England)
America) separate appendices
Mediterranean)
Far East)

It was doubtful for a time whether the enemy would not transfer his point of gravity to the Far East. This assumption proved wrong. The main mass of the British-American formations capable of employment is undoubtedly in the Mediterranean. Consequently we must reckon in every event with the continuation of the operations there. The only questions remaining open are: in what direction and on what scale? The supplies observed passing through the straits of Gibraltar per month amount to approx.1.8 million tons, of which approx. 300,000 tons go through the SUEZ Canal to the Far East. This leaves approx. 1.5 million tons for the Mediterranean to be divided between the Western and Eastern Mediterranean. That is not much more than is required for normal supply. Presumably therefore it is not proposed to send any new and stronger forces to the Mediterranean.

H1144-0141

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. L-172 (Cont'd)
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Distribution of the American Army

Europe:	16 Inf divisions 3 armoured divisions 3 armoured brigades 3 air-borne divisions 7 mixed brigades
U.S.A.:	29 Inf divisions 10 armoured divisions 1 air-borne division
Pacific:	14 Inf divisions 2 Marine infantry divisions 1 armoured brigade 2 mixed birgades

H1144-0142

H1144-0143

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. L-172 (Cont'd)
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Strength of the forces in Great Britain suitable for employment in attacking operations

40 - 41 Infantry divisions (of whom 4 - 5 American)
4 independent Inf brigades
9 armoured divisions
11 armoured brigades (of whom 1 American)
2 air-borne divisions
7 paratroop battalions (of whom 3 American)

Of these employed in South-East and South England only, in direct proximity to the starting ports:-

18 Infantry divisions
2 Infantry brigades
1 airborne division
8 armoured divisions
4 Army armoured brigades

In addition about 1,000 2-4 engined transport aircraft are able to put in approx. 20,000 air-borne troops.

It is also possible to reckon with the employment of approx. 20,000 paratroops.

Troop transport and landing boat tonnage is available for at least 11-12 Infantry divisions and 1-2 armoured divisions.

The forces and resources at the disposal of the enemy are already sufficient for a large scale operation intended to force the issue on the Continent. These forces and resources will presumably be reinforced still further in the course of the next few months.

H1144-0144

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. L-172 (Cont'd)
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Distribution of British Forces

Italy:

10 Infantry divisions
2 armoured divisions
3 armoured brigades
1 air-borne division
5 commandos.

Western Mediterranean:

(Gibraltar: garrison approx.20,000)

3 Infantry divisions
2 armoured divisions
2 armoured brigades
1 air-borne division

Middle East and
Near East:

15 Infantry divisions
and 4 Polish Infantry divisions
in all : 19

4 Inf brigades &

2 Greek
1 Czech
1 Yugoslav brigades
in all : 8

5 armoured divisions
5 armoured brigades
1 paratroop division

H1144-0145

(unnumbered)

V

According to my experience, there is yet another anxiety stalking the land. It concerns the morale of our own Allies and the fear that yet other, as yet neutral states, might join the ranks of our enemies. At this point, of course, I enter upon the ticklish question of foreign policy which is not my business and which I will traverse as speedily as possible.

Of the neutral countries, we are not loved by Sweden and Switzerland. The latter is surrounded, of no danger to us from the military point of view, and will not harm us. She lives on our bounty and benefit from her.

The same does not apply to Sweden. In the last few years she has been arming hard, and possesses 12-14 Infantry divisions, 3-4 armoured brigades, and in addition a few cyclist brigades, in all 400,000 men under arms. Sweden sways between fear of Bolshevism and hope of British-American aid. This latter is far away for as long as we in the SKAGERRAK cut off Sweden's contact with England.

Should an enemy landing in Norway or Denmark prove successful, Sweden may become dangerous - but not before.

Spain and Portugal have decided to remain neutral. They have not the necessary strength to defend themselves against England and America. Everything depends therefore on the good will of our Western opponents as to the measure in which they recognize this neutrality. Latest events in Portugal have shown this. I do not believe however that it is in the interest of the ANGLO-SAXONS either for political or military reasons to unleash war on the Iberian Peninsula and that is what would undoubtedly happen were Spain to be attacked. Whether the simpler methods of political disintegration which are at present being employed will be successful is doubtful, at all events in the case of Spain.

TURKEY so far has maintained a clear policy of neutrality. Its ideal would have been agreement between England and Germany and consequently reliable security against her traditional enemy: Russia. However, the closer the Soviet Power approaches the Balkans, and the more England - in order to win the war - enters into the tow of the Bolshevists, the more difficult the position of Turkey becomes, for against Soviet Russia and England she cannot possibly maintain her neutrality - Attack by surprise on the part of Turkey against the Axis powers is not to be expected. No more likely however is it that England should allow the Dardanelles to pass into the hands of Soviet Russia and so lose her own safety in the Mediterranean which is her aim. Nevertheless even if England were merely to occupy the Dardanelles, this would at once be regarded by the Soviets as a hostile act. Turkey's future attitude is dominated by this problem of 'Haute Politique'. She

H1144-0146

is able to maintain her neutrality thanks to the diverging interests of Soviet Russia and the Western Powers. Expansionist plans she has none, not even against BULGARIA.

Page 32 Our own Allies on the other hand are united and kept at our side by the fear of Bolshevism. That is understandable, for no people fights for another but only for its own existence.

Concerning the internal morale of Finland and Bulgaria there can be no doubt.

Roumania contains two worlds, the rigorous policy faithful to the alliance with us looks two ways.*) We must be clear with ourselves as to that.

In Hungary, as a feudal state on the old pattern, social contrasts are still present in their acute form. The country is therefore particularly liable to infection with the Communist idea. In no city in Europe however does this fact appear to be less recognized than in BUDAPEST . In that city a dissolute and strongly JUDAIFIED society strata is living and dancing on a volcano. However in contradistinction to Italy, here the main mass of the officer caste at least has recognized the danger. For the present at all events for Hungary there is no political way out.

Japan: There a heroic people is fighting decisively for its existence just as we are. From the political-strategic point of view a great gap yawns in the Far East in the clear line of the fronts. ROOSEVELT and CHURCHILL want Russia to join in the fight against Japan. We ourselves, from the purely military point of view, would be glad to see the Manchurian Armies cross the AMUR or advance against VLADIVOSTOK. But on this point both the Asiatic powers stop their ears to the siren songs of the West. The reasons for this do not lie solely in the supplementary military burdens which both States would have to take upon themselves by such a decision, but more probably in their own long-term political considerations. For why should Japan start a war against Russia for as long as it can be certain that there will be no American-British air base at VLADIVOSTOK and while on the distant horizon there still looms large a conflict of the Western powers against Soviet Russia?

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*) Translator's note: JODL says literally: "stands on 2 eyes".

H1144-0147

VI

page 34 Leaving the slippery ground of politics, I now turn to the problem which confronts the High Command today and will confront it in the near future. We are fighting along the inner line, that is, we are in a position to transfer strong forces from one theatre of war to another in a much shorter time. Our great successes in the East in 1917/18 and in Italy in 1917 we owe to able exploitation of the inner line. Today this tactical advantage of the inner line is not so marked; at the moment the enemy is so strong on all fronts that in spite of our shorter lines of communication we are scarcely in a position to produce more than local superiority. This state of affairs may change if the Anglo-Saxons steps to form a second or third front in addition to the Italian. At the present time, however, the hardest task of all of the Command is to

page 35 distribute its forces throughout the theatre of war as a whole in such a way that we may be sufficiently strong at those points at which the enemy delivers the blow. Moreover, it must be borne in mind that we are not in a position rapidly to reinforce the South-East, or Finland, or Norway, because the necessary technical facilities are not present there. We have won advanced positions in Finland, Norway, Denmark, in the West, in Italy and in the South-East in order to keep the core of the Reich itself alive. The same reasons which compelled us to take these positions also compel us now, at this particular time, when the superior range of the enemy air arm is inflicting grave injury to the centre of the Reich, to maintain them. To do so a certain measure of strength is necessary. That things are getting warm on the East front, must be admitted; however no success gained by the enemy is directly fatal there, with the exception of the loss of the Roumanian oil region. None the less the Command cannot close its eyes to the fact that the brand is now held in readiness at some time or other to start a conflagration in the West which if not extinguished then and there will pass beyond control.

page 36. It is at this point the various fronts ceaselessly drag on the nerves and decisions of the FUHRER. STEGEMANN once put this into words as follows: "In war there is always the same conflict: the swing between spending and saving the forces accumulated. This has been and still is a problem not easy to solve. War with its unpredictabilities, its intangible dynamics and its fluctuations of luck and chance cannot be determined beforehand. He who expends everything on one throw may later on, as the result of circumstance, be left with empty hands, and he who expends his accumulated forces sparingly may, as the result of circumstances, never come to win the upper hand. Only he who is able to solve this problem is able to master war. One thing however has always been so, namely, that whatever may be done must be done with all one's might if it is to pay. That is the only rule which in war has never failed."

Where the enemy will strike to obtain that decision, we do not know. He has a jumping-off base in the
page 37 Mediterranean and a jumping-off base in England.

No theatre of war can be weakened below a certain level. our uttermost efforts can therefore only take the form of creating, in spite of all our manpower problems, new tactical central reserves over and above the necessary

H1144-0148

minimum of occupying forces. That is now being done (Appendix).

This however brings us to the next difficult problem which always arises in every long war: the interplay and conflict between the need for soldiers at the front and the need for workers at home. Never before has this problem presented itself in so acute a form as in this highly mechanized war. Herewith a few figures (Appendix).

How therefore is the Command to decide? The front needs soldiers and the front needs weapons. Many weapons, and the better weapons the higher the value attached to the life of the fighting man himself.

If we had not the FUHRER at the head with sovereign rights of decision there would be black murder done on this question. One thing however is sure: it is a crime to keep a man able to bear arms working at home if he can be replaced by some other worker or if his work is not vital. Fortunately Italy's betrayal has its good
page 38 side in this question. The flow of military internees and workers from Italy will afford considerable relief in this domain.

This dilemma of man-power shortage has led to the idea of making more thorough use of the man-power reserves in the territories occupied by us. Here right thinking and wrong thinking are mixed up together. I believe that in so far as concerns labour, everything has been done that could be done. But where this has not yet been achieved, it appeared to be more favourable politically not to have recourse to measures of compulsion, exchanging for these order and economic aid. In my opinion however the time has now come to take steps with
page 39 remorseless vigour and resolution in Denmark, Holland, France and Belgium also to compel thousands of idle ones (Nichtstuer) to carry out the fortification work which is more important than any other work. The necessary orders for this have already been given.

The question of recruiting alien peoples as fighting men should however be examined with the greatest caution and scepticism. There was a time when something in the nature of a neurosis emanated from the East Front with the slogan "Russia can be conquered *) only by Russians". Many heads were haunted by the notion of an immense VLASJOV army. At that time we recruited over 160 battalions. Our experiences were good while we were ourselves attacking successfully. They became bad when the position changed for the worse and we were compelled to retreat. Today only about 100 Eastern battalions are available and hardly one of these is in the East. One Cossack and one TURKMEN division are at the moment
page 40 undergoing their test by fire in the South-East. At the moment the Reichsführer of the SS is engaged in draining the defensive resources of Estonia and Latvia as well as the Croatian, Moslem and Macedonian manpower supplies.

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*) In the typescript the word was typed as 'liberated'. This has been scratched out in favor of 'conquered'.

However, what weighs most heavily today on the home front, and consequently by reaction on the front line also, are the enemy terror raids from the air on our homes and so on our wives and children. In this respect the war - and this cannot be repeated often enough - has assumed forms solely through the fault of England such as are believed to be no longer possible since the days of the racial and religious wars.

The effect of these terror raids, psychological, moral, and material, is such that they must be relieved if they cannot be made to cease completely. It is true that they - like any other great trouble - have had some good effects. In face of the ruins of one's own possessions all social problems, all enviousness and all the petty impulses of the human soul die down. But this is no
page 41 consolation for us. Asking too much of our air arm and inability on the technical side to keep pace with the aircraft development and radio location of our enemies have brought us to this pass. The efforts of the JUHRER and the Reichs Marshal will overcome this crisis also. The first beginnings and first fruits are there. We shall counter the heavy and powerful armament of the 4-engined bombers by speed and the annihilating effect of fire at long range. Our enemies have realized this danger and are endeavouring to meet it by destroying the hearths of production. It is enough if the enemy bombers can be made with absolute cert inty in all day and night raids to lose 10 - 12% of the aircraft put in. They might perhaps replace this loss on the equipment side, but not in personnel; and above all the morale of the crews, most of whom have no idea for what they are fighting and who among the Americans are mainly materialists, will not hold out against it. I am fully convinced that thanks to our new weapons and technical progress the raids in close squadron formation which alone by means of their bomb carpets have been able to produce so annihilating an effect will not escape their f te.

Nevertheless the greatest hopes of all have been stamped by the military command and the German people in U-boat warfare, and that with every right, since within the framework of the general large-scale strategic defensive which we have been forced by the development of the war and the gradual coming into effect of the superior war potential of our enemies, submarine warfare may be regarded
page 42 as the only offensive sector of the German command. Here too, in the activities of this weapon, heavy set backs have had to be recorded in the course of the last few months, set backs which have resulted in the successes of the tonnage war no longer being able to keep up with the rate at which the enemy is able to build his merchantmen. The reason for the decline in U-boat successes lies in the anti U-boat defence measures which the opponent has been driving forward with the uttermost energy, making use for
page 43 this purpose of wide-scale support by the air arm and

H1144-0149

page 43 new highly efficient detector equipment together with high efficiency bombs and submarine weapons. The present crisis in the German U-boat war is therefore directly traceable to the enemy's air superiority over the Atlantic. This crisis must and will be overcome. The extraordinary importance of the tonnage war remains unassailable, as before. In the past it has afforded the greatest hindrance to all enemy plans of operation
page 44 and it will continue in the future to present the greatest threat to any future developments since all the continuous heavy transportation of men and equipment for the Anglo-Saxon Command and all supply for the armies employed in Europe and for England itself must come by sea. Elimination of the threat presented by the Tonnage-war would inevitably set free a vast enemy war potential for employment at other points.

On our side measures have been instituted, or are already being developed and driven forward with the utmost resolution, with a view to breaking the enemy defence and bringing about a radical improvement in the fighting value of the U-boat.

There is every reason to believe that they will lead to success in the near future and in this way put an end to the present slackening in the U-boat war.

For the rest the C in C of the navy has himself given you an account in greater detail of the general situation in the U-boat war.

To page 37 - top

In process of formation at the present time as a tactical reserve.

20 Infantry divisions

4 Italian divisions
1 Croatian mountain div, 1 Croatian Legionary div.
1 Galician infantry division
1 Macedonian infantry division.

2 Armoured divisions

5 Armoured Grenadier divisions

2 Northern Armoured Grenadier divisions
2 Assault brigades

2-3 Parachutist Jäger divisions

H1144-0151

To V

BULGARIA

To date 1.11.43

A. Land Forces:

1. Home area — 10 Inf Div (of which 1 in process of formation)
1 Cav div.
1 Cav brigade
1 Armoured brigade

2. Coastal defence — 2 Inf divisions
1 Cav brigade

3. Serbian Occupied territory:
7 Inf divs

In all: 19 Inf divs
1 armoured brigade
1 Cav division
2 Cav brigades

B. Air force: (only home area)

9 fighter squadrons (JAGDSTAFFELN)
3 combat squadrons (KAMPFSTAFFELN)
11 reconnaissance and transport squadrons

C. Air-borne and parachutist squadrons: None

H1144-0152

Roumania

To date 1.11.43

A. Land Forces

1. Home area (including Transaistria)

a) fully fit for service — 3 Inf Div

b) conditionally fit for service — 5 Inf Div, 1 Mountain Div

c) replenished or re-constituted — 8 Inf Div, 1 Cav div, 2 Cav div (mot), 1 Armoured Div

2. Russia: — 3 Inf divisions, 4 Mountain divisions, 2 Cav divisions

In all: 19 Inf Div (of which 5 conditionally fit for service)

5 Mountain divisions (of which 1 conditionally fit for service)

5 Cav div of which 2 (mot)
1 Armoured division

3. Air forces

1. Home area — 7 fighter squadrons (modern equipment)
1 night fighter squadron
8 combat squadrons ("KAMPFSTAFFELN")
19 reconnaissance and transport squadrons

2. Russia (employed with 4th Air Fleet) — 5 fighter squadrons
4 combat squadrons ("KAMPFSTAFFELN")
6 Battle squadrons ("SCHLACHTSTAFFELN")
4 reconnaissance squadrons

In all — 12 fighter squadrons
1 night fighter squadron
12 combat ("KAMPF") squadrons
6 battle ("SCHLACHT") squadron
23 reconnaissance squadrons

C. Air-borne and Parachutist formations: None

H1144-0153

Hungary

To date 1.11.43

A. Land Forces:

1. Home area (all formations conditionally fit for employment, equipment incomplete).

8 Inf div
1 light division
1 cavalry division
2 mountain brigades
1 armoured division

2. Russia (Occupation troops)

9 light divisions (security divisions)

In all
8 inf divisions
1 cavalry division
10 light divisions
2 mountain divisions
1 armoured division

B. Air Force:

1. Home area
4 fighter squadrons
2 combat ("KAMPF") squadrons
1 transport squadron

2. Russia (employed with Air Fleet 4)

2 fighter squadrons
2 combat ("KAMPF") squadrons
1 battle ("SCHLACHT") squadrons
2 reconnaissance squadrons

In all:
6 fighter squadrons
4 combat squadrons
1 battle squadron
2 reconnaissance squadrons
1 transport squadron

C. Air-borne and parachutist formations: NONE

H1144-0154

SWEDEN

To date 1.11.43

A. Land Forces: 12 - 14 Inf divisions
6 - 8 cyclist brigades
3 - 4 armoured brigades
1 mot brigade

Corps and army units and frontier and coast guard formations.

At the moment it may be assumed that the number of men under arms is 400,000.

B. Air Force

In all: 700 front line aircraft
76 reconnaissance aircraft

225 fighters
12 torpedo aircraft

of which approx 482 modern types

H1144-0155

Finland

To date 1.11.43

A. Land Forces:

(all formations in the area of operations)

14 Inf div (of which 3 inf divisions as reserve behind the front)
2 Inf brigades
1 armoured division
1 cavalry brigade
3 coastal defence brigades

Corps and army units, in addition, navy, air arm, ERSATZ (replacements) army, Home Air Defence, and building units to a total strength of approx 450,000.

According to report, it is proposed to form 1 new infantry divisions and 2 infantry brigades.

B. Air forces:

7 fighter squadrons
4 combat ("KAMPF") squadrons
4 other (reconnaissance and transport) squadrons

H1144-0156

To page 37 - 11c V B

Position with respect to Personnel

on 1.10.1943

1. In the Armed Forces (WEHRMACHT) 9,860,000
on 1.8.

of whom:	Waffen SS	402,000
	Navy	711,000
	Air Arm	2,007,000
	Replacements Army	2,185,000
	Field Army 1)	4,555,000

1) Field Army as per strength on 1.8.43; no newer reports available.

2. UK (subject to occupational deferment) and temporarily rejected: 5,726,000

Year-classes 1894 - 1926.
(note in pencil: including 18 - 50 year olds

of whom 348,000 year class 1914 - 45

3. Unfit for service: 2,931,000

Year classes 1894 - 1926

4. Available replacements 2):

year-class	1894 - 1899	18000
	1900 - 1922	6000
	1923	1000
	1924	3000
	1925	45000
	1926 3)	468000
		541,000

---

2) Year class 1884 - 1893 ("LANDSTURM") at present still being called up

3) Year class 1926 at the moment in the RAD (Reichs Labour Service)

5. Aliens working in Reich territory (to date 15,8.43)

men	3,586,000
women	1,678,000
	5,264,000

6.....

H1144-0158

6. Persons fit for work 1877 - 1927

57,500,000

This figure represents the sum total of these year-classes (population acc. to the Census figures for 1939). According to the Balance-Sheet of forces of the Reichs Statistical Office the number of occupied German nationals (i.e. without the Armed Forces, P.O.W. and aliens) on the 31.5.43:

men	15,462,000
women	14,274,000
	29,736,000

(no page 3)

To II

Armed Forces Operations Staff/ORG (II

FUHRER'S G.H.Q.
Nov. 3rd 1943

3 copies
-- copy

Men fit for service in the war supply industries (munitions industry).

Men liable for military service suitable and fit for service are to be found now in any number (excepting on the Reich railways and to some extent in agriculture) only in the war supply industries (including mining and building) and in particular in the munitions industry. The view continually being put forward by the munitions industry that any deduction of these young men liable for service would be bound to prejudice production is not shared by G.H.Q. Armed Forces in view of German labour which has flowed into the munitions industry since the beginning of the year of the basis of the Duty to Report and close down order throughout industry, of the Russian POW allocated by G.H.Q. Armed Forces (especially for mining), and the appreciable allocation being made at the present moment of Italian internees and free Italian labour, as well as other measures by the GBA (?) and the Minister for munitions aimed at supplying supplementary labour.

The war supply industries (including mining and building) according to the figures for 1.10.43 included in all 2,950,000 men liable for service temporarily deferred. Of these

year classes	06 - 13	783,000
" "	14 & later	203,000

According to the report of the GBA the total number of workers which it was found possible to allocate for the production of munitions from the 1.1. - 30.9.43 was 2,200,000 workers
including 770,000 metal workers.

These allocations replaced 300,000 men called up from munitions for service with the colours and wastage and in addition reinforced the personnel of the most important munitions concerns by

650,000 workers

The FÜHRER has now ordered that

210,000 men liable for military service of the year-classes 01 - 22. be transferred from industrial war supply (including mining and building) in three monthly contingents of 70,000 men as from November '43.

However whereas the transfers to the Armed Forces effected up to the present could be more than compensated,

H1144-0159

the transfers now ordered will be covered, in addition to the current allocations of the G.B.A. by

approx. 500,000 Italian military internees who have now become available and in addition by free Italian labour to be recruited by the G.B.A. and estimated by this body as numbering

Approx. 3,000,000 workers.

So that no decline in production need to anticipated.

The early and complete call-up of all young men liable for military service in the front line still employed in industrial war supply should be demanded for psychological reasons as well. A large number of letters from official bodies, and in particular from the mass of the people, show clearly that the forthcoming call-up of the LANDSTURM (young-classes 84-93) is not understood while there are still so many young men liable for military service, working at home under temporary deferment.

H1144-0160

To VI

FÜHRER'S GHQ
4.11.1943

4 copies

- copy

Contribution by Op M (Operations NAVY) to lecture

by Chief of Armed Forces Operations Staff.

Position of the Navy in the beginning of November 1943.

Submarine War:

The U-boat weapon is being employed in force in all the seas. Conditions much more difficult than before owing to comprehensive air reconnaissance (extension of range of reconnaissance as a result of theoccupation of the AZORES), excellent enemy detector apparatus, and exceptionally strong escort of convoys. The aircraft is to-day the chief enemy of the U-boat.

In spite of this by sticking stubbornly to the task and making fullest use of the U-boat weapon further successes have been gained. Increasing successes also recently in the fight against enemy aircraft and destroyers. Sinkages figures correspond to the difficulty of the position. Since 1.1.1943 sunk by U-boats only after careful counting far above 3,000,000 BRT plus a large number of destroyers, cruisers and escort vessels. To this figure may be added in the merchant fleet and tonnage war as a whole the successes gained by the surface tactical forces, the air arm and mines. This gives us since 1.1.1943 a total figure of almost 5,000,000 BRT British-American merchant tonnage sunk (without Russia).

In the war at sea the main task of the Navy in all the seas under our control: protection of own communications by sea, injury to enemy fleets, supply shipping, military transport and supply formations, defence against landing operations. All these tasks set extraordinarily high demands on the tactical and security formations of the Navy.

H1144-0161

Position in the individual theatres of war.

BALTIC

Naval supremacy completely in our hands. - Importance of BALTIC for ore-traffic from Sweden. - Lively own supply traffic to Finland, Finnish Gulf via BALTIC entrances. Interference by British air mine warfare especially in the KATTEGAT, the Sound and the Belts and in the Western BALTIC. Own loss up to the present very low thanks to active mine-clearing. Russians confined to inner part of Finnish Gulf by dense minefields. Attempts to break out so far always thwarted. In the inner Finnish Gulf recently several affrays with Russian trawler formations, all in our favour.

Importance of BALTIC as training arm for the naval tactical forces and the submarine weapon.

NORTH SEA

DEUTSCHE BUCHT (German Bight) and SKAGERRAK blocked by strong mine-wall. Own task: protection of lively coastal traffic, continuous patrol of shipping lanes, intensive mine detection, trawling and outpost activities. By means of continuous energetic air activity combined with mine-laying and raids by enemy speed-boats the enemy is endeavouring to stop our communications by sea. Up to the present we have always succeeded in maintaining communications without undue loss on our side. Good results in particular against enemy speedboats.

Norway:

Very busy own rations and supply traffic along the long stretch of coast under the protection of screening forces and numerous strong coastal batteries. Routes in the skerries protected by their natural position and mine-blocks. Our own escort movements interfered with by enemy air arms and speed-boats which hide in the skerries. Successes obtained by the enemy in attack so far very slight. In the Polar region attacks by Russian aircraft and submarines. Our own losses slight but enemy losses high.

Arctic

The presence of our own combat group of battleships and destroyers in Northern Waters is of considerable strategic influence. Since January of this year large-scale enemy supplies going to Russia via the Arctic have not been observed (Supply diverted to the far longer and more difficult route to the Persian Gulf and via IRAN). U-boats employed against individual enemy movements in the ARCTIC. We have now to see whether the despatch of supplies to Russia by the Arctic route begin again in the period of darkness now setting in.

Channel

In spiteof strong enemy superiority in the air and the lively activity of his light naval tactical forces combined with intensified mine-laying, German supplying and rationing traffic continues to be carried on practically to schedule. At the same time full employment of our own screening tactical units (mine detector, outpost, trawling and escort boats). Lively and successful offensive employment of our own speed-boats against British convoyed traffic and for mine-laying.

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H1144-0163

Conditions difficult owing to British superiority on sea and in the air. Warfare in the Channel area shows increasing signs of enemy threat of landing operation. Strong coastal defence on one side.

BISCAY/ATLANTIC coast

Air raids on our own ports have left U-boat defence unaffected. Main task for Navy:

> Keeping the seaways open and maintenance of escort for U-boats coming in and going out. In addition, counter-measures against British mine laying, against strong British air observation and the appearance of light enemy naval tactical forces.

MEDITERRANEAN

A very strong enemy naval fighting force (3 British, 1 French, 5 Italian battleships, 13 cruisers, 55 destroyers) is unopposed on our side by any fighting forces with the exception of U-boats and S-boats. A few Italian destroyers and torpedo boats are being commissioned. Our own U-boats are being employed against very busy British supply traffic. Numerous successes. For the rest, the task of the Navy is to carry out and protect our own supply traffic for the combatant troops in the LIGURIAN and TYRRHENIA Seas and in the ADRIATIC. Increasing activity on the part of the enemy tactical air and light naval forces. Transfer of our own supply to small ships and coastal traffic. The necessary freight tonnage and screening forces are being made ready.

AEGEAN

Support of the island garrisons by protective formations of the German Navy. Carrying out supply and rationing overseas. Strong enemy activity with submarines, cruisers, destroyers and tactical air forces.

BLACK SEA

All suitable fighting forces (U-boats, S- and R-boats, "MFP") employed to defend the CRIMEA. Own slight forces fully employed. Good success. So far activity of the Russian BLACK SEA Fleet slight. Up to the present rationing and supply traffic maintained in accordance with plan in spite of enemy air and submarine activity.

DISTRIBUTION:

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III. The grounds for our confidence in Final Victory.

When at the end of my considerations I come to sum up the general situation in a few words I am bound to describe it quite candidly as difficult, moreover I cannot gloss over the fact that I expect further severe crises. My own attitude towards these prospects I should like to characterise directly by the aphorism from FONTAINE:

"Great times are always just those when everything seems to be going wrong, when every moment brings the fear: now its all done for. That's when it shows. Courage is good but sticking it out is better. Sticking it out, that's the main thing."

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In particular however our confidence is built up on a series of points of view to be set forth objectively. At the head comes the ethical and moral foundation of our struggle which givesits impress to the general attitude of the German people and makes our Armed Forces a definitely reliable instrument in the hands of its Command. The force of the revolutionary idea has not only made possible a series of unprecedented successes, it also enables our brave troops to achieve feats in defence and in retreat according tp plan such perhaps the Russians but certainly no other people could achieve and which drive off into the realm of Utopie any hope on the part of our opponents for a military breakdown.

As against this themoral, political and military tendencies of our opponents by no means from a closed uniformly directed whole. This shows most clearly in the fighting morale of the English and Americans whose successes in Africa, Sicily and Italy are solely ascribable to the weakness and treachery
page 47 of our Italian ally. Where they have met German forces in battle, they have shown themselves inferior throughout and gained the advantage only as a result of multiple numerical advantage. This shows particularly clearly from the point of view of their conduct of the war, for according to our ideas it is totally incomprehensible that the Anglo-Americans should have avoided forming the Second Front in the WEST which their Russian allies have been demanding for over two years, and they have by no means extracted from their opportunities in Mediterranean that which according to the true state of affairs and by German standards of activity they might have extracted.

Well, whatever comes, any further attack by our opponents - whether in the NORTH or WEST, in Italy or in the Balkans - will place their readiness for action to a hard test. We ourselves could tell a tale from the struggle in North Africa what supply difficulties can mean and the sacrifices they may entail. And reports of the most various kinds from the camps of our opponents all point in the same direction, showing how difficult the reversion of these conditions is already being found by the enemy.

page 48 My most profound confidence is however based upon the fact that at the head of Germany there stands a man who by his entire development, his desires and striving can only have been destined by fate to lead our people into a brighter future. In defiance of all views to the contrary I must here

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testify that he is the soul not only of the political but also of the military conduct of the war and that the force of his willpower and the creative riches of his thought animate and hold together the whole of the German Armed Forces, with respect to strategy, organization and munitions of war. Similarly the unity of political and military command which is so important is personified by him in a way such as has never been known since the days of Frederick the Great.

That no command is free of errors has often been said by the FÜHRER himself, moreover the history of war - to use an aphorism of SCHLIEFFEN's - consists in general only of a series of errors and every war situation, naturally, can only be the product of errors.

page 49 What matters ultimately is constant readiness to act, the determination never to let oneself be beaten and always to stick to the enemy. That it is so now, I am able to assure you from the bottom of my heart.

Further, as regards the part played by his collaborators, once again, as before, a quotation from CLAUSEWITZ which is not very generally known has been found true: "The most perfect General Staff with the most correct views and principles does not in itself represent perfect leadership of an Army, if the soul of a great General is missing."

It behoves us all therefore to crush down within ourselves all faintheartedness and by so doing to create within ourselves the foundations of that confidence out of which alone victory can grow. After all, the other fellow is just a bit more frightened still, and a war is only lost when it is given up.

page 50 How this war will end, that no man can foretell. What imponderables it may yet bring with it, how many hopes may be disappointed, and how many troubles may turn to the contrary, lies hidden in the darkness of the future. All that is sure is that we shall never cease to fight for through the history of the world there run, like an bronze law, progress and advance upward. In these Europe has led and at the head of Europe - Germany. A Europe under the whip of American Jews or Bolshevik commissars is unthinkable.

At this hour I would wish to testify not with the lips but from my deepest heart,

- that our trust and faith in the FÜHRER is boundless.

- that for us there is no higher law and no more holy duty than to fight to the last breath for the freedom of our people.

page 51 - that we will throw off all who are soft and forget their duties.

- that all the threats of our opponents only make us harder and more resolute,

- that we do not cherish any false hopes that anyone else might save us from that Bolshevism which will sweep away all should Germany fall,

- that we ourselves will defend the ruins of our country to the last cartridge since it is a thousand times better to live among them than in servitude.

- that we shall win because we must win since otherwise world history would have lost all meaning.

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The Operations and Tactical Plans ranged in the order of their happening.

1. Campaign against Poland; defence in the WEST.
2. Plan of attack against the WEST; attempt to realise this during the winter.
3. Spring campaign against Norway.
4. Summer campaign against the WEST.
5. Intention to land in England.
6. Attempt to win the Spanish position and take GIBRALTAR.
7. Decision to intervene in North Africa. ROMMEL's counter-attack up to the Egyptian frontier.
8. Realisation of the necessity of a campaign against Soviet Russia. (Discussion with MOLOTOV in BERLIN).
9. Italy's surprise campaign against Greece.
10. The German campaign planned against Greece.
11. The overthrow in Yugoslavia and the campaign in the Balkans and its consequences; delay of the campaign in the EAST.
12. ROMMEL's retreat to CYRENAICA.
13. The Eastern campaign 1941 and the winter position 1941/42. Finland's entry into the war. The culminating point of the attack.
14. Japan's entry into the war.
15. The idea of occupying Iceland and the AZORES.
16. The Russian Spring offensive; the German counter-attack.
17. The German summer offensive: The CRIMEA - the DON - the VOLGA - the CAUCASUS.
    The intention of taking LENINGRAD is not realised.
18. ROMMEL's offensive up to EL ALAMEIN.
19. Counter-stroke by Western Powers. Landing in North Africa.
20. The German counter-stroke in France. Occupation of the whole country. Occupation of the Mediterranean littoral, occupation of TUNISIA.
21. The winter battle in Russia. The collapse of the confederates.
22. The loss of Tripolitania, attempt to hold TUNISIA.
23. The loss of the entire African position.
24. The beginning of the landing in Europe (Sicily).

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25. The summer offensive of the Soviet Army.

26. The treachery of Italy.

27. The landing of the Continent.

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	Available	Short
c. Tanks	4,252	2,995
d. Assault guns	2,409	338

12) Front line aircraft with the formations:

Fighters	1646
Night fighters	574
Combat ("KAMPF") aircraft	1676
Reconnaissance	613
STUKAS	441
Other aircraft	1127
in all	6077

18 Nov. 1945

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF
DOCUMENT NO. L-172

I, Willard E. Skidmore, Lt. (jg), USNR, 391590, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the indicated excerpt from Document No. L-172.

Willard E. Skidmore,
Lt (jg) USNR
391590

H1144-0169

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT L-180
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Translation

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ACTION - Group A.

Comprehensive Report up to 15 October 1941.

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(Note of translator: For Enclosures see translation page 13)

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(original page 1)

"Action-Group A, after preparing their vehicles for action proceeded to their area of concentration as ordered on 23 June 1941, the second day of the campaign in the East. Army Group North consisting of the 16th and 18th Armies and Panzer-Group 4 had left the day before. Our task was to hurriedly establish personal contact with the commanders of the Armies and with the commander of the army of the rear area. It must be stressed from the beginning that co-operation with the Armed Forces was generally good, in some cases, for instance with Panzer-Group 4 under Col. Gen. Hoeppner, it was very close, almost cordial. Misunderstandings which cropped up with some authorities in the first days, were cleared up mainly through personal discussions."

(The next two paragraphs - on page 1 and 2 - deal with the military advance only and here irrelevant.)

Page 2, bottom: "At the start of the Eastern Campaign it became obvious with regard to the Security Police that its special work had to be done not only in the rear areas, as was provided for in the original agreements,

(original page 3)

with the High Command of the Army, but also in the combat areas, and this for two reasons. On the one hand, the development of the rear area of the armies was delayed because of the quick advance and on the other hand, the undermining communist activities and the fight against partisans was most effective within the areas of actual fighting - especially when the Luga sector was reached.

To carry out the duties connected with security police, it was desirable to move into the larger towns together with the armed forces. We had our first experiences in this direction when a small advance detachment under my leadership entered Kowno together with the advance units of the Armed Forces on 25 June 1941. When the other larger towns, especially Libau, Mitau, Riga, Dorpat, Reval, and the larger suburbs of Leningrad were captured, a detachment of the Security Police was always with the first army units. Above all, communist functionaries and communist material had to be seized, and the armed forces themselves had to be secured against surprises inside the towns; the troops themselves were usually not able to take care of that because of their small numbers. For this purpose

(original page 4)

the Security Police immediately after capture formed volunteer detachments from reliable natives in all three Baltic provinces; they carried out their duties successfully under our command. For example, it may be mentioned that the armed forces suffered not inconsiderable losses through guerilles in Riga, on the left of the Duena river; on the right bank of the Duena river, however, after these volunteer detachments had been organized in Riga not a single soldier was injured, although these Latvian detachments suffered some killed and wounded in fighting with Russian stragglers.

Similarly, native anti-Semitic forces were induced to start prgroms against Jews during the first hours after capture, though this inducement proved to be very difficult. Following out orders, the Security Police was determined to solve the Jewish question with all possible means and most decisively. But it was desirable that the Security Police should not put in an immediate appearance, at least in the beginning, since the extraordinarily harsh measures were apt to stir even German circles. It had to be shown to the world that the native population itself took the first action by way of natural reaction against the suppression by Jews during several decades and against the terror exercised by

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(original page 5)

the Communists during the preceding period.

After reaching the Duena river and therewith Riga, the Action-Group detached itself at first from the further advance of the Army-Group North, and concentrated its forces on the pacification of the Lithousnian and Latvian area, and later of the old-Russian area which was reached at Opotschka. The work in this connection took on many shapes.

In view of the constant changes in German troops and the fluctuation within the German authorities, which was caused by the transfer of the rear-area of the Wehrmacht to the rear-area of the armies, and later to the civil administration and to the Commander of the Armed Forces the personnel and thus the opinions of the German authorities changed far too often andfar too quickly. In the Security Police this had to be avoided, which led us to adopt the policy of keeping the same commanders in the same locality as far as possible. Thereby the Security Police gained a considerable advantage over all other comers, because it knew facts and people. As a matter of fact, they alone amongst all authorities may claim to have achieved a certain steadiness on the German side. The Lithouanians, Latvians, and the Esthonians, who have a fine feeling for such matters,

(original page 6)

came soon to acknowledge this fact and acted accordingly.

Under these circumstances the Security Police tried to guide political, economic, and cultural matters according to definite policies, and to advise the other German authorities on these subjects. In the political sphere particularly the several competent authorities followed different viewpoints. It was regrettable that the Ministry for Eastern Affairs had not given clear directions from the beginning, so that up to date and in spite of our efforts the situation in the Baltic provinces is not clear. The example of Esthonia is significant for this fluctuation. In agreement with the RSHA the Action-Group brought with them the Esthonian Dr. MAE as presumptive political advisor for the Esthonians. In order to avoid a pernicious muddle, as happened in Lithounia and Latvia, and in order to obtain the appointment of Dr. MAE or to avoid his removal, negotiations had to be carried out with, one after the other, the Army division capturing Reval, the Army Corps competent for Reval, the Garrison commander Reval, the Field Commandatura Reval, the 18. Army Group North, the Commander

(original page 7)

of the Rear Army Area at the Army Group North, the General Commissioner and his deputy, and with the representative of the Ministry for Eastern Affairs.

After the conquest of Lithouania and Latvia, the Action-Detachments 2 and 3 were separated from the Commander of the Rear-Area of the Armed Forces and were left in Lithouania and Latvia respectively for essential assignments. The Commanders of Action-Detachments 2 and 3 have been staying permanently in Kowno and Riga since the beginning of July.

Contact was established also with the Reich Commissioner as soon as he was appointed and likewise with the General Commissioners, i.e. by the Action-Group and by the Action-Detachments. Co-operation with the Reich Commissioner depended on

a) a delay in the inquiry addressed to the RSHA as to how the interpolation (sc. of the Security Police) at the Reich Commissioner's should be effected, and

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b) on the negotiations of the Superior SS-and Police Fuehrer who on his own account had initiated negotiations with the Reich commissioner with regard to the interpolation of the police. No initiative of our own was admissible therefore until the questions to a) and b) had been settled. It was intended to get in touch with the Reich Commissioner with regard to this question at a convenient moment. There are plenty of special occasions.

(original page 8)

When the advance of the Army Group North was halted in Esthonia and at Luga and when heavy fighting and strong Russian attacks against the centre and the right wing ensued, the Action-Group again teamed up with the armies, in particular the 4. Panzer Group, because the struggle against the partisans who now began to appear in great numbers, was and still is a job for the Security Police. The area to the North of Pleskau and between the Peipus- and Ilmen- lakes with far extending forest and swamps was really an ideal area for Russian partisan warfare. The difficulties of the terrain further impeded activities even for the smaller units. After the failure of purely military activities such as the placing of sentries and combing through the newly occupied territories with whole divisions, even the Armed Forces had to look out for new methods. The Action-Group undertook to search for new methods. Soon therefore the Armed Forces adopted the experiences of the Security Police and their methods of combatting the partisans. For details I refer to the numerous reports concerning the struggle against thepartisans.

(original page 9)

The activities of the Security Police were rendered more difficult during the further course of the struggle against the partisans because the vehicles either could not be used or were to be preserved for the advance on Leningrad, which was always expected at that time.

Special difficulties arose for the Command of the Action-Group at this time. Whilst the larger parts of the Security Police, in action in Lithouania and Latvia, were 700 km to the rear, the other parts were in action against the partisans behind the frontline, extending for nearly 600 km. For the transmission of signals we had only a wireless truck stationed in Riga, and one medium and one light wireless truck for this vast area. Even the use of army telephones failed over distances of more then 200 km. The Action-Group as a whole could be led only by personal contacts, although the ways and roads, including the army highways, were in an extremely bad state. Even on the army highway an hourly average speed of 10 km could not be exceeded. In spite of this, my own motorcar had to do 15.000 km during this time. Similar difficulties because of the vast areas arose for the Commanders of the Action-detachments, so that even messenger trips became a serious problem.

(original page 10)

For some time this situation became even more difficult, when the further attack against Leningrad no longer followed the great road from Pleskau via Lugau, but had to bend far to the West, so that the centre of the counter-attacks against partisans was transferred to the forest and swamp areas East of the Peipus Lake and the areas to the West of the Ilmen Lake."

(Following sentence and further two paragraphs about difficulties are irrelevant)

Page 10 - continued - "During the process of capturing Esthonia the Action-Group 1a was transferred definitely to Estonia, except for the detachment with the 18th Army. The pacification of Estonia had to be considered as especially important because of the good racial composition of the population."

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(original page 11)

"After Action-Group B had transferred parts of White Ruthenia to Action Group A, Action-detachment 1b reinforced by parts of Action-detachment 2 and 3 took over this area.

For the investment of Leningrad, the Security Police aside from the heavily increased activities against the partisans, received the further assignment to observe carefully the population which was slowly returning from the woods. As trench warfare developped around Leningrad, it was recommended to the armies to evacuate wholly a zone around Leningrad, a measure which had been carried out already whenever possible by the Security Police together with units of Armed SS and the uniformed police.

In this area a network for information is being established which is to be as complete as possible. From the very beginning, the Security Police systematically collected information about Leningrad in all aspects. The 18th Army asked us to take over in addition military reconnaissance of Leningrad of resp. the area of the 8th Russian Army which was invested in the area around Oranienburg."

(Following two sentences about other reports are irrelevant.)

(original page 12)

"This description of the over-all situation showed and shows that the members of the Stapo (the Secret State Police), Kripo and SD (Security Service) who are attached to the Action-Group, are active mainly in Lithuouania, Latvia, Esthonia, White-Ruthenia and to a smaller part in front of Leningrad. It shows further that the forces of the uniformed police and the Armed SS are active mainly in front of Leningrad, in order to take measures against the returning population and under their own officers. This is so much easier because the Action detachments in Lithouania, Latvia and Esthonia have at their disposal native police
encl. 1 units, as described in encl. 1; and because so far 150 Latvian reinforcements have been sent to White-Ruthenia.

The distribution of the leaders of Security Police and SD during the
encl. 2 individual phases can be gathered from encl. 2, the advance
encl. 3 and the activities of the Action-Group and the Action-detachments from encl. 3. It should be mentioned that the leaders of the Armed -SS and of the uniformed police who are reserves have declared their wish to stay on with the Security Police and the SD.

(original page 13)

A. The Baltic Area.

I. Organization Measures.

1) Formation of auxiliary police and of police.

In view of the extension of the area of operations and the great number of duties which had to be performed by the Security Police, it was intended from the very beginning to obtain the co-operation of the reliable population for the fight against vermin - that is mainly the Jews and Communists. Beyond our directing of the first spontaneous actions of self-cleansing, which will be reported elsewhere, care had to be taken that reliable people should be put to the cleansing job and that they were appointed auxiliary members of the Security Police. The difference of the situation in each part of the area of operations also had to be taken into account.

In Lithouania activist and nationalist people formed themselves into

so-called partisan-units at the beginning of the Eastern Campaign, in order to take active part in the fight against Bolshevism. According to their own report they suffered 4,000 casualties."

(The following paragraph which is continued on original page 14 deals with partisan-units in Kowno which were used for pacifying some areas, and for preparing and large scale liquidation sections initiated by the Action-Group detachments. Here irrelevant.)

(The rest of page 14, page 15 and the upper half of page 16 deal with the use of these partisans for purposes of the police.)

"Strength and distribution of the Lithouanian auxiliary police is to be seen in encl. 4."

(The second part ofpage 16 andpages 17, 18 deal with auxiliary police forces, mainly in Latvia. "Their strength and distribution see encl.
encl. 4 4." Here irrelevant.)

(Pages 19, 20, upper part deal with Estonia. Here irrelevant.)

Page 20 continued:

"2) Reconstruction of prisons.

The prisons in the Baltic countries were found to be either empty or occupied by Jews or Communists who had been arrested by Self-Protection Units."

(The following paragraph deals with the departure of the Russians and is irrelevant; likewise the following paragraph which deals with the taking over of allprisons by the Security Police.) "Whenever the prisons were to small because of the large number of people who were to be arrested, provisional concentration camps were established. The
encl. 5 construction of larger concentration camps is in preparation. The schedules attached as encl. 5 show the present occupancy of the prisons.

(original page 21)

II. Cleansing and Securing the Area of Operations.

1) Instigation of self-cleansing actions.

Considering that the population of the Baltic countries had suffered very heavily under the Government of Bolshevism and Jewry while they were incorporated in the USSR, it was to be expected that after the liberation from that foreign government, they (i.e. the population themselves) would render harmless most of the enemies left behind after the retreat of the Red Army. It was the duty of the Security Police to set in motion these self-cleansing movements and to direct them into the correct channels in order to accomplish the purpose of the cleansing operations as quickly as possible. It was no less important in view of the future to establish the unshakable and provable fact that the liberated population themselves took the most severe measures against the Bolshevist and Jewish enemy quite on their own, so that the direction by German authorities could not be found out.

In Lithouania this was achieved for the first time by partisan activities in Kowno. To our surprise it was not easy at first to set in motion an extensive porgrom against Jews. KLIMATIS, the leader of the partisan unit, mentioned above, who was used for this purpose primarily, succeeded in starting a pogrom on the basis of advice given to him by a small advanced detachment acting in Kowno, and

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(original page 22)

in such a way that no German order or German instigation was noticed from the outside. During the first pogrom in the night from 25. to 26.6 the Lithouanian partisans did away with more than 1.500 Jews, set fire to several Synagogues or destroyed them by other means and burned down a Jewish dwelling district consisting of about 60 houses. During the following nights about 2,300 Jews were made harmless in a similar way. In other parts of Lithouania similar actions followed the example of Kowno, though smaller and extending to the Communists who had been left behind.

These self-cleansing actions went smoothly because the Army authorities who had been informed showed understanding for this procedure. From the beginning it was obvious that only the first days after the occupation would offer the opportunity for carrying out pogroms. After the disarmament of the partisans the self-cleansing actions ceased necessarily.

It proved much more difficult to set in motion similar cleansing actions in Latvia. Essentially the reason was that the whole of the national stratum of leaders had been assassinated or destroyed by the Soviets, especially in Riga. It was possible though through similar influences on the Latvian auxiliary to set in motion a pogrom against Jews also in Riga. During this pogrom all synagogues were destroyed and about 400 Jews were killed, As

(original page 23)

the population of Riga quieted down quickly, further pogroms were not convenient.

So far as possible, both in Kowno and in Riga evidence by film and photo was established that the first spontaneous executions of Jews and Communists were carried out by Lithouanians and Latvians.

In Estonia by reason of the relatively small number of Jews no opportunity presented itself to instigate pogroms. The Esthonian self-protection units made harmless only some individual Communists whom they hated especially, but generally they limited themselves to carrying out arrests.

(original page 24)

2) Combating Communism

Everywhere in the area of operation counteractions against communism and Jewry took first place in the work of the Security Police.

The Soviet officials and the functionaries of the Communist Party had fled with the Soviet Army. In view of the experiences made during the Bolshevist oppression which lasted more than one year, the population of the Baltic countries realized that all remainders of Communism left behind after the retreat of the Red Army had to be removed. Such basic opinion facilitated essentially the work of the Security Police with regard to cleansing in this sphere, especially since active nationalist people co-operated in this cleansing, viz. in Lithouania the partisans, in Latvia and Esthonia the self-protection units."

a) Safeguarding material

(This chapter extending to pages 25 and 26 deals with the seizure of buildings, printed and other matter and persons connected with the Communist and Soviet parties and organizations including a close study of all written and printed matter in order to gather military political

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and personal intelligence and general propaganda material to be used against Communism and Soviet Russia. The details seem irrelevent.)

(original page 26)

"b) Search for and Arrest of Communists.

Aside from these searching activities, a systematic search was made for Communist functionaries, Red-Army soldiers, and persons more seriously suspect because of their activities for Communism and who had been left behind. In some places the Self-Protection Units themselves had rendered harmless the most infamous Communists already spontenecusly.

Using all available units of the Detachments and Self-Protection Formations, and with the help of the German uniformed police, large scale actions were carried out in the larger towns resulting in many arrests and search actions."

(original page 27)

(The first paragraph describes similar activities in rural areas.

Next paragraph:

encl. 8 "The extent of this cleansing in line with the counteractions against Communism may be seen in the survey on encl. 8 which gives the number of people executed.

c) Counteraction against illegal Communist activities.

(This chapter extending to pages 28, 29 describes the organization and preparation of alleged underground work on the part of Communists and the counteractions against it. Here irrelevant.)

(original page 30)

3) Action against Jewry

From the beginning it was to be expected that the Jewish problem in the East could not be solved by pogroms alone. In accordance with the basic orders received, however, the cleansing activities of the Security Police had to aim at a complete annihilation of the Jews, Special detachments reinforced by selected units - in Lithouania partisan detachments, in Latvia units of the Latvian auxiliary police - therefore performed extensive executions both in the towns and in rural areas. The actions of the execution detachments were performed smoothly. When attaching Lithouanian and Latvian detachments to the execution squads, men were chosen whose relatives had been murdered or removed by the Russians.

Especially severe and extensive measures became necessary in Lithouania. In some places - especially in Kowno - the Jews had armed themselves and participated actively in franctireur war and committed arson. Besides these activities the Jews in Lithouania had collaborated most actively hand in glove with the Soviets.

The sum total of the Jews liquidated in Lithouania amounts to 71.105.

During the pogroms in Kowno 3.800 Jews were eliminated, in the smaller towns about 1.200 Jews.

(original page 31)

In Latvia as well the Jews participated in acts of sabotage and arson after the invasion of the German Armed Forces. In Duensburg so

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many fires were lighted by the Jews that a large part of the town was lost. The electric power station burnt down to a mere shell. The streets which were mainly inhabited by Jews remained unscathed.

In Latvia up to now 30.000 Jews were executed in all. 500 were made harmless by pogroms in Riga.

Most of the 4.500 Jews living in Esthonia at the beginning of the Eastern Campaign fled with the retreating Red Army. About 2.00 stayed behind. In Reval alone there lived about 1.000 Jews.

The arrest of all male Jews of over 16 years of age has been nearly finished. With the exception of the doctors and the Elders of the Jews who were appointed by the Special Commandos, they were executed by the Self-Protection Units under the control of the Special Detachment 1a. Jewesses in Pernau and Reval of the age groups from 16 to 60 who are fit for work were arrested and put to peat-cutting or other labor.

At present a camp is being constructed in Harku, in which all Esthonian Jews are to be assembled, so th t Esthonia will be free of Jews within a short while.

After the carrying out of the first larger executions in Lithouania and Latvia it became soon apparent that an annihilation of the Jews without leaving any traces could not be carried out, at least not at the present moment. Since a large part of the trades in

(original page 32)

Lithouania and Latvia are in Jewish hands and others carried on nearly exclusively by Jews (especially those of glaziers, plumbers, stove-builders, cobblers) many Jewish partisans are indispensable at present for repairing installations of vital importance for the reconstruction of towns destroyed and for work of military importance. Although the employers aim at replacing Jewish labor with Lithouanian or Latvian labor, it is not yet possible to displace all employed Jews especially not in the larger towns. In co-operation with the labor exchange offices, however, all Jews who are no longer fit for work are being arrested and shall be executed in small badges.

In this connection it may be mentioned that some authorities of the Civil Administration offered resistance, at times even a strong one, against the carrying out of larger executions. This resistance was answered by calling attention to the fact that it was a matter of carrying out basic orders.

Apart from organizing and carrying out measures of execution, the creation of Ghettos was begun in the larger towns at once during the first days of operations. This was especially urgent in Kowno because there were 30.000 Jews in a total population of 152.400. Therefore, at the end of the first pogrom a Jewish Committee was summoned who were informed that the German authorities so far had not seen any reason to interfere in the quarrels between Lithouanians and Jews. The sole basis for creating a normal situation would be to construct a Jewish Ghetto. Against remonstrations made by the Jewish Committee, it was declared that there was no other possibility to prevent further pogroms. On this the Jews at once declared themselves ready to do everything in their power to transfer their co-racials to the town district of Viriampol which was intended as a Jewish Ghetto and with the greatest possible speed. This own district lies in the triangle between the Mamel river and a tributary; it is connected with Kowno by one bridge only and can, therefore, easily be locked off.

In Riga the so-called "Moskau suburb" was destinated as a Ghetto. This is the worst dwelling district of Riga, already now mostly inhabited

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by Jews. The transfer of the Jews into the Ghetto-district proved rather difficult because the Latvians dwelling in that district had to be evacuated and residential space in Riga is very crowded. 24.000 of the 28.000 Jews living in Riga have been transferred into the Ghetto so far. In creating the Ghetto, the Security Police restricted themselves to more policing duties, while the establishment and administration of the Ghetto as well as the regulation of the food supply for the inmates of the Ghetto were left to Civil Administration; the Labor Offices were left in charge of Jewish labor.

In the other towns with a larger Jewish population Ghettos shall be established likewise.

(original page 34)

Marking of the Jews by a yellow star, to be worn on the breast and the back which was ordered in the first instance by provisional orders of the Security Police, was carried out within a short time on the basis of regulations issued by the Commander of the Rear Area and later by the Civil Administration.

The number of Jews executed up to the present may be seen in the
encl. 8 schedule on encl. 8.

Original pages 35, 36 deal with:

24) Counteractions against partisans."

(Irrelevant)

The concluding sentence reads:

"Copies of the latest experience reports are attached as encl. 9."
encl. 9 (This enclosure reveals the name of the Commander of the Action-Group:)
"Dr. STAHLECKER, SS-Brigade Commander and Major-General of the Police".

(original page 37)

"5) Other jobs of the Security Police.

1) Occasionally the conditions prevailing in the lunatic asylums necessitated operations of the Security Police. Many institutions had been robbed by the retreating Russians of their whole food supply. Often the guard and nursing personnel had fled. The inmates of several institutions broke out and became a danger to the general security; therefore

in Aglona (Lithouania)	544 lunatics	
in Mariampol (")	109 "	and
in Magutowo (near Luga)	95 "	

were liquidated.

Sometimes authorities of the Armed Forces asked us to clean out in a similar way other institutions which were wanted as billets. However, as interests of the Security Police did not require any intervention, it was left to the authorities of the Armed Forces, to take the necessary action with their own forces.

2) The Action-Commandos dealt to a large extent with the search for persons who had been deported and with the exhumation of people who had been murdered by the Russians. For reasons of propaganda

(original page 38)

the propaganda squadrons of the Armed Forces and sometimes of the foreign press were made to participate.

In Esthonia the exhumation of Esthonians murdered by the Russians was organized more extensively. In view of the extent of the work which had been done here, a central office was established in Reval, in order to organize searches for the whereabouts of removed and murdered persons, under the systematic guidance of the Security Police.

The extent of this work is shown by the fact that from Reval alone 30.000 men had been reported missing.

(original page 39, 40.)

"III Counteraction against espionage"

Here irrelevant.

(original pages 41, 42, 43, 44)

"V. Work of the Police concerning Crime Detection."

(Here irrelevant. One sentence on page 42 shall be mentioned:)

"In order to eliminate the most heavy cases of crime until preventive measures can be introduced, professional criminals are being taken into the care of the Action-detachments and executed whenever the case warrants such measures."

(original pages 45, 46)

"B. The Old-Russian Area and White-Ruthenia"

(This chapter deals with matters of crime detection and the difficulties caused by the destruction of files etc. by the Russians. Further with counteractions against partisans:

To be quoted from page 45:)

"Action-Group B liquidated so far 7.620 Jews in Borrissow."

(original pages 47-61)

"III. Report on the Situation

A. Report concerning the Situation before the Invasion by German Armed Forces."

(This chapter gives a general survey on political, racial, cultural, industrial etc. conditions before and during the occupation by Soviet Russia, of the Baltic countries.

Here irrelevant.)

(original page 61)

"B. General conditions in the inhabited areas"

(Introduction continued on pages 62, 63

They contain some criticisms against the German civil administration, which in the opinion of the reporter, do not follow a clear line. Report on general political ideas prevailing the Baltic countries. Here

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irrelevant.)

(original page 63 continued:)

"A. The Situation in Lithouania

As the population did not receive any information with regard to their future fate, the national-minded part (sc. of the population) is still thinking of a future Lithouanian State of their own. No effort can be noticed to approach the Lithouanian people to the German peoples." (The ideas of the national-minded Lithouanians are explained in some detail, which are irrelevant. This extends to page 64.

(original page 64)

(see preceding page.) One paragraph may be quoted:

"The active anti-Semitism which flared up quickly after the German occupation did not falter. Lithouanians are voluntarily and untiringly at our disposal for all measures against Jews, sometimes they even execute such measures on their own."

(The remainder of page 64 and pages 65, 66 deal with administrative and university matters. The last par. of original page 66 reads:)

"The faculties of Arts and Sciences should be closed altogether. There is some need though for the Medical faculty and some of the technical branches. More than 60% of the dentists were Jews; more than 50% of the other doctors as well. The disappearance of these brings about an extreme shortage of doctors which cannot be overcome even by bringing in doctors from the Reich."

(Original pages 67, 68, 69, 70 deal with further general questions of education, pages etc. Here irrelevant.)

(original page 71)

"B) The Situation in Latvia"

(pages 72, 73 deal with general political questions, here irrelevant. Continuing this chapter, page 74 reads):

"In Courland the ordinance of the Naval Commander in Libau, Captain Dr. KAVELMACHER of the German Navy had caused some unrest. This ordinance announced measures of reprisal against the population of Libau in case of attacks against German soldiers. It reads as follows:

'For each and every case of a known or unknown culprit firing on German soldiers, certain people of Libau shall be arrested and shot at once under Martial Law.' 'Similarly' runs the ordinance 'for each and every attempt of sabotage whether effective or not, part of the Latvian population living near the place of the act of sabotage shall be arrested and shot under Martial Law'. This ordinance was published in the Libau paper "Das Kurlaendische Wort". The Libau population is quite excited, as may be understood. The fear is abroad that further actions may be provoked by hostile people (Communist or Jewish)...."

(The remainder is irrelevant; it deals with the annulation of the ordinance.

(original pages 75 to 80 incl)

deal further with administrative, legal, economic etc. matters. Here irrelevant.)

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(original pages 90 to 104 incl)

"C. The Situation in Esthonia"

(General report generally about economic, cultural, political and racial matters, but are here irrelevant.

(original pages 104 (cont.) 105, 106)

"D. The Situation in White-Ruthenia."

Here irrelevant.

(Original pages 107 to 133 incl.)

"C. Jewish Influence on the General Conditions in the Eastern Territories

(General report of the "Jewish Question" in the Baltic countries with some statistical figures in terms generally used by the Nazis. No facts about the activities of the Security Police or other German authorities. Therefore here irrelevant.)

(original pages 134 to 143 incl.)

"IV. Nuisances and Suggestions for Changes"

(deal with administrative suggestions. Here irrelevant.)

"Table of Enclosures

Enclosures 1.a. Survey of the whole Personnel of the Action-Group A.

1.b. Map of Distribution of the Members of Action-Group A on action commandos.

2. (Headquarters) of Commanders of Action-Group.

3. Lines of Advance of Action-Group A.

4. Strength and Distribution of the Auxiliary Police.

5. Figures on Prison-Inmates.

6. Special Report on the GPU in Latvia.

7. Survey of the Supreme Authorities of the Esthonian Socialist Soviet-Republic.

8. Report on the Number of Executions.

9. Report on Experiences in Counteractions against Partisans.

10. Schedule concerning Organization and Distribution of departments of the Crime Detective Force in Latvia.

11. Report on the Work of the Crime Detective Force in Latvia.

12. Schedule of the Crime Detective Force in Esthonia.

13. The Peoples of the Baltic Countries.

14. Map showing Employees in the Baltic Countries according to Economic Branches.

15. Number of Employees of the Main Economic Groups in the Baltic Countries.

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16. Number and Distribution of Jewish Population in the Areas.

17. Share of the Jews in the Economy.

18. Share of Jews in Number of Latvian Trade Establishments.

Encl. 1 a

Total Strength of Action Group A

Total:	990	
Waffen - SS	340	34.4%
Motor Bicycle-Riders	172	17.4%
Administration	18	1.8%
Security Service (SD)	35	3.5%
Criminal Police (Kripo)	41	4.1%
State Police (Gestapo)	89	9.0%
Auxiliary Police	87	8.8%
Order Police	133	13.4%
Female Employees	13	1.3%
Interpreters	51	5.1%
Teleprinter-Operators	3	0.3%
Wireless-Operators	8	0.8%

Enclosure 1 b

Composition of the Action-detachments

Action-detachments	1 b		1 b		2		3	
Interpreters	15	13.7%	6	5.4%	18	10.8%	8	5.6%
Wireless-) Operators)	2	1.9%	1	0.9%	2	1.2%	1	0.7%
Teleprinter-) Operators)						1.8%		
Reservists	25	24%	26	23.7%	41	23.6%	32	22.9%
Motorbicycle-) Riders)	23	22.1%	34	30.9%	50	29.4%	34	24.3%
Administration	3	2.9%	2	1.8%	4	2.4%	1	0.7%
Security-) Service)	3	7.8%	3	2.7%	8	4.8%	10	7.%
Criminal) Police)	11	10.5%	6	5.4%	13	7.8%	10	7.%
State Police) Gestapo)	18	16.2%	12	11.%	26	15.6%	29	20.6%
Auxiliary) Police)			20	18.2%			15	10.5%
Female) Employees)	1	0.9%			4	2.4%	1	0.7%

Composition of the Action-detachments (continued)

Action-detachments	1b	1 b	2		3
	105	110	170	*)	141

*) addition in original is incorrect.

Enclosure 2

For maps showing "Headquarters of the Commanders", on 1 July 1941, 1 August 1941, 1 September 1941, 1 October 1941 "Number of Commanders (without administration, interpreters, Armed-SS and Uniformed Police." (Irrelevant)

Enclosure 3.

May showing "Lines of advance of Action-Group A." (Irrelevant)

Enclosure 4.

"Strength and Distribution of Latvian Auxiliary Police" (Irrelevant)

Enclosure 5.

Occupation of Prisons.

Page 1: Prisons in Lithouania

Action-detachment 3 at present in ascertaining the number of occupants of prisons in Lithouania.
In Kowne are under arrest:

in the central prison	520 persons, including 50 Jews
in the police prison	69 persons, including 3 Jews

Page 2: Prisons in Latvia"

Schedule headings read:
"Prisons, political prisoners Criminal prisoners"
(Irrelevant)

Page 3: Prisoners in Esthonia

(Gives number of inmates. Irrelevant)

Enclosure 6 is missing.

Enclosure 7 concerning the Supreme Authorities and services of the Esthonian Soviet-Republic is irrelevant here.

Enclosure 8 Survey of the number of executed persons.

	Area	Jews	Communists	Total
	Kowno town and surroundings (land)	31.914	80	31.994
Lithouania	Schaulen	41.382	763	42.145
	Wilna	7.015	17	7.032
		80.311	860	81.171

Enclosure 8 Survey of the number of executed persons. (cont'd)

	Area	Jews	Communists	Total
	Riga town and surroundings (land)			6.378
Latvia	Mitau			3.576
	Libau			11.860
	Wolmar			.209
	Dueanaburg	9.256	589	9.845
		30.025	1.843	31.868
Esthonia		474	684	1.158
White-Ruthenia		7.620		7.620
Total:	Lithouania	80.311	860	81.171
	Latvia	30.025	1.845	31.868
	Esthonia	474	684	1.158
	White-Ruthenia	7.620	---	7.620
		118.430	3.387	121.817

to be added to these figures:

In Lithouania and Latvia Jews annihilated by pogroms	5.500
Jews, Communists and partisans executed in old-Russian area	2.000
Lunatics executed	748
	122.455
Communists and Jews liquidated by State Pol. and Security Service Tilsit during search actions	5.502
	135.567

Map showing "Number of persons liquidated in the Baltic countries as per 25.10.1941"

The following figures have been entered into the map:

District of Libau	in area of Courland:	11.860
District of Mitau	in area of Semgslen:	3.576
District of Riga town	in area of	6.378
" "	" " " Livland:	209
" " Fellin		1.158
" " Dueanburg	" " " Lettgslen:	9.845
	" " " Shcaulen:	42.145
" " Kowno		31.994
	" " " Wilna-land:	7.032

Additionally pogroms

in Lithouania and Latvia about	:	5.500
border area Lithouania	:	5.502

Enclosure 9: Report on Activities and Experience in Counteractions against Partisans." First Report:

17.7.1941

"Action Group A of the
Security Police and the
Security Service.
(Gen-) Staff

Report on activities and Experiences in Counteractions against Partisans.

When it was decided to extend the German operations to Leningrad and also to extend the activities of Action Group A to this town, I gave orders on 18 July 1941 to parts of Action Detachments 2 and 3 and to the Staff of the Group to advance to Novosselje, in order to prepare these activities and to be able to advance as early as possible into the area around Leningrad and into the city itself. The advance of the forces of Action Group A which were intended to be used for Leningrad, wad effected in agreement with and on the express wish of Panzer-Group 4.

The detachment which was formed for action towards Leningrad was trained for operations in Leningrad during the first days after the advance to Novosselje. However, as an advance to Leningrad is not to be expected at the time planned previously, the parts of Action detachments 2 and 3 which were concentrated in Novosselje were used for extensive operations of cleansing and pacifying in the area of Panzer-Group 4, in agreement with this Group. This is done mainly in the area limited by the connection-line between Pog-Gora-Novosselje-Osjerjewo.

(original page 2)

In their operations it was inten/ded to arrest in the first instance any remaining Communist functionaries, and other active Communists and Jews. As nearly all Jews and Communist functionaries had fled with the retreating Soviet forces, only 6 Jews and 10 Connumists were arrested and executed."

(The remainder of page 2, and pages 3, 4, and 5 deal with general descriptions of working conditions of the Group and of the partisans, and with counteractions in general. This is irrelevant.

(original page 5)

deals with operations to obtain intelligence of partisan-activities. Beginning on line 11 from the bottom it reads):

"At the start the following procedure was followed:

In villages, in the area where partisans had not been ascertained before, one behaved friendly towards the population. In view of the generally known shortage of bread one usually succeeded very quickly on finding one or several villagers who could be used as persons of confidence. They were promised to get bread provided they would give information concerning

(original page 6)

partisans or if they would inform the nearest units of the German Army or Police of any partisans appearing in the future. The network of information, thus built up yielded much information for the Action-Group, thus enabling them to surround more narrowly the quarters of the partisans.

There was especially information concerning villagers who had given good or provisional shelter to partisans. On the basis of these reports a great many villages were combed out. After a village had been surrounded, all the inhabitants were forcibly sheperded into one square. The persons suspected on account of confidential information and other villagers were interrogated, and thus it was possible in most cases to find the people who helped the partisans. These were either shot off-hand or if further interrogations promised useful information, taken to headquarters. After the interrogation they were shot.

In order to get a deterring effect, the houses of these who helped the partisans were burned down on several occasions. The population

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which had congregated was told of the reasons for the punitive measures. At the same time they were threatened that the whole village would be burned down if partisans were helped once more and if partisans appearing in the village were not reported as quickly as possible.

The tactics, to put terror against terror, succeeded marvellously. From fear of reprisals, the peasants came a distance of 20 km

(original page 7)

and more to the headquarters of the detachment of Action Group A on foot or on horseback in order to bring news about partisans, news which was correct in most of the cases. During the cleansing operations which were made on account of these reports, 48 helpers of partisans, including 6 women, were shot so far.

In this connection a single case may be mentioned, which proves the correctness of the principle "terror against terror". In the village of Jachnowa it was ascertained on the basis of a report made by the peasant Jemeljanow and after further interrogations and other searches that partisans had been fed in the house of Anna Prokoffjewa. The house was burnt down on 8 August 1941 at about 21 hours, and its inhabitant arrested. Shortly after midnight partisans set alight the house of the informer Jemeljanow. A detachment sent to Jachnowa on the following day ascertained that the peasant woman Ossipowa had told the partisans that Jemeljanow had made the report which had caused our action.

Ossipowa was shot and her house burnt down. Further two 16 year old youths from the village were shot because according to their own confession, they had rendered information and courier-services to the partisans. Obviously, it was on account of these punitive measures that the partisans left the forest camp near the village. The camp was found during this operation.

(original page 8, 9, 10)

give further reports and instances of activities here irrelevant.) On page 10 is the signature of "Dr. Stahlecker
ss Brigade Commander and Maj Gen of the Police."

(Second report)

"The Commander of the Security Police Riga 29.9.1941

and the Security Service
Action-Group A.

Report on Experiences in Counteractions against the Partisans."

Page 1 reports generally on partisan activities. Here irrelevant.

Page 2 ditto, the first part irrelevant. In continuing:

"Action detachment of Action Group A of the Security Police participated from the beginning in the fight against the nusance created by partisans. Close collaboration with the Armed Forces and the Exchange of experiences which were collected in the fight partisans, brought about a thorough knowledge of the origin, organization, strength, equipment and system used by the Red partisans as time went on."

(The remainder of page 2 reports more details of organization of anti-partisan activities. Here irrelevant)

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Page 3 "The main results of this work were the following:

"I. Origin and Organization of the Partisans."

(This part extending to the upper half of page 5 reports very extensively on the subject, showing clearly that the partisans were organized as fighting units under orders of the Russian State. Details irrelevant here).

Page 5, 6 "II. Equipment and Armament." (Here irrelevant)

Page 6, 7 "III. Duties and Manner of Fighting." (Here irrelevant)

Page 7. "IV. Counteractions against the Partisans."

(This chapter begins with generalities about counteractions, which are irrelevant here, continued on pages 8 and 9. After reporting on the difficulties of obtaining correct intelligence on partisans and Russian threats against informers, it continues on line 9 of Page 9.) "As it was vitally necessary, though, to obtain hints and information concerning abode and direction of the partisans from the population, the latter had to be forced by the use of the most severe measures, to supply useful information and reports. In the knowledge that the Russian has been accustomed from old to ruthless measures on the part of the authorities, the most severe measures were applied. He who helped the partisans to obtain food and shelter, rendered them information services or who have knowingly false information, was shot or hanged. Houses where partisans obtained food or shelter were burnt down. Where a larger number of villagers helped the partisans in such a way, the whole village was burnt down as punishment and in order to create terror." (The remainder of page 9, page 10 and the larger part of page 11 deal with the customary behavior of partisans to cater for their needs. Here irrelevant.)

Page 11 line 7 from the bottom: "Escaped Red Armists who have found their way through the German lines procure civilian clothes as quickly as possible and get in touch with partisans. It has been ascertained that these Red-Armies form the fighting back-bone of

(original page 12)

the partisan units. It does not seem, therefore, expedient to treat Red-Armists found in civilian clothing as prisoners of war without further ado and to collect them in prisoner-of-war camps. But an interrogation and survey has to be carried out as thoroughly as possible. It has further to be considered in each and every case, whether Red-Armists found in civilian clothes should be separated from regular prisoners of war, and should be brought into the assembly camps for civilian internees. It seems further suitable to enhort escaped Red-Armists by posters to give themselves up at the nearest Army Unit within a short time after the posting of such posters, say within 3 days. Should they not comply with this order they should be dealt with as partisans, that means they should be shot, without making such exception dependent of proof that they actually knew of the order.

To conclude, attention should be drawn to the necessity of interrogating captured partisans thoroughly before they are liquidated so that we increase our knowledge on organization, abode, strength, armament and plans of the partisans. Sometimes it may become necessary to take advantage of the opportunity to use third degree interrogation methods." (The remainder concerning wireless installations in use of the partisans and Page 13 with a general concluding remark are irrelevant)

"signéd: Dr. Stahlecker
SS-Brigade-Commander"

Enclosure 10.

Organization and Departmental Distribution of the Criminal Police in Latvia.

(with map)

irrelevant.

"Enclosure 11.

Report on the Activities of the Latvian Criminal Police."

irrelevant.

"Enclosure 12.

Organization and Departmental Distribution of the Criminal Police in Esthonia."

irrelevant.

"Enclosure 13.

Distribution of Races in the Baltic Countries."

irrelevant.

"Enclosure 14.

Distribution of persons employed in the several branches of Economy in the Baltic Countries. 1935".

irrelevant.

"Enclosure 15.

Distribution of Employed into the Main Branches of Economy in the Baltic Countries 1935."

irrelevant.

"Enclosure 16.

Number of the Jewish Population and their Distribution in the Areas. (1935)."

irrelevant.

"Enclosure 17.

Share of the Jews in Branches of Economy."

irrelevant.

"Enclosure 18.

Share of the Jews in Latvian Trade enterprises. (Value Categories) 1938."

irrelevant.

H1144-0189

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. L-180

12 November 1945.

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt., Inf., O-1335567, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. L-180.

FRED NIEBERGALL,
2nd Lt., Inf.,
O-1335567.

H1144-0190

Exhibit U.S.a. 541
Filed Jan. 4, 1946

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT I-323 (L-71)
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

"With a view to delaying the moment of discovery of surprise attack, and on account of intelligence to hand, that the Norwegian Armed Forces have orders not to oppose an English invasion by force of arms, the British war flag should be flown by all forces when putting into port until the start of disembarkation (when anchoring, making fast, or landing its first troops).

The Narvik group is an exception to this order. The Commanding Officer of the troops there, Colonel Sundlo, is pro-German, thus giving reason to expect no difficulties where he is concerned, if the German flag is flown when running into harbour".

H1144-0191

Subject: "Weserübung Nord".

Operation Order for the Occupation of Norway

(Copy with inserted cover leaves 1 - 4)

The Führer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has issued orders to carry out all measures to occupy Norway with part forces of the three services, when the situation in Scandinavia demands it. (Weserübung North)".

Entry in the War Diary of the C-in-C of the Navy (Naval War Staff) on "Weserübung".

1) 10th October 1939. First reference of the C-in-C of the Navy (Naval War Staff), when visiting the Führer, to the significance of Norway for sea and air warfare. The Führer intends to give the matter consideration.

12th December 1939. Führer received Q and H.

Subsequent instructions to the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces to make mental preparations. The C-in-C of the Navy is having an essay prepared, which will be ready in January. With reference to this essay, Kapitaen zur see Krancke "Weserübung".

During the time which followed, H maintained contact with the Chief of Staff of the C-in-C of the Navy. His aim was to develop the Party Q with a view to making it capable of making a coup, and to give the Supreme Command of the Navy information on political developments in Norway and military questions. In general he pressed for a speeding-up of preparations, but considered that it was first necessary to expand the organization. The support which had been promised him in the form of money and coal was set in motion only very slowly and came in small quantities, and he repeatedly complained about this. It was not until the end of March that Q considered the coup (Aktion) so urgent that the expansion of his organization could not wait. The military advice of H were passed on to the OKW.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

CERTIFICATE OF PARTIAL TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. L-323

17 November 1945.

I, BETTY D. RICHARDSON, P/O, W.R.N.S., 66370, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct partial translation of Document No. L-323.

BETTY D. RICHARDSON
P/O, W.R.N.S.
66370.

H1144-0192

Exhibit USA 156
Filed Jan. 7, 1946

D-411

UK 81

UK 81

SECRET.

12th Infantry Division

Int. Sec. No. 607/41 Secret

Int 54/816/41 Secr.
Received 27th November, 1941.

Div. H.Q. 26th Nov. 1941

Subject: Protection of troops against Partisans and Sabotage.

To: The General Command of H.Q.
2nd Army Corps - Ic.

Enclosed the divisional intelligence section sends a secret order dated 17th November, 1941 concerning combatting of partisans. For information.

For Div. H.Q.
Chief of the General Staff

(Signed) WEISER (?)

Adj.

1 enclosure.

(309)

H1144-0193

SECRET

12th Infantry Division
Section Ic/Ia/Adj. No. 607/41 sch.

Div. H.Q. 17th Nov., 1941.

Subject: Protection of Troops against Partisans and Sabotage.

Reference: C.-i-C. Army - Gen. Staff of the Army. "Ausb." section (Ia) No. 1900/41 dated 25th October, 1941.

I. The conduct of the troops in the Eastern territories (see enclosure: secret order by Field Marshal v. Reichenau, dated 10th October, 1941)

II. Herewith enclosure 1, a blueprint of a captured map 1:100.000 Sheet no. O-36-XI (West) DEMJANSK (the original has not been sent to H.Q. 2nd Army Corps)

This print contains the defence areas alloted to regiments and independant detachments of the Division.

The Commanders of the units in question are responsible for the carrying and of the cleaning up of partisans in these areas and their permanent control. They regulate the employment of troops a t their disposal in the area. In case of the appearance of partisans, Ic and neighbour will be notified. The anti-tank company in IGOGHEWO and 12 Detachment of the field military police - excluding the squad attached to the Adjutant - will be at the disposal of Quartermaster Section in their area.

2. The surrounding area of villages, paths and roads will be kept under control also at night by patrols and occasional snap controls.

3. The Commanders will consider the employment of local commanders in the occupied villages and will submit their names to the division.

In all places of their defence area even when not occupied, after scrutinising the local conditions, village elders (natschalniks) will be installed, if this has not yet been done. The notifications handed out by the Ic Section of the division will be hung up even in places which are not occupied. The exhibition of these notifications must be constantly checked.

4. The village-elders will be directed to compile lists of the population in which all strangers - with the date of their arrival - will be shown particularly. The houses of every place are to be numbered in an easily visible manner, and the number of their inhabitants to be listed with special columns for men, women and children. Check through snap roll calls. Strangers will be reported to the competent Command by the village elders. Collective punitive measures will be carried out immediately for non-compliance with these orders (in serious cases the shooting of the responsible inhabitants, in lighter cases their arrest and the confiscation of foodstuff etc.) For this the order of a Commander (C.O. BN) is necessary.

5. The travelling of Russians - men, women or children - on roads will be stopped. The leaving of villages is allowed only in exceptional cases (of economic nature) with the written approval of the Garrison Commander. Such permits must bear the date of the day, the route to be covered and place to be visited. The validity of the pa ss will on principle be not longer than one day. A record of issued permits is to be kept. The permits will be returned on the day of expiration. Threat of penalties for the non-

returning of permits! All persons found on the high roads without a permit will be arrested. Every soldier has the duty of arresting civilians. Caution when approaching. Every suspected civilian in the battle area will be ruthlessly shot.

6. Civilians living in dug-outs in the woods will be accommodated in inhabited localities or in certain cases in dugouts in the emmediate vicinity of inhabited localities.

7. The following will be shot as partisans: Russian soldiers in uniform and mufti who did not report to the nearest garrison command or to the military authorities by 20.11. and those civilians who are found on the high roads without a permit and who do not belong to the nearest village.

Apart from that, those civilians found in possession of arms of any kind or explosives.

8. The population is to be encouraged to co-operate - by rewards. (see special orders concerning supplies No.60 dated 30 August 1941).

9. The shooting or hanging of partisans and such elements who support partisans and who are in possession of arms will take place in the locality where they have been encounted. If possible, persons concerned should be interrogated first - about their organisation and leaders.

Special distribution 39.

H1144-0194

H1144-0195

Appendix to 12 Inf.Div. I.c/Adj.
No. 607/41 Secret date 17.11.1941.

Copy of a Copy.

High Command of the Army
Gen. Staff of the Army/Quarter
Master General Branch Admin.

(Qu.4/B)

II. 7498/41 g.

H.Qu. High Command
of the Army
28.10.41.

SECRET!

Subject:

Conduct of Troops in the Eastern Territories

By order of the C.in.C. Army, an enclosed copy of an order by G.O.C. 6th Army on the conduct of the Troops in eastern territories which has been described by the Fuhrer as excellent, is being forwarded with the request to issue corresponding instructions on the same lines if this has not already been done.

By order.

(Signed) Wagner

H1144-0196

Army H.Q., 10.10.41

Army Command 6.
Sec. Ia - A.H.7

SECRET!

Subject: Conduct of Troops in Eastern Territories.

Regarding the conduct of troops towards the bolshevistic system, vague ideas are still prevalent in many cases. The most essential aim of war against the Jewish - bolshevistic system is a complete destruction of their means of power and the elimination of asiatic influence from the European culture. In this connection the troops are facing tasks which excede the onesided routine of soldiering. The soldier in the eastern territories is not merely a fighter according to the rules of the art of war but also a bearer of ruthless national ideology and the avenger of bestialities which have been inflicted upon German and racially related nations.

Therefore the soldier must have full understanding for the necessity of a severe but just revenge on subhuman Jewry. The Army has to aim at another purpose i.e. the annihilation of revolts in hinterland which, as experience proves, have always been caused by Jews.

The combatting of the enemy behind the front line is still not being taken seriously enough. Treacherous, cruel partisans and unnatural women are still being made prisoners of war and guerilla fighters dressed partly in uniforms or plain clothes and vagabonds are still being treated as proper soldiers, and sent to prisoner of war camps. In fact, captured Russian officers talk even mockingly about Soviet agents moving openly about the roads and very often eating at German field kitchens. Such an attitude of the troops can only be explained by complete thoughtlessness, so it is now high time for the commanders to clarify the meaning of the present struggle.

The feeding of the natives and of prisoners of war who are not working for the Armed Forces from Army kitchens is an equally misunderstood humanitarian act as is the giving of cigarettes and bread. Things which the people at home can spare under great sacrifices and things which are bing brought by the Command to the front under great difficulties, should not be given to the enemy by the soldier not even if they originate from booty. It is an important part of our supply.

When retreating the Soviets have often set buildings on fire. The troops should be interested in extinguishing of fires only as far as it is necessary to secure sufficient numbers of billets. Otherwise the disappearance of symbols of the former bolshevistic rule even in the form of buildings is part of the struggle of distruction. Neither historic nor artistic considerations are of any importance in the eastern territories. The command issues the necessary directives for the securing of raw materials and plants, essential for war economy. The complete disarming of the civil population in the rear of the fighting troops is imperative considering the long and vulnerable lines of communications. Where possible, captured weapons and ammunition should be stored and guarded. Should this be impossible because of the situation of the battle so the weapons and ammunition will be rendered useless. If isolated partisans are found using firearm in the rear of the army drastic measures are to be taken. These measures will be extended to that part of the male population who were in a position to hinder or report the attacks. The indifference of numerous apparently anti-soviet elements which originates from a "wait and see" attitude, must give way to a clear decision for active collaboration. If not, no one can complain about being judges and treated a member of the Soviet System.

H1144-0197

The fear of the German counter-measures must be stronger than the threats of the wandering bolshevistic remnants. Being far from all political considerations of the future the soldier has to fulfil two tasks:

1) Complete annihilation of the false bolshevistic doctrine of the Soviet State and its armed forces.

2) The pitiless extermination of foreign treachery and cruelty and thus the protection of the lives of military personnel in Russia.

This is the only way to fulfil our historic task to liberate the German people once for ever from the Asiatic-Jewish danger.

Commander in Chief
(Signed) von Reichenau
Field Marshal.

Certified Copy:
signed (illegible)
Captain.

(814)

File Copy

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Vol. II

GENERAL STAFF AND HIGH COMMAND GROUP

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H1144-0198